The First Carlisle Sir James Hay, First Earl of Carlisle as Courtier, Diplomat and Entrepreneur, 1580-1636

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The First Carlisle

Sir James Hay, First Earl of Carlisle as Courtier, Diplomat and Entrepreneur, 1580–1636

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THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

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Abbreviations

A.P.C.	Acts of the Privy Council
B.L.	British Library
B.S.B.	Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
C.S.P.D.	Calendar of State Papers, Domestic
C.S.P. Ven.	Calendar of State Papers, Venetian
Eg. MS.	Egerton Manuscript
Harl. MS.	Harleian Manuscript
H.H.S.	Haus-Hof und Staats Archiv
H.M.C.	Historical Manuscripts Commission
H.L.R.O.	House of Lords Record Office
N.S.	New style dating
P.R.O.	Public Record Office

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INTRODUCTION

Initially James Hay, first Earl of Carlisle, a little known seventeenth-century Scotsman, seems an unlikely candidate for a biography. Hay, however, was a key figure in the early Stuart era. Unlike the vast majority of Scots who entered England with James I, Hay absorbed the culture of the southern nation and tried to become a genuine part of it. He did so in order to play an important role for his adopted country on both the national and international level. Yet he was aware of the dangers that such a choice involved, and he chose to play a carefully crafted part that kept him away from the center of political attention. Although he was one of the chief courtiers for thirty years and one of the king's leading foreign policy advisers for nearly twenty, he always refused to either establish a faction or to become the monarch's leading minister. He had opportunities to do both. Hay preferred a position once removed from the first rank. Such a role did not mean, however, that he lacked ambition, or the will to be heard. He had no secret desire to live a quiet life in the country. Clearly Hay sought influence with those who had power, and, as his career well demonstrates, he found it. For more than three decades Hay was at the right hand of those who made the decisions, and politely advised them on what to decide.

What Hay said was of no small consequence to the course of British history, for in time he assumed the role of extraordinary ambassador and was the man on the spot who did the negotiating. In practice his views mattered a very great deal. Between 1616 and 1629 Hay conducted embassies to virtually every major Western European nation. In the process he came to know their rulers and their public ministers better than most of his contemporaries did. Of equal importance, he did not begrudge others his experience; by the time he completed his final embassy, a large number of England's diplomats either had been in his service or had worked with him as an associate. When it came to advice on foreign policy, there were few who could match his expertise.

Throughout his career, Hay was not merely indulging some egocentric whim to stand at the center of European events. He had defined policy goals that he wished to see instituted. During most of his life, like so many of his Scottish compatriots, he wanted to preserve close ties between France and Britain, but his designs were more complex than that. Although the tradition of the "Auld Alliance" no doubt played a large role in forming this desire, the apparent danger of Roman Catholic imperialism, especially as represented by the Habsburgs, was his primary motivation for wanting the support of the relatively tolerant French monarchy. After an abortive

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attempt in 1616, Hay had apparently achieved his goal in 1625 when he negotiated a marriage treaty and alliance for Charles I. Meanwhile, the Thirty Years War had changed all previous calculations, and Stuart England found itself involved in the war whether it wanted such a role or not. As a result Hay's immediate goals, if not his long term policy, shifted. His principal concern became the restoration of the English princess, Elizabeth, and her German husband, Frederick, to their Palatinate homeland. It was one of the monumental ironies of Hay's life that, just as he reached a level of prestige and importance that enabled him to influence English foreign policy in the desired direction, his master, with Hay's early prodding, stumbled into one of the most disastrous policies ever conceived: simultaneous war with Spain and France. As a result, Hay found himself caught in a variety of shifting foreign and domestic alliances that even led him, briefly, into the Spanish Habsburg camp.

It is a commonplace of the early seventeenth century that it was a faction-ridden era. Given Hay's defined set of political goals and his reluctance to seek the political limelight, it should come as no surprise that his relationship with the established political factions lacked permanence. When it came to factional loyalties, he was a "trimmer." It was a pattern he established early in his career, and undoubtedly from his perspective, it was the most intelligent, though not the easiest, approach. It would have been natural for him to have remained associated with the other Scots who came to England with James I, but he took pains to separate from them even while remaining true to their pro-French sentiments. He had the wit to perceive that he was now operating in a different context in which the English would predominate. Therefore he changed his style and not only married English wives, but also adopted English ways. After his transformation, however, Hay did not rush into any of the native groupings. Although he had no objection to working with various factions, he only did so as long as they served his political ends. As one might expect, most frequently he was associated with the anti-Spaniards such as Abbot and Pembroke, but, if he felt the political necessity, he could also work with Arundel, Laud and Wentworth. His only permanent attachment was to the king, with a sidelong nod in the direction of the leading minister of the moment. It is the essence of the man that in the midst of these changing factional loyalties, he seldom made enemies. His charm, his tact and his elegance saw him through the major crises of his career.

Perhaps the major reason for Hay's success was that he understood his own strengths and weaknesses and was able to convince his masters to make use of the one while ignoring the other. He began by relying upon his aesthetic sensibilities to advance in the royal service, and the first Stuart king of England responded by making him Master of the Robes and then of the Wardrobe. James also took no notice of the huge deficits that appeared in the departments shortly after Hay began to manage them. Yet, over

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the long run, it was his tact that the king needed most, and gradually Hay had his chance at diplomacy and with it, genuine political influence.

Since James fancied himself as the "Peacemaker of Europe," and since Charles desperately needed all the allies he could find in his early ventures as a warrior king, Hay had more than ample opportunity to exercise his talents. Beginning in 1618, the Austrian Habsburgs, with the not altogether wholehearted support from their Spanish cousins, increased their strength at the expense of the Protestant Germans and their allies. During this time, France was suffering from the aftereffects of a minority rule, religious conflicts with the Huguenots, and aristocratic rebellions. As a result, despite Hay's efforts and desires, the French could be of little help in offsetting the aggressive designs of the Catholic Habsburgs. Yet with Dutch assistance, various German states, the Danes and the Swedes all tried to throw back the Austrians and their supporters. None truly succeeded. Because of the nature of its government and the related problems of financing ambitious international ventures, England participated sporadically and ineffectually in making both peace and war. About 1635, at the very end of Hay's life, he saw his old ally, France, now under the direction of Cardinal Richelieu, begin a more successful challenge to Habsburg power. No one was more surprised than Hay at this development, for he and the cardinal seemed to have little in common during the negotiations to make Henrietta Maria Queen of England. Not having the power of foresight, Hay did not always manage to pick his way through these alterations in the continental scene successfully. Yet whatever his errors, it is an undeniable fact that he was at the center of England's reactions to them for two vital decades.

Hay was at the center of another phenomenon of his time, and in terms of the history of England, one of equal importance. He was the model in almost all respects of the new aristocrat that James was creating in his southern kingdom. His lesser gentry origins, his emphasis on civilian government employment (as opposed to the military), his devotion to the court over the country and his ardent entrepreneurship all single him out as a Jacobean aristocrat.

In studying Hay and producing a book about him, it would have been a great help if a large body of personal papers had survived through which one could track the man's life and thoughts. Unfortunately such is not the case. Therefore it should amaze no one to discover that the nature of this work was shaped by the existing sources. As a result, the concentration is upon Hay's diplomacy, political matters in which he played a role and his finances. A glance at the footnotes should indicate that a reasonably wide search was conducted for such papers. Given the relatively small number of books that are devoted to especially the first of these areas by British historians, such an emphasis should not do the profession a disservice. What it does mean, however, is that those who are looking for a detailed analysis of privy council actions, parliamentary politics, religious conflicts or shifting factions are likely to be disappointed. But for those

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who are looking for a narrative study of a courtier who rose to play a major influential role in Britain's relations with the continent and who received large rewards for performing these services, this story should meet their needs.

Acknowledgments

I have received direct help from a large number of people, and, whenever possible, their names are mentioned in footnotes. There were also several people who agreed to read all or part of this work and to offer me their advice. Roger Lockyer, Conrad Russell, Albert Loomie, Linda Peck, Carla Hoffman, and Stephen Porter all helped me and saved me from some serious oversights. So did my father. In addition I owe a special thanks to Vivian and Linda McIver who braved the perils of Italian court hand and the Dublin archives to arrange microfilming for me. I should also like to thank the Duke of Devonshire, the Marquis of Downshire, Lord Fitzwilliam, the Duke of Northumberland and Lord Sackville who put their papers at my disposal. In addition the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Research and Development Committee of Indiana University at South Bend both have contributed needed funds. Finally, there is my wife, Sally, who lived jointly with me and the Earl of Carlisle for the past ten years. She has heard every word of this biography read aloud at some truly extraordinary times. To her I dedicate this book.

A Note on Dating and Quotations

Following what has become the accepted convention, all dates in this book will follow the older, Julian calendar. Any exceptions will be indicated by the abbreviation: N.S. The new year will, however, be reckoned as January first. The spelling in quotations will follow the seventeenth-century models from which they are drawn, but punctuation and capitalization follow modern usage.

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I. JAMES I

Beginnings

It was a common sight at Whitehall during the first thirty years of Stuart rule in England to see the servants of James Hay, first Earl of Carlisle prepare for a banquet. Twenty or twenty-five covered dishes at one time were carried from the kitchen across the courtyard to the banqueting hall. The richly dressed gentlemen-waiters performing this function were preceded by a steward and followed by a clerk. Everyone was bareheaded, and they would make many such journeys during the course of serving this semi-regal meal. At one major feast one hundred cooks, of whom forty were masters, worked for eight days preparing the food. A grand total of sixteen hundred dishes was not unknown, and the quality of the fare matched its abundance: a gross of larks, whole fresh salmon served two and three to the dish, as well as sturgeon, some exceeding six feet in length. Pairs of swans and of pigs, each pair served in a single dish, were brought forth, as well as a gross of pheasants.[1]

This kind of extravagance overwhelmed even the most jaded, worldly-wise observers of the early seventeenth century English court, which was, of course, exactly what Carlisle had in mind. His lifelong sense of the magnificent lasted even after his death. Virtually all the noblemen in London turned out in May 1636 to see his funeral procession at the end of which his remains were placed in the choir of old St. Paul's Cathedral next to Sir Philip Sidney's.

If all the grandeur with which James Hay was buried was true to his life, so, too, was its aftermath. A large number of the servants who marched in the funeral procession sued Hay's executors for their back wages; the earl's all too numerous creditors were not slow to put in their claims as well. To their dismay they discovered that Carlisle had conveyed away most of his property on his deathbed. Many of them, who had already waited ten years and more for payment, had to wait yet another decade before the second Earl of Carlisle was forced to honor debts that had grown from £11,000 to £34,000.[2]

Grandeur and debt were the two themes that consistently ran through Hay's life, and his achievements in both areas left his contemporaries

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[1] *The Autobiography of Thomas Raymond,* 24, and *The Letters of John Chamberlain,* 2: 333–34.

[2] A schedule of debts allowed by the right honorable James Earle of Carlisle, MS. 736, Trinity College, Dublin, and *Calendar of Treasury Papers, 1556/7-1696,* 12.

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breathless and groping for words. His banquets, his clothes, his extraordinary embassies amazed the British and the continentals in equal measure. Clarendon estimated that Hay spent above £400,000 in his roughly thirty years in England.[3] If anything, including both public departments and private grants, this estimate is on the modest side. What is particularly notable about the money for personal use is that it was derived almost exclusively from the grants and favors of the first two Stuart kings. So, too, of course, were the funds allocated for the running of the royal departments that Hay directed, the robes and the wardrobe, as well as for the extraordinary embassies he performed. Nevertheless, the profusion with which he disbursed the crown's money was scarcely less generous than that of his own funds. In one relatively quiet year, Michaelmas 1614 to Michaelmas 1615, he over-spent the money allotted the wardrobe by 75 per cent.[4]

Given the position Hay attained and the life he led, one might well expect him to come from one of the great aristocratic families. In fact, his beginnings were modest. During the fifteenth century his branch of the Hay family had broken off from the senior line which held the earldom of Errol. James Hay's father, also called James, was a second son and settled at Pitcorthie in Fifeshire. His mother was most likely Margaret Murray and came from an equally unassuming background. He was born about 1580.[5] There were two younger children as well, Robert and Agnes, both of whom survived until adulthood.[6] Information on the future earl's early life is virtually non-existent, but some facts can be pieced together.

Though there is no record of Hay having attended a Scottish university, somewhere in his life he learned to speak fluent French, Latin, and adequate Italian. Whether he acquired his language skills on a grand tour or by some other means is not known. One source claimed he was actually a member of Henri IV's Scots Guards.[7] About the only feature of Hay's early life that has the general agreement of his contemporaries is that he spent part of it in France. It was indeed a Frenchman who started him on the way to preferment in his own country.

Hay's first patron was Charles Cauchon de Maupas, Baron du Tour.[8] The baron was a highly talented French diplomat who was sent over to Scotland in the summer of 1602 and succeeded in ingratiating himself with James in a manner that was not duplicated by another diplomat for many years.[9] Hay apparently returned to his native country with the

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[3] Edward, Earl of Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England,* 78.

[4] Wardrobe expenses, EN M1124, Sackville MS., Kent Record Office.

[5] *The Scots Peerage founded on Wood's edition of Sir Robert Douglass's Peerage of Scotland,* 5: 218. The elder James also married a widow named Barclay and it is possible one or more of the children are hers. Alexander H. Miller, *Fife: Pictorial and Historical,* 1: 401.

[6] *The Scots Peerage,* 4: 218, 244.

[7] Walter Wood, *The East Neuk of Fife: its histories and antiquities,* 393.

[8] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 52.

[9] *Papiers d'état . . . Relatifs à l'Histoire de l'Écosse au XVI^e Siècle,* 3: 715 note.

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ambassador, and it is not unreasonable to assume that he was the young Scottish gentleman sent to gather a suitable escort for the baron as he crossed from English into Scottish territory.[10]

In May of the next year, perhaps as a favor to the departing du Tour, Hay was made a Gentleman of the Privy Chamber, and, at the behest of Queen Anne, he was elevated to the bedchamber in early August.[11] In October 1603, Hay made his first recorded appearance in England. Some time before that event, he was made a knight in Scotland, but the surviving records give no date. It is also unknown by what means or when Hay arrived in England. It is possible that he came from France rather than Scotland; his first entry point into English records was the port town of Southampton. Yet, since he was part of a mixed group of English and Scottish courtiers passing through the town on their way to Salisbury where James I was on progress,[12] it seems unlikely he had made a separate journey. It is fortunate there is that much notice of him in these early months for, aside from a rather obscure indication to the contrary among Francis Bacon's papers, there is no sign from this period that Hay was any more noteworthy than the rest of the Scottish courtiers and officials.[13]

As far as the English were concerned all of these Scots were the same, a pack of hungry beggars who had come to make their fortunes in the south at the southerners' expense. As Hay's career demonstrates, that perception had more than a little truth to it, but it is a mistake to make a single group of all the Scots. They were divided in a variety of ways. There were several who were primarily civil servants, men such as Sir George Home who became Earl of Dunbar and Edward Bruce, Lord Kinloss. These men had been James's government officials for years, and he trusted them. Yet even here there is a division, for Home's primary focus was on Scottish matters whereas Bruce, besides becoming an English privy councilor, also became the English Master of the Rolls and devoted his attentions to the new kingdom. The courtiers also had similar divisions. John Erskine, Earl of Mar, came to England only briefly whereas his relative, Sir Thomas Erskine, remained at the royal court all his life.

Hay was part of a younger generation of Scots, born since James came to his mother's throne, who therefore had no time to establish themselves in the public eye before the move was made to England. More important, perhaps, to their lives, James had not singled any of them out for special interest immediately before becoming the English king, but by the winter of 1603, Hay was noticed. By December, along with the Englishman, Philip Herbert, the king gave him a license to export three thousand broadcloths

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[10] Ibid., 718.

[11] *H.M.C. 11th Report, Part 3, The manuscripts of the Corporations of Southampton and King's Lynn,* 23.

[12] John Nichols, *Progresses, processions and magnificent festivities of King James the First,* 1: 247. My thanks to the Lord Lyon at Arms for the information on the Privy Chamber appointment.

[13] James Spedding, *The Letters and Life of Francis Bacon,* 4: 42.

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over the next five years. The grant was worth at least £1500 to each of them.[14] From that day onward Hay was never out of royal favor. Yet, though his growth was sudden, it certainly was much less meteoric than the two later favorites, Carr and Villiers, and it did not end in murder and tragedy.

Just what drew the king's attention to this young Scot remains uncertain. The surviving pictures of Hay come from a much later stage of his life and show a man of elegant bearing with a broad forehead and soft, doe-like eyes that tended to narrow as he grew older. His nose was wide and straight with flared nostrils, all of which tended to intensify the essentially triangular shape of his face. Perhaps James's daughter, Elizabeth, summed up Hay best. She addressed him in her letters as "Camel-face." Judging from later royal choices of favorites, the king was inclined to men of grace and agility, a clear case of opposites attracting. From all reports Hay possessed these qualities in ample measure, plus a special kind of charm that comes from the enjoyment of life while not taking it too seriously.

The form that James's favor took toward this graceful and charming young man, besides that of providing financial reward, was to provide opportunity for display. The means chosen in early 1604 was to send Hay into France on a special mission to Henri IV. The journey's purpose, or rather its real purpose, was a matter for some speculation. In March 1604 peace had not yet been concluded with Spain ending the Elizabethan wars. The French had no great interest in seeing such a treaty signed, and the Spanish were thus nervous that James might have second thoughts. When the man who was recognized as a prime royal favorite left the country supposedly to console Henri IV on the death of his sister, suspicions were quickly expressed.[15] In fact it is impossible to tell for certain if Hay was meant as a conduit for information or was simply satisfying a private whim that James was willing to indulge. Perhaps it was a bit of both. Hay certainly left the impression with Monsieur Beaumont, the French ambassador to England, that he would be a good private path to the English king's ear and that he was devoted to the French interest,[16] but perhaps he was only trying to make himself appear bribeworthy. Robert Cecil, England's most influential minister, assured Sir Thomas Parry, the English ambassador in France, that Hay's voyage was strictly one of compliment.[17]

Compliment and ceremony there were in great measure. Hay traveled to the French court in a royal coach accompanied by Maréchal de Vitry and ten or twelve gentlemen. One can only speculate on how different Hay's first entry into France must have been as the son of a modestly endowed Scottish gentleman. This time he met Henri IV and Queen Marie de' Medici as well as numerous other French aristocrats and was invited

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[14] December 1603, IND 6744, P.R.O. and Hay to [Buckingham], 18 August 16[20], Southampton; Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 334^{b}, B.L.

[15] *C.S.P. Ven., 1603–1607,* no. 203, p. 140.

[16] Beaumont to Henri IV, March 1604; PRO 31/3/37, fo. 70^{a-b}, P.R.O.

[17] Cecil to Parry, 5 March 1604; SP 78/51, fos. 74^{a}–75^{b}, P.R.O.

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to hunt the royal stag.[18] If the Venetian ambassador to France is correct, one discordant note was sounded during this mission. Hay pressed Henri too hard about the treatment of the Huguenots and, as a result, had his departing gift reduced to a jewel worth a mere six hundred crowns.[19] Despite this problem, the mission was a success from the young Scot's perspective. He had served his first turn as ambassador extraordinary, met those who mattered at the French court and had a taste of what putting on a grand display could be like. James gave him £300 for the embassy; he spent £6,000.[20]

Given the manner of living to which Hay was all too rapidly growing accustomed, it was clear that he needed some permanent basis for his fortune. As James preferred his favorites to take wives, preferably rich ones, this path looked the most promising. The king was especially interested in his Scottish servants taking English wives. A fair number of the Scots at court did so. Their numbers included Sir John Ramsay, Earl of Holderness, Sir David Foulis (Hay's cousin), Sir Thomas Erskine and Sir John Kennedy, who was so keen on the idea that he did not let the existence of a Scottish wife stop him.[21] As for Hay, the lady chosen for the honor of being his wife was appropriately named Honora Denny. She was the only daughter and heir of Sir Edward Denny of Essex and Hertford. She was also the granddaughter of Thomas, Lord Burghley (soon Earl of Exeter), Robert Cecil's elder brother.[22] The financial and political desirability of such a match for Hay was beyond question; what it would bring Denny was another story. Sir Edward was by no means a stupid man. He was not about to take some unknown Scot as his son-in-law without strong inducements. Even at this early stage of his career, Hay's spendthrift ways must have been apparent. What is more, Denny was a man of some compassion,[23] and he would not have wanted his only daughter involved in an unhappy marriage.

The king overcame Sir Edward's scruples by increasing the inducements, financial and otherwise, for the proposed match. First there was the promise of a barony for Denny when the negotiations began in July 1604; then the prospective couple was given a grant of land located in several counties with property included for Sir Edward as well.[24] By July 1605 Hay and his intended father-in-law were made joint keepers of Chingford Walk and New Lodge in Waltham Forest.

The other part of the royal plan for this marriage was to make Hay seem like a more stable prospect. In December 1605 he became Keeper

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[18] Parry to Cecil, ibid., fo. 96[a–b].
[19] *C.S.P. Ven., 1603–1607,* no. 206, p. 143.
[20] Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 336[a], B.L.
[21] Lawrence Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558–1641,* 625–26.
[22] G.E.C., *The Complete Peerage,* 3: 32.
[23] See his letter to Sir Thomas Barrington in Eg. MS. 2646, fo. 78[a], B.L.
[24] Dudley Carleton to John Chamberlain, 10 August 1604, London; SP 14/9[a]/8, fo. 15[b], P.R.O.

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of the King's Robes. The following June he was made a baron, though without the right to sit in the English parliament.[25] It was not until the end of 1606 that Denny finally consented. He had held out for over two years.

In virtually any society a marriage provides an opportunity for display along with the celebration. For his own in January 1607 Hay had no intention of missing such an opportunity. Among other spectacles, he arranged for Thomas Campion to write a masque honoring his marriage. Though it is unknown how Campion was chosen, there are indications that Ben Jonson was not pleased with missing the assignment.[26] Court masques were certainly one of the great ornaments of the Jacobean age with the designers trying to out-do each other in theatrical invention and the aristocratic performers attempting to do the same in the lavishness and outlandishness of their costumes. As Hay himself said some years later, ". . . when I was a masker . . . the mode was to appeare very small in the wast, I remember I was drawne up from the ground by both hands whilst the tayler with all his strength buttoned on my doublet."[27] The costumes for this marriage masque certainly included their share of the grotesque, both intentionally and otherwise. Wild men in flesh colored garments that made them appear naked as well as sylvans with wreaths of flowers on their heads played a part in the production. In this masque, too, were Knights of Apollo dressed in elaborate turban-like crowns with petal-shaped outer coats, tunics underneath and bare legs from mid-calf to mid-thigh.[28]

The set was a multi-level pastoral scene; included were bats and owls that periodically would appear to fly. The great surprise of this production was supposed to be the golden trees that moved and danced when cued by the appropriate music. Since some privileged spectators got an early look, the effect was spoiled. In the event, it was the designer rather than the audience who was surprised when a stagehand forgot to attach the trees to the machines that moved them.[29] Whatever the disappointments, the production must have been something of a success; Sir Robert Cecil thought enough of it to record some of its verses.[30]

Through Hay's first two decades at the Stuart court his name is mentioned regularly as one of the masquers and, at widely spaced intervals, he acted as producer for some of these extravaganzas. It was an elaborate, expensive, time-consuming process, but it had obvious satisfactions for a man of Hay's strongly developed aesthetic tastes. The problem was that in many ways it was an over-crowded field dominated by royalty or great public

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[25] *C.S.P.D. 1603–1610,* pp. 230, 269, 321.
[26] J. Nichols, *Progresses,* 2: 105–121, 165.
[27] *The Autobiography of Thomas Raymond,* 25.
[28] Allardyce Nicoll, *Stuart Masques and the Renaissance Stage,* 205, 210, fig. 190.
[29] Ibid., 57–58.
[30] *H.M.C. Salisbury,* Part 19, 2.

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institutions such as the Inns of Court and the universities. In lieu of this area, especially as Hay grew older, he devoted more and more of his energies to giving banquets. By the second decade of James's reign, he had carved himself a unique and virtually unassailable position as a banquet master.[31]

There were two prime objectives in a banquet given by Hay: to present the food in a stately manner in keeping with the elegance of the occasion and to overwhelm the spectators and participants with the richness and variety of the fare. Contemporaries noted or at least estimated the expense: between £2,000 and £3,000 for a particularly important banquet was not uncommon.[32]

Only one aspect is missing from this picture to make up the perfect Jacobean courtier and that is the martial arts. As James's early years on the throne were peaceful, what battles there were occurred on the dueling field or in the tilt-yard. Hay's name was rarely associated with the former pursuit, but he was a frequent participant in the latter until he was nearly forty years old. It would not be unfair to say that, even as late as the seventeenth century, tilting could be as dangerous as dueling. The possibility of being thrown from a charging horse while wearing close to one hundred weight of armor, makes this understandable. As a result, as Hay approached middle age, he became more cautious and appointed a substitute to run for him. Unfortunately he committed what was probably the only mistake in etiquette of his entire career when he appeared in the stands to see how his surrogate fared. Once his presence was discovered, the knight rightfully refused to participate.[33] Hay's next appearance at a tilt was as a judge.[34]

In an indirect way tilting had a major effect on Hay's career. About two months after his marriage in 1607, he participated in a contest honoring the king's accession to the English throne. It was customary to have a mounted page present the participants' shields to the king before they rode. Hay's page was thrown from his horse while performing his duty and broke his leg. James left the stands to see if he could be of assistance and laid eyes on Robin Ker, or Robert Carr to the English, his ill-starred favorite.[35] From that time on Hay maintained a secondary place in the king's affections, but as events developed, a secure one.

Beneath Hay's love of display and ceremony, one can see a slow maturing. Gradually he showed more interest in English than Scottish affairs, and had the good sense to stay near the people who mattered at the English court: Cecil (now Earl of Salisbury and Lord Treasurer) and, of course, the king. In time he became their intermediary, thereby enhancing

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[31] J. Chamberlain, *Letters*, 2: 94.
[32] Ibid., 57, 334.
[33] G.P.V. Akrigg, *Jacobean Pageant*, 162–63.
[34] Nichols, *Progresses*, 4: 604.
[35] Akrigg, *Jacobean Pageant*, 177.

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the respect both men had for him. James's famous dispute with Lord Balmerino is evidence of their increased trust in Hay. Balmerino was a Roman Catholic and the king's secretary in Scotland who had been involved in sending the pope a royal letter. When an uproar concerning the matter occurred in 1608, it was Hay who was the primary witness to Cecil on the facts of the case.[36]

Four years later, when the Lord Treasurer lay dying, it was Hay who rode toward the West Country to present him with James's final gift, a diamond worth £400.[37] The death of the young Scot's "uncle" made no significant difference in his standing with the king, for the very next year, 1613, he became Master of the Great Wardrobe,[38] the most profitable office he ever held.

Hay's importance at this stage of his career must not, however, be overrated. He was not one of the great men of either Scotland or England. He may have helped his father to the post of Scottish Comptroller in 1608[39] and his brother, Robert, to an English pension of £200 per year and a groomship in the royal bedchamber,[40] but even presuming Hay's involvement, these minor successes do not mark him as a great man of the court. Whatever his influence, one aging and ambitious courtier, Robert Naunton, felt that he was not desperate enough to accept Hay's offer of patronage tendered some months after Cecil's death.[41] By 1612 Hay was no longer just a primping dandy, but James did not consider him a statesman either.

What may well have made the difference to Hay's political career and put him on the path to genuine respectability was the Carr-Overbury murder scandal. Carr and his friend, Sir Thomas Overbury, became two of the leading powers at James's court, especially after Cecil's death in 1612. Carr in turn became involved with Frances Howard, then Countess of Essex, and this caused a breach with Overbury. In the wake of the conflict Overbury landed in the Tower where he was poisoned, undoubtedly at Frances Howard's instigation and most likely with at least the guilty knowledge after the fact of her new husband, Carr.

To his credit James agreed to a full and public trial of his former favorite. This decision was a dangerous one for the king because Carr had all the instincts of a trapped animal. He might have done or said anything to save himself, and if death was certain, there were some royal tales that might have been worth the telling. James thus had a delicate assignment: convincing Carr to confess his guilt while relying upon a verbal promise

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[36] *H.M.C. Salisbury*, part 20, 256–57. For details on the controversy see David H. Willson, *James VI and I*, 232–38.

[37] Chamberlain, *Letters*, 1: 350.

[38] *C.S.P.D., 1611–1618*, 177.

[39] *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1607–10*, vii, 73 note.

[40] 8 October 1611; E 403/1712, P.R.O.

[41] Roy E. Schreiber, *The Political Career of Sir Robert Naunton, 1589–1635*, 24: 6.

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of forgiveness that could only come to fruition after conviction and sentencing. It was Balmerino all over again.

The negotiations took some time. By November 1615, Carr had been placed in the Tower but he did not stand trial until May 1616. The interim period was needed to bring him to a reasonable frame of mind. At first commissioners were appointed to deal with the man: the Duke of Lennox, Lord Ellesmere, Lord Zouch and Sir Edward Coke. As all of these men were hostile to Carr personally and to the Howard faction with whom he had associated himself, Carr was understandably reluctant to use the commissioners as intermediaries with the king. Instead he suggested to Sir George More, the Lieutenant of the Tower, that Hay and Lord Knollis, Carr's aged brother-in-law, would be fitter instruments for such a purpose.[42] There was clearly more than a little reluctance to grant the request, but ultimately it was deemed the only workable solution, and the bargaining began.[43]

Whatever James may have felt about the mediation arrangements in the initial stages, he ultimately did make Hay one of his advisers on this matter. Hay's evenhandedness at this task impressed even the cool, calculating Bacon who by May 1616 thought this Scot would be one of the best means of making the final offer of leniency to Carr.[44] Hay's charm was so effective that it was only after the trial that he went to the former favorite with firm assurances of mercy and more importantly of £5,000 per year in land to uphold the dignity of his rank as earl.[45]

In this highly delicate matter Hay had proved himself a competent, discreet intermediary, capable of earning the trust of both sides in the negotiations. He had been a model of diplomacy and tact. His mentor, Baron du Tour, would have been proud. On the more practical side, such talents were useful to a monarch, especially one who coveted the title, "Peacemaker of Europe."

Europe in the early seventeenth century was like an unstable molecule whose atoms were constantly rearranging themselves at unpredictable intervals. In March 1616 it became clear that Hay would play a role as an alchemist in this process. He was appointed extraordinary ambassador to the court of Louis XIII of France.[46]

The choice of Hay is not a particularly surprising one. If James had not exactly groomed him for this role, he had certainly put him in a position where he could earn it. The king commonly placed Hay in contact with visiting French dignitaries either in the role of greeter or messenger.[47] The

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[42] 29 December 1615; *H.M.C. 7th Report,* 673[a], and SP 14/83, no. 55, P.R.O.

[43] Spedding, *Bacon,* 5: 294.

[44] Ibid., 266; SP 16/310, no. 89.

[45] SP 16/310, no. 89.

[46] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 1: 617; Desmarets to Puisieulx, 20 March 1616 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/50, fos. 25[b]–26[a], P.R.O.

[47] *C.S.P.D., 1611–18,* 32, 89, 90; *C.S.P. Ven., 1607–10,* no. 918, p. 494 and ibid., *1610–13,* no. 758, p. 489.

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French thought well enough of his services to place him on their list of pensioners at the English court.[48] In maintaining his contacts with France and his favorable attitude toward that country Hay was not only being true to his Scottish heritage but also to his Protestant religion. He was one of many in England who presumed that the French were more flexible on religious matters than the Spanish. Hay seemed to feel that, if an English monarch had to have a Roman Catholic bride, as it appeared Prince Charles must, it was better that she wear her religion lightly.

In addition to being favorably disposed toward the French and well liked by them, Hay had other requisite qualifications for his new role. His rank was now sufficient to enable him to act as a true extraordinary ambassador. In the summer of 1615 he had been quietly elevated to a full English peerage as Baron Hay of Sawley, Yorkshire.[49] More importantly over his dozen or so years at the royal court he had proved his discretion, a quality he once again demonstrated in the Carr affair. He also had that indispensable quality for a successful extraordinary ambassador, a sense for the magnificent.

An extraordinary ambassador had to have as much in common with the modern day producer of a movie spectacular as he did with an ordinary diplomat. Extraordinary for him could not be just an extra word in his title; it had to be an evocative description of a style that was as much a weapon in his diplomatic arsenal as artillery was for a general. He was presenting himself in a manner designed to give him psychological dominance over his adversaries just as surely as a Homeric warrior bellowing forth his war cry.

Hay set about the task of preparing for this venture with great verve and an eye for detail. He provided himself with twenty suits, one for each proposed day of his residence at the French court. When he received word that French styles had changed shortly before he was due to leave in July 1616, he commanded alterations in his wardrobe.[50] As for the appearance of the clothes themselves, one eye-witness spoke of a cloak and hose made of white beaver and richly sewn with gold and silver thread. The cloak, inside and out, had scarcely any other lining but the embroidery. The doublet was cloth of gold and also embroidered, but so thickly that one had to look carefully to detect the handiwork. The outfit was topped off with a white beaver hat with a fully decorated brim.[51]

His train of gentlemen and servants was equally well appointed both in terms of personnel and appearance. Three future earls (Holland, Leicester and Norwich) were there. So were other knights along with royal musicians and dancers. All these people were dressed as sumptuously as their leader right down to the footcloths. It was decided that to better exhibit their

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[48] *C.S.P.D., 1611–18,* 199.
[49] Ibid., 290.
[50] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 13–14.
[51] Nichols, *Progresses,* 3: 183, citing Kennett's *Complete History of England,* 2: 703.

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grandeur, the whole train should enter Paris on horseback rather than in coaches. The final touch comes from a story that may well be apocryphal but nevertheless sums up the effect that was intended. Supposedly Hay's horse was lightly shod with silver shoes and trained to prance in such a manner that they would come off when the ambassador gave the command. A liveried attendant would then produce a replacement from a tawny velvet bag and rapidly nail it into place so that the performance could be repeated.[52] It was a mission designed to overawe the French. When Monsieur Desmarets, the French ambassador in England, wrote home describing the equipage and apparel as truly princely,[53] it was clear the desired purpose had been achieved.

What reason did James have for putting on such an impressive show for the French? His feelings were most likely ambivalent. For some years he had been trying to negotiate a French marriage for his sons, first Henry and then Charles. Before Henri IV's assassination in 1610, James had reluctantly acknowledged French leadership of the anti-Habsburg nations of Europe. The King of Great Britain was forced to defer to His Most Christian Majesty who, despite his Catholicism, was capable of directing a Protestant alliance against the Catholic Habsburgs of Spain and the Empire. This role was one that James coveted, and he was not pleased with his secondary position. Henri's occasional barbs in the English king's direction—he was the one who attached that choice tag, the wisest fool in Christendom—made the inferior position all the more unpleasant. Though James was undoubtedly shocked by Henri's violent death, he also saw the opportunity it presented to move into the now vacant leadership role.

The first step in this direction was the marriage of James's daughter, Elizabeth, to the young Elector Palatine, Frederick V, the Empire's most prestigious elector. Through this dynastic tie that was made in 1613, the English king was able to place himself at the head of the Princes of the Union, the defensive alliance of Protestant German states. Henri had held a similar position.

What James then felt he needed was a dynastic link with France so that he would be in a position to affect that country's policy during the long minority of Louis XIII. Such an alliance system would have put James in a position to have an impact on European affairs for at least the next decade.

The problem was that Marie de' Medici, the regent for Louis XIII, concluded the famous double marriage treaty of 1612 in which her oldest daughter, Elisabeth, originally intended for Prince Charles, would marry the future Phillip IV of Spain while his sister, the Infanta Anne, would marry Louis. Though the marriages did not take place until 1615, their prospect largely destroyed James's short-lived hopes for European prom-

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[52] Ibid., 184.

[53] Desmarets to Puisieulx, 19 June 1616 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/50, fo. 45ª, P.R.O.

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inence. What is more, a Franco-Spanish alliance could have been directed against England, a threat that had haunted every English monarch since the days of Henry VII.

In order to counter this potential menace, the English king pursued two seemingly contradictory policies. He continued to negotiate a match for Charles with a French princess, now Christine the second daughter, and he began giving encouragement, if not aid, to the dissident forces in France, the great nobles and the Huguenots. He was thus, in the modern phrase, not averse from destabilizing the French government while seemingly acting as its friend and potential ally. What James was most likely trying to demonstrate to Marie was his nuisance value and that England's goodwill was as important to her as Spain's. In practice what occurred was that James increasingly assumed the role of protector of the French dissidents, and through his ambassador in ordinary, Sir Thomas Edmonds, acted as intermediary between the two sides.[54]

France under Marie's regency needed precious little encouragement to come unhinged. It was a country in which the pull of decentralizing forces had always been strong, and though Henri had been reasonably successful in maintaining a degree of centralized, monarchical control, he had done so by force of personality rather than by significant alteration in the structure of the French government. Marie did not have her late husband's talent, nor did she have the ability to recognize the talents of others who might have supplemented her own limited abilities. She rather preferred the self-serving talents of the Concinis, Leonora and Concino, who were paramount in her increasingly narrow circle of advisers. The result of this exclusive policy was an extreme degree of discontent among the greater aristocrats (especially the Prince Condé) who considered themselves the natural advisers to the monarchy.

From 1614 onwards periodically both the nobles and Huguenots had withdrawn themselves into their provincial fortresses and challenged the central government to dig them out. As the announcement of the Hay embassy was made in March 1616, the French were in the process of patching up yet another truce that permitted the nobles to return to court. The agreement was completed in May, but the problem was that Condé and most of the other aristocrats remained essentially outside the government and were still discontented.[55]

With the Hay mission scheduled during this shaky lull, James was making a final effort to either conclude the lengthy marriage negotiations, or to free himself to look elsewhere. This latter option had looked more and more viable since 1614 with the appearance in England of a new Spanish ambassador, Sarmiento de Acuña, usually known as the Conde de Gon-

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[54] The information on Anglo-French relations was derived principally from an unpublished article by Professor T. V. Thoroughman based on his 1968 dissertation at the University of North Carolina.

[55] Victor L. Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, 76–77.

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domar. He was a man of learning, civilization and wit who was, in addition, as Hay learned to his cost, no mean hand at verbal cut and thrust. One day they had a dispute over who should have the lower stair and therefore precedence. " 'My Lord,' sayd Gondomar, 'I will goe doune the cellar but I will have it.' 'Then my Lord,' sayd Carlile (Hay), 'goe down to Hell!' Nay, there my Lord,' sayd Gondomar, 'I leave you.' "[56] Such a man appealed to James, and his siren-song of a Spanish match with a large dowry increasingly riveted his attention, a fact not unknown to the French.[57] The well-rooted Habsburgs, desirous of maintaining the *status quo,* looked like a safer connection than the unpredictable and quarrelsome Bourbons. An increasingly nasty trade dispute with France's allies, the Dutch, may have also influenced the English king's thinking.

Then was the Hay mission a genuine one, or was it only a gloriously embroidered cover for a closed book? Most likely James was willing to accept either result. He had unquestionably stiffened his terms for the match with the French just before Hay left, a fact that made both Hay and Edmonds politely question his motives.[58] The effect of this change in conjunction with the rumors of the Spanish match was to put the French in a position where either they had to put forth an attractive counter-proposal or break off the negotiations. James must have recognized that a break was most likely, for he had already worked out a bargaining tool to use in the Spanish match: Sir Walter Raleigh had been released from the Tower and was organizing an expedition to Spanish-claimed America in search of a gold mine. Yet the fact remains, if the French had accepted James's terms or found some effective way to make theirs more attractive, in all likelihood the marriage would have taken place.[59]

At the end of July 1616 Hay arrived in France and his hosts made the embassy a major event. The whole French court visited him; even the Parisian magistrates appeared at his quarters. The presents he received were identical to those given to Queen Anne when she arrived the previous year.[60] Hay was accompanied to his first formal meeting with the French royal family by some of the most prestigious members of the nobility (a far cry from Maréchal de Vitry and the dozen gentlemen for the mission a decade earlier). The excitement and the throng were so great that Hay had more than a little trouble making his way to the privy chamber where he presented James's formal congratulations on the double marriage and announced his readiness to engage in further negotiations.[61]

After the ceremony and feasting ended, Hay and Edmonds prepared

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[56] *Autobiography of Thomas Raymond,* 25.

[57] Desmarets to Villeroy, 17 July 1616 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/50, fo. 55[a], P.R.O.

[58] Hay and Edmonds to Winwood, 31 July 1616, Paris; SP 78/66, fos. 31[a]–32[a], P.R.O.

[59] Instructions to Hay and Edmonds, 19 August 1616; SP 78/66, fos. 40[a]–42[a], 38[a]–39[a], P.R.O.

[60] Woodford to Trumbull, 6 August 1616, Paris; Trumbull—Downshire MSS., 49: no. 7, Berkshire Record Office.

[61] Hay and Edmonds to Winwood, 31 July 1616, Paris; SP 78/66, fos. 29[b]–31[a], P.R.O.

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to deal with specially appointed commissioners on a whole variety of issues of which the marriage was the most important.[62]

What brought matters to an end almost before they began was a successful *coup* by Marie; she imprisoned Condé. He was at the Louvre in late August 1616, believing that he was waiting to see Marie and then go hunting with Louis. Instead, as the ominous phrase goes, he was confined to a chamber during the king's pleasure. The word quickly spread to the rest of the nobility, and they fled the capital or barricaded themselves in their palaces. Earlier the Concinis had the good sense to retreat to their Norman estates, lest some of Condé's followers try to eliminate the source of their master's trouble.[63]

Hay was now in an impossible situation. James had adopted the position of protector of the greater French nobles; the imprisonment of their leader was an obvious blow to his pretensions. The only hope of saving the negotiations was in Marie's hands. She had to relent and reinstate the agreement reached with Condé and the other nobles the previous May. She was not about to oblige, but quite the contrary installed a ministry that was even more subservient to her and the Concinis. About the only saving grace in this otherwise unimpressive crew was the Bishop of Luçon, the future Cardinal Richelieu. He made his first appearance as a government minister when he became the foreign secretary.[64] But neither he nor anyone else in the ministry was capable of saving the negotiations with Hay.

Once James heard of Condé's imprisonment, he showed his distaste for the whole business by making it difficult for Monsieur Desmarets to obtain an audience to explain the matter.[65] In the vain hope that Marie might prove more flexible than his own master, Hay continued negotiating through September 1616. He knew James would never agree to substantive talks on the marriage while Condé remained in prison, and France was on the verge of civil war. Therefore in October he could not have been surprised when he received royal instructions to end the marriage negotiations and return home.[66]

That Hay left with reluctance is beyond question. He had a genuine commitment to close ties between England and France, and he hated to see the advent of a Spanish match. His vanity was also involved; the prestige of having negotiated a French marriage in the face of all these obstacles would have been worth an earldom to him and probably the Garter as well. As a result, Hay did not so much leave as make a slow, strategic withdrawal. Upon reaching the port of Dieppe, he picked up rumors of favorable changes in the French government, and immediately wrote Edmonds to see if they were true.[67] They were not, and a week

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[62] Woodford to Trumbull, 17/27 August 1616, Paris; Trumbull—Downshire MSS., 49 no. 8, Berkshire Record Office.

[63] Hay and Edmonds to Winwood, 21 August 1616, Paris; SP 78/66, fos. 47ª–49ª, P.R.O.

[64] Tapié, *France*, 77.

[65] Pembroke to Hay, 16 September 1616; Eg. MS. 2592, fo. 7ª, B.L.

[66] Lake to Hay, 11 April [1617], York; Stowe MS. 176, fo. 78ª, B.L.

[67] Hay to Edmonds, 2 October 1616, Dieppe; ibid., fo. 30ª.

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later he appeared at his father-in-law Lord Denny's, in Waltham where, supposedly suffering from a tennis injury, he remained for a few days before going to Royston and the king.[68]

By any scale this embassy was a failure. Relations with the French were, if anything, slightly worse after Hay's departure than before he came. Most assuredly the French match was a dead issue. None of these results had anything to do with Hay, however. He did all that it was possible to do but fell victim to circumstances beyond his control. The French bore him no ill will; besides the rather substantial presents he received upon his first entry, he was given a generous gift of a diamond worth 10,000 crowns and wine from the royal cellars.[69] As for James, he must have valued the services his ambassador extraordinary performed because in March 1617 he was made a member of the English privy council.[70]

The failure of the extraordinary mission did nothing to change Hay's attitude toward Anglo-French relations. He made a point of visiting the French ambassador in England and saying what favorable treatment he had received at the hands of French royalty. In the course of the conversation he was even diplomatic enough to blame the breakdown of the negotiations on Condé and the malcontents.[71]

With the appearance in early 1617 of his old friend and patron, Baron du Tour, as a French extraordinary ambassador, his favor towards the French was further demonstrated. Though the French felt very much under a cloud at the English court and were extremely sensitive to all slights, real and imagined,[72] Hay did his best to make them feel welcome. He prepared one of his famous banquets in their honor[73] and gave Ben Jonson an opportunity to work his magic in the *Masque of the Lethe* or *Lovers made Men.*[74] Hay did a little too well in his efforts because not long after the baron left, James wanted assurances from his former extraordinary ambassador that he did indeed break off the marriage negotiations and did not leave the matter open for further discussion.[75]

Perhaps Hay had rather overdone the grandeur of his former patron's reception, but there was a good reason. The baron was not the only person who was supposed to be impressed.[76] There was a new woman in Hay's life, and for her sake, he was more prepared than ever to follow his family motto and Spare Nought.[77]

Honora Denny had died in August 1614.[78] As she was leaving a masque

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[68] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 24–25.
[69] Edmonds to Hay, 9 October 1616, Paris; Eg. MS. 2592, fo. 8[a–b], B.L. and *C.S.P. Ven., 1615–1617,* no. 464, p. 319.
[70] *A.P.C., 1616–1617,* 201.
[71] Desmarets to Villeroy, 5 November 1616 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/51, fo. 91[b], P.R.O.
[72] Desmarets to Luçon, 3 February 1617 (N.S.), London; ibid., fos. 135[b]–136[a].
[73] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 57–58.
[74] Nichols, *Progresses,* 3: 247 and Nicholl, *Stuart Masques,* 216.
[75] Lake to Hay, 11 April [1617], York; Stowe MS. 176, fo. 78[a], B.L.
[76] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 57–58.
[77] J. H. Stevenson, *Heraldry in Scotland,* 2: 211.
[78] G.E.C., *Complete Peerage,* 3: 32.

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or supper late in the area of Ludgate Hill, a man grabbed the decorative jewel she had on her forehead and unsuccessfully tried to run away with it. Despite her pleas to the king to spare the thief's life, he was hanged. Honora, in an advanced stage of pregnancy at the time, delivered prematurely. A week later she was dead.[79]

Little is known of the first Baroness Hay. If what various poets of the age said about her is true, she was appreciative of literature and had some musical talent of her own.[80] There was, however, another side to Honora's nature, for she was connected with a scandal. If the reports are correct, she was a great personal favorite of Queen Anne's and used her position to facilitate the punishment of a Scotsman who had plotted the murder of the baroness's supposed lover.[81] What Hay thought of these matters is unknown, but he could not have been entirely displeased with his first wife. Honora had done what was expected of her by bearing two children, James and Anne. In addition she had provided a link with Edward, Lord Denny whose friendship and advice Hay valued for the rest of his life.

It is difficult to tell just when the teenaged Lady Lucy Percy attracted Hay's attention. Her brother-in-law, Robert Sidney, a future Earl of Leicester, had gone to France on the extraordinary embassy. By February 1617 it was rumored that the Countess of Bedford was acting as marriage broker and had succeeded so far that the lady and her mother (at least initially) were favorable to the idea.[82] Henry Percy, the ninth "Wizzard" Earl of Northumberland and the young lady's father, was definitely not of the same mind.

At first acquaintance Hay did not seem to have much luck with prospective fathers-in-law. Within two weeks of the first rumors about the marriage the earl summoned his daughter to the Tower, where he had been an enforced guest since the Gunpowder Plot, a decade earlier. With the sour announcement that he would endure his daughter to dance no Scottish jigs, Lucy was kept in the Tower at her father's order.[83]

Hay's life was further complicated by a problem in his wooing that was not easily handled. James was returning to Scotland for the first time since his accession to the English throne. He obviously expected the major figures of his court to appear there with him, especially those of Scottish background. Hay was especially needed because James intended to make him a member of the Scottish privy council.[84] The solution was to leave late and return early. Hay was in London when James reached York in early April. When the king crossed the English border in early July, Hay and the earls of Montgomery and Southampton made straight for London.[85]

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[79] *H.M.C. 10th Report,* part 6, 84.
[80] R. Niccols, *Mondia or Waltham's Complaint;* and *Du Bartas his Divine Weeks,* 1171.
[81] *C.S.P. Ven., 1613–1615,* nos. 870, 871 and 902, pp. 481, 482, and 507.
[82] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 55–56.
[83] Ibid., 57–58.
[84] *The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1616–19,* xxi.
[85] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 84–85.

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During the Scottish sojourn, Northumberland had attempted to convince his daughter that she was making a mistake. He alternated threats with blandishments; first saying he would cut her off from the family and then offering her £20,000 to follow his advice. Instead Lucy managed to leave the Tower and retire to the Wardrobe building, Hay's London residence, where he had left £2,000 for her entertainment.[86]

Hay realized that he would have to win over Lucy's family if this marriage was to take place, and he set about this in the manner he knew best. Renting Hanworth, a manor near Northumberland's estate at Syon, west of London on the Thames, he provided such elegant daily feasts that Lady Northumberland felt she could not match them.[87]

Through the summer Hay's campaign had its effect; gradually the Sidneys and Lady Northumberland, who had wavered, came to approve the marriage. There only remained the imprisoned earl. Though the marriage might have taken place without his consent, Hay realized he should come to terms with his future father-in-law. In late October 1617 he went to the Tower and surprisingly obtained the earl's approval.[88] What could a middle-aged Scot have said to change the mind of a man whose family had built its reputation on defending England from the northern barbarians? No record exists, but one might speculate that Northumberland wanted his freedom, and having a son-in-law who was a royal favorite was one way to obtain it. There was also that indefinable element in Hay's personality, charm. Time and time again people who were predisposed to dislike the man, after conversation with him became his friends and allies. Such was the case with Northumberland. He and Hay ultimately became good friends with a degree of empathy between them that was totally unexpected.

The wedding took place in early November and was, by Hay's standards, a fairly modest affair costing only £1,600. Nonetheless, James, Prince Charles and the new favorite, George Villiers (ultimately Duke of Buckingham) were in attendance, as were all the appropriate relatives and nobles.[89] That this second marriage was a love match is certain; that this teenage girl would become one of the most admired, intelligent and sought-after women in Stuart England would become evident in good time. What would only become evident with hindsight was that this marriage was the final milestone on Hay's path to becoming an English figure rather than a Scottish one. His admittance to the Scottish privy council was a *pro forma* move. He would only see his native land once more in his life. Though people found many reasons to differ with Hay through the rest of his career, no instance survives of his opponents hurling his origins as an emigré Scot in his face. He had arrived.

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[86] Ibid., and p. 77.
[87] Ibid., 94.
[88] *H.M.C. De L'isle and Dudley MSS*, part 5, 415.
[89] G. Herbert to Carleton, 8 November 1617, London; SP 14/94, no. 13, P.R.O.

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Germany—The Start of a European Disaster

The year 1618 was not a particularly memorable year in Hay's career. He became a viscount in July, taking his title from the Yorkshire town of Doncaster. He also gave up his position as Master of the Great Wardrobe and turned it over to Sir Lionel Cranfield. James was slowly learning the value of economy in government, and he could no longer afford someone with Hay's tastes as the head of a major spending department.

For Europe as a whole 1618 was the beginning of an evil time that would last for a third of a century and would have repercussions for virtually every part of the world touched by western European nations. It all began comically enough. Two representatives of the Habsburg king, Ferdinand of Bohemia, were thrown through a palace window in Prague by irate Bohemian nobles. The victims landed unceremoniously on a manure pile, picked themselves up with as much dignity as such circumstances permitted and rode rapidly to inform their master that his subjects were in revolt. Protestants in the very heartland of the Habsburg possessions were threatening to further fragment an already divided empire.

Here was an opportunity for James. His ploy of using Raleigh and the gold mine as a bargaining counter for a Spanish match was a failure. Raleigh found no mine and returned to England broken and desperate. Under pressure from Gondomar, the last of the great Elizabethan adventurers was executed in November 1618. The English king now changed his tack and decided to facilitate his relations with the Spanish by doing them a favor and enhancing his own reputation at the same time. Virtually as Sir Walter's head was falling into a basket, discussion had begun with the Spanish about using James to mediate the Bohemian dispute.[1]

Why was Spain the starting point for settling an imperial problem? In the early seventeenth century the links between Habsburg Spain and Habsburg Austria were still strong, and unquestionably, if the situation in Bohemia worsened, the Spaniards would come to the aid of their German-based cousins.[2] In 1618 this prospect could not have been a particularly pleasing one. In about two years the truce between Spain and the Dutch Republic would expire. Even if the Spaniards decided to negotiate for an extension, which was doubtful, they could not afford any expensive distractions. Certainly if it came down to war with their old opponents, the Spaniards would need to carefully husband their resources. If the Bohemian crisis was ended with a minimum of embarrassment to King Ferdinand, there was no reason why the Spanish would scorn a peaceful solution.

On the Austrian side the old emperor, Matthias, had little interest in war if other methods were available for a settlement. Even the younger, more aggressive Ferdinand would at least have liked more time to prepare

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[1] *Letters and Other Documents Illustrating the Relations Between England and Germany at the Commencement of the Thirty Years War*, 9–12.

[2] Bohdan Chudoba, *Spain and the Empire 1519–1643*, 223.

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for crushing his rebellious subjects. In the final analysis the erstwhile king of the Bohemians was thinking in terms of a military settlement, but the likelihood of his achieving one in November 1618 was far from certain. The native Bohemian army and Count Mansfeld's mercenaries had largely secured the country for the rebels and were advancing into Austria itself. Even if this setback only sharpened Ferdinand's desire to prove he was the true king, there was every reason to believe that Spain, by controlling the purse strings, could keep him in line.

The least likely to listen to a peace plan were the rebel Bohemians. They had tried Ferdinand's brand of government and found it profoundly wanting. What little they saw of him made them deeply suspicious of his inclinations toward their religion and toward them as individuals. Convincing them to accept any government led by Ferdinand was not going to be a simple matter.

Also in need of convincing was James's son-in-law, Frederick. His divided territories included a sizable portion, called the Upper Palatinate, that was located next to Bohemia's western border. The close proximity alone would have aroused the elector's interest in his neighbor's affairs. In fact by October 1618 Frederick had sent an embassy to Prague,[3] and exhibited much more than a passing interest in the whole, troubled situation. He and the Duke of Savoy were the principal movers in bringing Count Mansfeld's army into Bohemia. As early as January 1619 Frederick was considering the possibility that he might procure the crown of Bohemia for himself.[4] If James was going to prevent a total breakdown of the peace efforts, he had to restrain his son-in-law from meddling too far with the rebels. That is why he refused to let Frederick act as his agent in the dispute.[5] The elector's self-interest was too obviously involved for anyone to consider him a neutral.

James's own self-interest also was a factor here. Even leaving aside the question of the prestige he could win by settling the dispute, he was a man who wanted a foot on both sides of the river. His role as leader of the Princes of the Union was compatible with his efforts to marry his son to a Spanish princess only if the torrent of affairs did not swell to a flood tide of anger. If it did, James would be forced to jump to one side, or he would drown.

The likelihood of Frederick's active participation was of great concern for reasons besides his interference in the peace efforts. After the unmarried Prince Charles, the Palatine, his wife and their yearly expanding family were the next heirs to the English throne. It may have taken two generations, but their grandson did ultimately become King of England. In a dynastic age such a relationship could not be ignored. Frederick's involvement was James's as well whether he liked it or not.

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[3] MS. Clm. 10397, fo. 2 *et seq.*, B.S.B., Munich.

[4] Elmar Weiss, *Die Unterstützung Friedrichs V. von der Pfalz durch Jacob I und Karl I von England im Dreissigjährigen Krieg, 1618–1632*, 8.

[5] MS. Clm. 10397, fo. 56, B.S.B., Munich.

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Another consideration for the English king was the ever-increasing Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry. As the Dutch usually had the upper hand in this conflict, they were singularly unwilling to discuss matters, much to James's fury. If Spain could devote its full attention to the Dutch Republic without the distractions of Bohemia, the Netherlands would become more tractable.

Weighing and balancing all the various factors involved, what James needed most for the mediation was someone who could act as a restraining force on the Bohemians and Frederick. (Presumably the Spanish and the emperor had to look after the other side.) Hay was the obvious choice. His staunch Protestantism, his known anti-Spanish bias and his experience as an extraordinary ambassador all pointed to him as the logical candidate. In addition he had a special relationship with the Princess Elizabeth who would be only too happy to see her "camelface" again. She in turn reputedly had a great deal of influence with her husband.

The choice of Hay as ambassador became public knowledge by the end of February 1619.[6] From then on he set about methodically gathering the staff and equipment necessary for the embassy. The death of Queen Anne on 1 March must have made a slow task even slower, but it could have been worse. If she had died after all the clothes had been made, the embassy staff would have needed a completely new set. As it was, they could assume the mourning directly.

Embassy personnel chosen to wear this clothing amounted to about fifty people including gentlemen and servants. The list included Hay's brothers-in-law, Robert Sidney and Algernon Percy, and several soldiers, Sir Charles Rich, Sir Robert Killigrew, Sir Charles Morgan and Sir William Croftes. There was also his cousin, George Hay, and two men of special note, John Donne and Francis Nethersole.[7]

Hay had been introduced to Donne ten years before this mission and had immediately taken a liking to the man. Twentieth-century critics recognize Donne as one of seventeenth-century England's great men of letters, so the admiration that the courtier felt for the poet may not seem surprising. By contemporary standards, however, such an attitude was scarcely a foregone conclusion. When Hay took up with Donne in 1608, the poet was still viewed with suspicion for having married Sir George More's daughter without consent. Donne's literary abilities scarcely were recognized, or mattered. Gaining preferment was no easy matter at the Stuart court even without such a handicap; however, through the next decade, Hay had slowly helped his friend into the royal service. It was as a churchman that Donne eventually flourished, and now Hay had an opportunity to bestow some very useful patronage on his client in the form of a chaplaincy to the embassy.[8]

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[6] Chamberlain, *Letters*, 2: 216.
[7] Trumbull-Downshire MSS., 24: no. 40, Berkshire Record Office.
[8] R. C. Bald, *John Donne, A Life*, 160–161, 304, 340.

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The choice was not, however, just a simple act of kindness. By 1619, despite a comparatively short career as a cleric, Donne had begun to overcome his previous obscurity and to gain recognition as one of the best preachers of his day. Hay had heard him give a sermon at St. Paul's Cross in 1617 and was not the only one who was impressed by it.[9] When dealing with the Calvinists of Germany and the diverse Protestant groups in Bohemia, what better weapon to have in a diplomatic arsenal than a former Roman Catholic who had seen the error of his way? He was, in addition, a genuinely learned preacher who could enthrall them with the word of God delivered in flawless Latin.

Francis Nethersole was another useful weapon. He went as secretary to Hay. Born in 1587, Nethersole had spent most of his life at Cambridge where he rose to become University Orator. His literary skills were recognized as so superior that in 1617 Edward Bolton felt that he was an obvious choice for membership in a proposed English literary academy.[10] In that same year Hay transferred £1,000 worth of East India Company stock into Nethersole's name,[11] whether as some kind of retainer or in a straight cash deal is unknown. In any case the two men had taken the measure of each other some time before the 1619 mission and liked what they saw. Given the amount of written communication involved in an embassy, a man of Nethersole's literary talents was indispensable, though anyone who ever had to wade through volumes of his spikey penmanship in light brown ink is unlikely to feel the same way.

Though professional diplomats such as Sir Dudley Carleton might sneer that all the embassy staff except Donne had their fathers yet living[12] (an interesting demographic observation, if nothing else), these men were well balanced for Hay's purposes. They were skilled in the areas most important to the embassy's success and were in the physical condition needed to ride through much of central Europe in the course of the next nine months.

Unfortunately the health of other key people was not nearly so sound. The Emperor Matthias died at the end of March. Ferdinand was now the logical candidate to succeed to the imperial throne. From such a lofty position it was unlikely that any force in Europe could restrain him. This situation also reduced the Spaniards' inclination to restrain the would-be emperor, for their self-interest now had shifted. They had an agreement with Ferdinand, made in the Treaty of Graz in 1617, that they would back his candidacy for the imperial throne if he would agree to turn over Alsace to Spanish control and thus secure the vital Flanders Road for the upcoming war against the Dutch.

As a final roadblock to a successful mission, James was struck down by a mysterious ailment at almost the same instant that Matthias died. The

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[9] Chamberlain, *Letters*, 2: 67.

[10] *D.N.B. sub* Nethersole, Sir Francis.

[11] *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China and Japan, 1617–21*, 18 November 1617, 100.

[12] Carleton to Chamberlain, 16 July 1619, The Hague, SP 84/91, fo. 41ª, P.R.O.

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illness was so serious that the king's life seemed in danger,[13] and it was not until May that he was fit to resume a normal schedule.[14]

As a result of his master's sudden indisposition, Hay did not receive his final instructions until the second week in May 1619.[15] Unfortunately the longer the mission was postponed, the less chance it had of succeeding. It was vital to begin work on the settlement before Ferdinand was able to strengthen his forces. In fact the dispossessed Bohemian king was not slow to rally supporters. At least a month before Hay left England, he had sent two embassies, one to Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, and the other to John George, Elector of Saxony.[16] Ultimately these contacts resulted in an alliance among the three powers and robbed James of the support of the most influential moderates.

During the first weeks of Hay's mission, the altered military situation was of even greater significance than these tentative diplomatic advances. On 1 June 1619, just as the viscount was leaving Brussels, Mansfeld's luck turned true to form, and his forces were severely mauled by the imperial army near the Roman Catholic stronghold of Budweis. The result of his defeat was the withdrawal of the Bohemian troops from the gates of Vienna to a defensive position about the rebel capital of Prague. The Bohemians had lost the initiative, and they never regained it. Ferdinand's reasons for even considering a truce as a delaying tactic were now gone. All he needed was the imperial crown to assure him of the ability to administer the final blow.

Even before the victory near Budweis, Hay had realized the importance of the imperial election to Ferdinand. If at all possible, he had to find a suitable Roman Catholic to oppose the Bohemian king. In doing so he must have realized the Spanish would take offense, but their sensibilities were no longer a major concern. Actually, Hay's first choice might not have caused that much trouble. He was Archduke Albert, brother to the late emperor and joint ruler of the Spanish Netherlands with the Infanta Isabella. If he proved reluctant, there were more daring choices: Maximilian of Bavaria or Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy. It was a very delicate path to tread as any heavy-handedness on Hay's part would alienate the Habsburgs. The ambassador would then be in some danger, and James would not be slow to disown any measures that endangered the Spanish match.

Luck did not favor the Protestants' diplomacy any more than it did their armies. Albert quickly proved an unlikely prospect. Although immediately after Matthias's death there had been a flurry of letters between Brussels and the ecclesiastical electors of the empire, troops and money

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[13] Naunton to Trumbull, 27 March 1619; Trumbull-Downshire MSS., 33: no. 31, Berkshire Record Office.

[14] 10 May 1619, ibid., no. 14.

[15] Hay to Naunton, 13/23 May 1619, *England and Germany*, 89.

[16] Instructions to Liechtenstein and Stralendorff, 2 May 1619 (N.S.), RK 10 fos. 25[a]–26[b] and 28[a]–39[a], H.H.S.

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flowed through the Spanish lowlands for the imperial cause.[17] Of more importance was the treaty of Graz. Albert's age and ill health also made it obvious that he would not become a serious candidate.[18] Thus when Hay met the archduke on 26 May 1619, he had to content himself with asking the old gentleman for a letter of support for the peace mission.[19] Since the relations between Brussels and Vienna were rather cold, it is questionable how much value this letter had.[20]

Having rapidly exhausted the possibilities for negotiations in the Spanish Netherlands, Hay moved on to the Lower Palatinate capital of Heidelberg. He arrived there on 10 June 1619, and three days later he had an audience with the Prince Palatine.[21] Frederick was at a meeting of the Princes of the Union when the ambassador arrived in the Palatinate, and the ambassador was reluctant to meet with the Princess Elizabeth before her husband's return. There had been a major row a few years earlier over whether the Elector or the Electress had precedence. Hay did not want to stir matters up again by kissing Elizabeth's hand first. She, however, was having none of her favorite diplomat's niceties and forbade Heidelberg merchants to sell food to the embassy. A happy reunion ensued.[22]

Hay did take the opportunity of his stay in Heidelberg to have Donne preach, but it is difficult to determine what concrete negotiations went on there. It is unlikely that the ambassador abandoned his peace mission at this stage and joined the war party, but by the same token he did not convince Frederick to cease active support for the rebels. All that is known with certainty is, when the Elector received a definite offer of the Bohemian throne the month after Hay left, he wrote his chief foreign policy adviser, Christian of Anhalt, that he would do nothing without sending an ambassador to England to obtain James's advice.[23] Perhaps this move was inspired by some of the cautions that Hay delivered.

From the Palatinate the embassy moved toward Bavaria. This approach to Duke Maximilian was Hay's idea and was accomplished at the expense of visiting the Saxon elector.[24] Though a remoter prospect for the imperial throne than the Habsburg candidates, the duke was a reasonably young man who might well have harbored ambitions. Hay indeed found Maximilian a very amiable prince, but one uninterested in becoming emperor.[25]

Since Ferdinand then relied upon the Duke of Bavaria's support, his open-handed reception of Hay must have briefly shaken this relationship.

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[17] *Correspondence de la Cour d'Espagne sur Les Affaires de Pays-Bas au XVIIe Siècle*, ed., H. Lonchay et J. Cuvelier, 1 (Brussels, 1923), Précis de la Correspondance de Philippe III (1598–1621), no. 1384, p. 531.

[18] Trumbull to Naunton, 1 April 1619; SP 77/13, fo. 210[a], P.R.O.

[19] *England and Germany*, 101–02.

[20] Ibid., 106–07.

[21] Ibid., 131–32.

[22] R. C. Bald, *John Donne*, 349–50.

[23] MS. Clm. 10397, fo. 108[a-b], B.S.B., Munich.

[24] *England and Germany*, 135–36.

[25] Ibid., 144.

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Yet it was all a shadow in an otherwise bright imperial sky, and the ambassador knew it.

There was no way for Hay to speak directly with the other potential candidate for the imperial throne, the Duke of Savoy. The man was definitely interested and had approached James for support.[26] Frederick had expressed interest in the Savoyard's candidacy, but without the support of the other secular electors, especially John George of Saxony, the chances for a successful campaign were virtually nonexistent.[27]

So after leaving Maximilian's court, Hay decided he had best find Ferdinand before the imperial title was confirmed. Hay intercepted his quarry at Salzburg on 5 July 1619 and immediately applied for an audience.[28]

By this time the extent of the Bohemian reverse outside Budweis was known to the English ambassador, and he was fully aware of the difficulties this action would cause in moderating Ferdinand's demands.[29]

The viscount's worst fears were realized. In the first instance the councillor assigned to negotiate with Hay denied the necessity of the English mediation effort on the grounds that several princes of the empire, including the Prince Palatine and the Duke of Bavaria, were working on the problem and needed no outside aid.

In an effort to overcome this negative reaction the ambassador called upon every conceivable argument. He spoke of the dangers of misunderstanding when the Bohemians received Ferdinand's peace offers and volunteered to explain them in person at Prague. He warned of the ephemeral nature of the fortunes of war and pointed out the advantages of making a peaceful settlement now that the situation was temporarily in the Habsburg's favor.[30]

It was a fine performance, but to no effect. Hay was informed that after the election, the German princes nominated as arbitrators would meet with the Spanish ambassador, the Conde de Oñate, and they would handle the matter. Ferdinand had no intention of permitting a third force, especially a Protestant one, of interfering in the empire unless it was absolutely necessary. With the Bohemian military effort crumbling, it no longer was.

Hay was justifiably discouraged by the intractable attitude of Ferdinand and his ministers, but he still was willing to see what could be salvaged. He wrote James asking if he had any objections to a joint effort with the imperial arbitration team or the French, who were also rumored as interested in peacemaking.[31] Meanwhile he followed the Habsburg party toward the imperial election site at Frankfurt and in late July lodged at Hanau, a town not far from where the electors would meet.

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[26] Eg. MS. 2592, fo. 263[a], B.L.
[27] *England and Germany,* 134, and Add. MS. 18641, fo. 85[b]–86, B.L.
[28] *England and Germany,* 157.
[29] Ibid., 157–59.
[30] Ibid., 160–63.
[31] Ibid., 163–65.

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The Habsburg group had their own fears about Hay's influence. They, too, realized it was to the ambassador's advantage to hinder Ferdinand's election. The would-be emperor's party therefore obtained a ban that prevented Hay from entering Frankfurt and thus kept him away from the delegates.[32] He was thereafter reduced to using intermediaries to everyone including Ferdinand. What little optimism Hay had left centered on the Spanish ambassador.

Although the Spanish court had agreed to the peace mission, their representative in Germany, Oñate, proved the worst possible choice as an intermediary. He was a bellicose man determined to push Habsburg claims to their limit. He favored a war of annihilation against the rebels and had held that position since they first resorted to arms. He was in fact the principal proponent of direct Spanish military intervention.[33] On top of all these disadvantages, he wanted Ferdinand's son to marry the Spanish Infanta intended for Prince Charles.[34] What is of more significance to the fate of the peace mission, after considerable effort Oñate had won the Spanish Council of State to his point of view. The suggestion of the peace mission was virtually the final gasp of the Duke of Lerma's regime. By December 1618 Baltasar Zúñiga, the former Spanish ambassador to Vienna, had become chief foreign policy adviser to the council. Zúñiga was convinced of the importance of retaining Bohemia at any price, and his increased influence practically assured a more militant policy.[35] The supposed cooperation of the Spanish from that point on was only a ploy to distract James from aiding the Bohemians.

Considering these circumstances, it should come as no surprise that when Hay encountered Oñate on 26 July 1619, he became convinced his peace mission was over. The Spaniard calmly told him that the situation was entirely different than it had been in Matthias's day. Ferdinand had a large army, and he intended to use it to crush the rebels. What is more, Oñate went so far as to claim that both Bohemia and Hungary were Habsburg by hereditary right, and the election of a king was a meaningless form.[36] The Spaniard's attitude was that victory was in the Habsburgs' grasp, and the reasons for deluding the English any further about their intentions were gone. Any intervention on behalf of the Bohemians at this stage could not possibly affect the outcome. The self-confidence, even arrogance, of the Spanish ambassador so infuriated Hay that he had all he could do just to control his temper.[37]

From this point onward the peace mission was at an end, and the ambassador knew it. After a brief stop-over at Heidelberg in mid-August, Hay and about half his company retreated to Spa in the Spanish Neth-

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[32] MS. Clm. 10397, fo. 98ª, B.S.B., Munich.
[33] B. Chudoba, *Spain and the Empire*, 217.
[34] Ibid., 213.
[35] Ibid., 223.
[36] Ibid., 207–08; and *England and Germany*, 193–94.
[37] *England and Germany*, 195.

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erlands to drink the waters and recuperate. At this stage Frederick received formal notification of his election as King of Bohemia, and Ferdinand became Holy Roman Emperor. The latter accepted immediately; the former still hesitated. Hay felt at this point he had to write James for further instructions.

It occurred to a wide variety of people that the English ambassador may not have been as passive in the new Bohemian election as he appeared. That he knew what was going on is beyond question. As August ended, Secretary of State Naunton wrote the ambassador about the Bohemian election.[38] (The two men were now brothers-in-law and political allies.) Hay must surely have heard at least two weeks earlier while traveling through Cologne to Spa. Of course his knowledge is not what is at issue.

Certainly in the frustration of a failed mission, a mission that so far as Hay could tell had been sabotaged by the Habsburgs, the temptation to retaliate must have been very strong. Any advice, however, that the ambassador gave Frederick remained unrecorded. It is known that the two men met secretly in mid-September at Heidelberg.[39] As a result, using Nethersole, Hay may have sent word back to England of his favorable attitude, for Naunton was certain that his brother-in-law would favor the Palatine's assumption of the Bohemian throne and wanted him to return to England. His weight at the privy council discussions on the subject would have meant something.[40]

Yet as events developed Hay kept his distance from the Prince Palatine during the period when he made his decision. It was William Norris, a member of the embassy staff with good Bohemian connections, who wrote the ambassador on 4 September that Frederick would accept the crown.[41] Still, as late as 27 September, Hay was writing Dudley Carleton in a manner that suggested that he did not know definitely what the Prince Palatine would do.[42]

What stands out here is the discretion and caution with which Hay approached such a potentially dangerous issue. While denying any special knowledge of the would-be monarchs' plans, he sang their praises at every opportunity.[43] Without doubt by this stage, he favored Frederick's and Elizabeth's ambitions. The shoal upon which he feared a wreck was the accusation that, since his appearance on the continent in May, he had plotted with the Palatines for them to assume the throne. If that charge was believed, the bottom would have been knocked out of his diplomatic career. James would never have trusted him on another mission and the position he had built over nearly two decades at court would have been destroyed.

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[38] Naunton to Hay, 25 August 1619, Whitehall; Eg. MS. 2593, fo. 8[b], B.L.
[39] R. C. Bald, *John Donne*, 358 note.
[40] Naunton to Hay, 2 September 1619, Eg. MS. 2593, fo. 13[a], B.L.
[41] Norris to Hay, 14 September 1619 (N.S.), Frankfort; Eg. MS. 2593, fo. 25[a], B.L.
[42] Hay to Carleton, 27 September 1619, Frankfort; SP 84/92, fo. 82[a], B.L.
[43] *C.S.P. Ven., 1619–1621*, no. 71, p. 40.

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There was reason enough to fear what the king might do. His reputation as a peacemaker and his devotion to the Spanish match were matters on which he would brook no slurs or interference. If throwing Hay overboard saved face on either issue, James was perfectly capable of doing so. The English political landscape was metaphorically littered with the bodies of men who had paid that price of which Carr was thus far the most famous victim. As events would demonstrate, the ambassador's caution was fully justified.

If Hay had any doubts about the king's attitude toward his son-in-law's adventurism, they were dispelled by the instructions Nethersole brought back with him in late September. Besides having to track down Ferdinand once again and officially congratulate him on his election, Hay was to return to England through the Dutch Republic. There he was ordered to protest his master's innocence in encouraging Frederick to accept the Bohemian crown, but nonetheless to move the Dutch for support of the Princes of the Union in order to protect Germany against any incursions by Albert and Isabella's troops.[44] Of course what James meant was that he did not want Frederick's hereditary lands occupied by the Habsburgs while he was off playing the Protestant knight in Bohemia. The next year that is exactly what happened—and worse.

These instructions also indicate the rather restricted position in which the English king now found himself. Hay was not alone in favoring the Palatine's acceptance of the Bohemian throne. Influential members of the privy council ranging from Archbishop Abbot to the Earl of Pembroke and experienced diplomats from Carleton to Sir Henry Wotton all held the same views. They represented a large segment of English opinion that viewed the Habsburgs as agents of the papal anti-Christ and Frederick as the true Christian prince who would smite them all. James could not totally alienate these people, nor could he place Frederick in a position from which he would lose everything. The humiliation of having the second heir to the throne a landless nonentity, begging for his bread, was more than the king then felt he could bear.

Upon receiving the royal instructions, Hay set off on his wanderings once again. He had to go all the way to Austria to find the new emperor, and having shed his mourning clothes for Queen Anne, was able to put on a show with his usual pomp.[45] They had a private interview in early November at Graz in which the two men conversed in Latin, presumably about the Bohemian situation and Frederick's role therein.

After leaving Ferdinand, on an impulse Hay decided to see Venice. He had no official business there, though it is not hard to imagine his desire to make personal contact with a government that feared the growth of Habsburg influence in the north of Italy and the Adriatic. Presumably

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[44] James to Hay, 23 September 1619, Theobalds, SP 84/92, fos. 68[a]–69[b], P.R.O.
[45] *C.S.P. Ven., 1619–21*, no. 71, p. 41.

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James was expected to foot the bill for this venture as Hay was still officially on his embassy. What the ambassador had not foreseen was that he had to pass through territory in which there had been an outbreak of the plague. As the Venetians had some of the most enlightened quarantine laws of the seventeenth century, the embassy was forbidden to proceed immediately to the city.[46] Whether Hay developed a conscience about living off the royal purse for an extended period of time without accomplishing anything, or he simply felt he had been away from the court long enough, is unknown. In any event in late November 1619 he gave up his dream of seeing Venice and took his party northward for the final part of his mission in the Dutch Republic.

Though it happened by accident, Hay's visit to the Dutch Republic at the end of his embassy rather than the beginning made matters more pleasant for all concerned. The Dutch were well aware that peace between Ferdinand and the Bohemians was not in their interest, and Prince Maurice of Orange, the military commander of the United Provinces, had expressed his impatience with the whole purpose of the embassy. In his opinion James, Frederick and the Princes of the Union should have thrown their full support behind the rebel Bohemians as soon as the troops could be mustered.[47] With Frederick now leading the anti-Habsburg crusade in middle-Europe, and Hay discreetly encouraging aid for him, the English and the Dutch were likely to find common ground.

Reports indicate that the ambassador's Christmastime reception in The Hague was indeed a merry one. He put on the kind of impressive display that gratified even the Dutch Calvinists. His distribution of presents on a lavish scale, even to minor figures such as trumpeters and drummers,[48] must have aided his cause as well. There was, of course, the usual feasting by all parties, and even Carleton, whose complaints of near bankruptcy had become a *leit motiv* in his dispatches, found the money to join in the merry-making.[49]

All of this entertainment was the background to Hay's mission of encouragement to the Estates General and Prince Maurice to support and defend the German Protestants. The ambassador duly appeared before their High Mightinesses with the message from his Britannic Majesty, and they were certainly not averse to cooperation. But they also made clear that they expected James to do his share.[50] Privately Hay gave every indication that, upon his return to England, he intended to encourage his master to do just that.[51]

When the ambassador did return in January 1620, he was forced to fight for his own interests before he could defend Frederick's. The antic-

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[46] Ibid., no. 86, p. 49.
[47] *C.S.P., Ven., 1617–1619,* no. 908, p. 560.
[48] Carleton to Chamberlain, 1 January 1620, The Hague; SP 84/94, fos. 5^{b}–6^{b}, P.R.O.
[49] *C.S.P., Ven., 1619–1621,* no. 180, p. 105.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., 106.

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ipated trouble about his role in the assumption of the Bohemian throne materialized all too rapidly. The Spanish had presumed Hay would complain about their lack of cooperation on the peace mission. They decided to counter his complaints with loud and vigorous protests of their own about his partisanship. The move definitely threw Hay off balance, though he must have expected it. Perhaps the speed and strength of their attack disconcerted him. As he wrote Carleton in January 1620, "Wunder not at my sylens sinse my returne in England for I hawe ever sinse beene in the Spanish inquisition, . . ."[52] It is hardly amazing that it was Oñate who originated the counterattack,[53] but this time it was Hay who came forth as victor.

Even before coming back to court after the embassy, the ambassador had sent Nethersole ahead to check out the atmosphere. Having found it generally favorable, Hay abandoned his cautious approach and took the offensive. He demanded a meeting with the Spanish diplomatic agents in England and forced them to retract their charges.[54] Even so, though James professed himself satisfied with his ambassador's behavior, no hint of doubt could remain if other embassies or favors were to follow this one. Therefore in February 1620 Hay took the usual step of seeking confirmation of his good behavior from the "enemy" camp.[55]

The agent chosen for this task was Toby Mathew, son of a Jacobean archbishop, and now a converted Roman Catholic living in exile in the Spanish Netherlands. On the surface the choice seems an odd one. There is more than a little of the gadfly about Mathew who professed close friendships with Francis Bacon and John Donne. In the next decade he came to worship Lucy Hay as if she were a saint rather than a human being, a truly strange attitude for one closely associated with the Jesuits as he was. But Hay knew what he was doing. Mathew had connections as a Roman Catholic in a Habsburg country that other Englishmen lacked, and he was able to obtain the confirmations sought.[56] Hay also got something he had not bargained for, a forthright evaluation of the 1619 mission as the Spanish saw it.

Those at Brussels regarded the ambassador as a worthy, wise, well-governed and noble-hearted man who was mightily French in his affections. They felt he had no reason to be disgusted with Ferdinand's response to the mission when they met in Salzburg since it was then too late to carry out the original peacemaking project. They also were not oblivious to Hay's efforts either to postpone the imperial election or perhaps keep Ferdinand from the throne. The journey to Bavaria in particular was "a very suspected peece of work." Yet even Oñate (to whom Mathew referred as that little

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[52] Hay to Carleton, January 1620; SP 84/94, fo. 117[a], P.R.O.
[53] Nethersole to Carleton, 18 January 1620, Essex House; SP 14/112, no. 20, P.R.O.
[54] Ibid., 8 January 1620, no. 10.
[55] Hay to Trumbull, 28 February 1620, Essex House; Trumbull-Downshire, MSS., 24: no. 53, Berkshire Record Office.
[56] Mathew to Hay, 26 March 1620, Brussels, Eg. MS. 2593, fo. 110[a-b], B.L.

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baptized Indian) acknowledged that the ambassador had in no way exceeded his instructions. This was dangerous stuff, and Mathew rightfully advised Hay not to probe any further.[57] He had the good sense to follow that advice.

Since it was no longer necessary for Hay to worry about his own position, he began to concern himself single-mindedly with Frederick's. All the previous reticence about the Bohemian cause was cast off, and he threw himself into the battle for James's good will. The fight would not be an easy one. What the English king undoubtedly wanted was the best deal possible between his son-in-law and the emperor and then a return to the Palatinate before it was conquered. Yet the domestic pressure on James to support the Protestant cause was so strong that he could not overtly make such a statement. Instead he tried to smother the embers of rebellion by playing the role of a wet blanket. He would not permit prayers for his "children" as the king and queen of Bohemia, and when Bishop Baily offered them in a sermon at St. Paul's Cross, he was rebuked.[58] When Frederick's agent, Baron Achatius Dohna, arrived at court in February 1620, he was forced to discourse at length on what Frederick claimed was Ferdinand's lack of justification for his actions and the Bohemians' right to depose an elected king. James was not impressed.[59]

Perhaps if the English king could have persistently followed the same course of action over a period of years, he might have worn his opposition down. For many reasons, he could not. The problem of protecting the hereditary lands in Germany meant that he dared not cut off all the Palatine's aid; thus when the Scottish commander, Sir Andrew Gray, came recruiting soldiers in England for Frederick, James did not interfere.[60] The Protestant group felt this action and the subsequent beating of the recruiting drum by Sir Horace Vere that summer was an indication that the king was weakening, and so they kept the pressure on. They refused to make the hair-splitting distinctions James made between Frederick's new and old lands, and they hoped to make it impractical for their sovereign to continue doing so. As for the Spaniards and their allies, they viewed any help given the Palatine as a hostile act. Even if Gray's and Vere's troops were not used in Bohemia, their presence freed those who otherwise would have been defending the German lands.

James's concern for the hereditary lands was well founded. In September 1620 the Marquis de Spinola invaded the Lower Palatinate from the Spanish Netherlands. Two months later the Battle of White Mountain drove Frederick from Bohemia as well. Exactly the situation that James most feared now faced him. His son-in-law had lived up to his derisive title of the Winter King. What is more, the Stuart dynasty had been downcast and

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[57] Ibid., fos. 112[a]–113[a].
[58] SP 14/112, no. 10.
[59] Nethersole to Carleton, 20 February 1620, Essex House; Ibid., no. 93, P.R.O.
[60] Ibid.

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disgraced in full view of the rulers of Europe. All of the English king's efforts to bring respectability and prestige to his family were now in vain. Worse yet, rather than discouraging Frederick's adherents, his losses had only driven them into a greater frenzy. Now they were determined to see a parliament that would grant the funds to reinstate their hero at the head of a victorious army.

Through it all, Hay remained one of the Winter King's staunchest supporters. Here his recent diplomatic experience gave him an advantage, for he was slowly developing a series of contacts with English diplomats all over Europe. Carleton sent him news from the Hague;[61] Trumbull did the same from Brussels.[62] Nethersole, who was now both ambassador to the Princes of the Union and private secretary to Elizabeth, performed the same service. Hay also had cultivated the good will of various officers in the Protestant armies and received their information as well.[63]

There were a variety of uses the former ambassador could make of such information. It helped advance his own diplomatic career, but it also gave him increased credit with James.

Just what the English king or anyone else, for that matter, could do was not at all clear. The invasion of the Lower Palatinate and the loss of Bohemia sent English minds reeling. The carefully balanced program James had attempted to follow was now entirely meaningless. The Palatine no longer had anything to trade his Habsburg conquerors; others would have to do his trading, and all sides expected the English king to do the most. He had two options: either negotiate an agreement preserving at least the fiction of Frederick's sovereignty over his hereditary lands or declare war and take the territories back by force. In practice the first method meant working out something within the Spanish marriage negotiations. Here, obviously, the Spaniards were prepared to make no free gifts. James needed something to trade on Frederick's behalf, and what he decided to use as a bargaining counter was the threat of war and a cessation of the marriage negotiations.

In order to make the war threat credible, money was needed, and that meant a parliament. The king only agreed to this step with great reluctance and always with the hope that somehow he would be able to retract the decision before the first meeting in January 1621.[64]

The other part of making the danger seem real to the Spanish involved Hay. He and others with good ties to the French were sent to the Comte de Tillières, the French ambassador in residence at the English court, with the idea of renewing rumors about a French match. The Frenchman's skepticism did not help to facilitate this portion of the plan;[65] so when

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[61] SP 84/94, fo. 146[a-b], P.R.O., and Eg. MS. 2593, fos. 213[a]–214[a], B.L.
[62] Trumbull-Downshire MSS., 24: nos. 56 and 59, Berkshire Record Office.
[63] T. Fairfax to Hay, 7 August 1620, The Hague: Eg. MS. 2593, fo. 175[a], B.L.
[64] Robert Zaller, *The Parliament of 1621*, 16–30.
[65] Tillières to Puisieulx, 28 September 1620 (N.S.), Leytonstone; PRO 31/3/54, fos. 55[b]–56[a]; and ibid., 27 October 1620 (N.S.), fo. 66[a], P.R.O.

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Monsieur de Cadenet, brother to Louis's favorite Monsieur de Luynes, came over from Calais for a complimentary visit, James seized the opportunity and surrounded the mission with a great deal of mystery. The device worked to such an extent that some Habsburg diplomats at the English court were convinced the Spanish match was over.[66] Hay added to the effect by feasting the visiting Frenchmen with one of his elaborate banquets.[67]

All of this cleverness had one major flaw: Gondomar saw right through it. He had sized up James well enough to recognize that war was anathema to him and that the Spanish match had become a keystone of his policy. He therefore took a gamble and, as the Cadenet mission left, confronted James with some difficult choices. It took him five hours of argument, but the results must have been better than the Spaniard had ever dared dream. Secretary Naunton was suspended from office; Archbishop Abbot was given a stern warning and threatened with removal from the privy council and Baron Dohna was told to stay out of English affairs; subsequently he was forced to leave the country.[68] Frederick's party at the English court had been rendered virtually powerless and was forced to witness the final symbolic blow. James wrote a letter to Louis denying that he had any interest in renewing negotiations for a French match.[69] Without French support there could be no war on the continent for England.

Hay did not escape untainted from this debacle. As Secretary Naunton was his brother-in-law and political ally and as they were both engaged in encouraging the French to believe in a renewal of the match, he was vulnerable to Gondomar's attack. An attempt was made to bring him down with the rest of his faction, but he proved too adept at survival. Among other defensive measures, Hay chose this time to reconcile with the pro-Spanish ambassador, Lord Digby, and he made at least a *pro forma* apology to the Spanish. For Hay, personally, the affairs of January 1621 proved no more than a brief shadow, but for the group that he represented, the one dedicated to Frederick's reinstatement through force of arms, they had reached their nadir. The Habsburgs seemed to dominate English affairs along with the rest of Europe's.

James has taken a good deal of the blame for the position in which the English and Frederick now found themselves.[70] Even at the time the feeling on the part of a large number of influential people, including Hay, was that James should have thrown himself wholeheartedly into the Protestant cause as soon as Frederick became Bohemia's king. Yet, as the next decade

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[66] Charles H. Carter, *Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598–1625,* 184.

[67] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 333–34.

[68] Gondomar to Philip III, 10 February 1621 (N.S.); PRO 31/12/21, from E.L. 2602, fo. 18[a], PRO 31/12/24, fo. 46[a].

[69] Boswell to Calvert, 30 January 1621, Paris; PRO 30/53/4, fo. 37[b], P.R.O. For a full discussion of the plan and its failure see, Schreiber, *Sir Robert Naunton,* 68–84.

[70] *England and Germany,* xxviii–xxxv.

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was to demonstrate time and again, England was unprepared to wage war. It was not organized to do so, and it did not have the financial structure to support a military machine. Having said that, it is also true that James had absolutely no interest in reorganizing and restructuring his government so that it could wage war. If the truth be known, based on the later behavior of the parliaments, there is no firm evidence that the nation at large was prepared to pay the price either. There certainly existed a romantic hankering after the glorious days of Elizabethan privateering. Yet the effectiveness of this type of warfare is an open question. Even presuming the best possible outcome, the capture or destruction of the Spanish treasure fleet, it is difficult to imagine how such an accomplishment would have driven the Austrian Habsburgs out of the Palatinate. Their armies were largely financed by the Bavarians and later by Wallenstein. Certainly when the Dutch captured the fleet in 1629, it did not cause any change in the German situation. It would take the intervention of powerful armies to do that, as the Swedes and later the French were to prove.

James's strength did not lie with his minuscule army or his slowly growing navy; his strength was his ability to talk with people on all sides of the political and religious spectrum. Unfortunately for him, the age felt it had little need of someone with these talents. As a result, James spent the remainder of his reign looking increasingly futile and powerless to control vital events, and in this case, looks were not deceiving.

Huguenots and Spaniards

As Hay tried to struggle free from the pit into which Gondomar had pushed him and his allies, the Parliament of 1621 began. Though Hay had been in England for nearly twenty years, this was the first parliament in which he was entitled to sit as a peer of England. He had many reasons to look forward to the experience with optimism, but he also had reasons for fearing it. Despite the disgrace of Frederick's allies, the parliamentarians who favored his cause represented a powerful group within both the Commons and the Lords. If they applied pressure to James in a concerted way, the recent reverses might be canceled and the Protestant cause triumph. The problem was the Commons had other matters of deep concern besides foreign policy. They had grievances, both financial and constitutional, that required redress, and these complaints could touch Hay in a most unpleasant manner. If there was an investigation of his management of the wardrobe or of any of his patents and monopolies, he might well be unable to defend himself without the king's help. No one could predict accurately if it would be forthcoming. If it came down to parliament demanding that a minister shoulder the blame for past errors, James was more likely to sacrifice Hay than the current favorite, George Villiers.

For all these reasons Hay was careful to attend most of the sessions

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between the opening in January and the adjournment of the first session in June.[1] Though he was there to observe and undoubtedly to drop a word in the proper ear, there is no record that he played any part in the debates. As a "new boy," such forwardness may have seemed inappropriate, and as a vulnerable man, offending as few people as possible made good sense. He did serve on the committee that was charged with investigating the export of ordnance. Spain was most likely the target of these efforts, and therefore there was some controversy.[2] Nevertheless his remaining House of Lords' committees, such as the one for preventing the export of gold and silver and the one to consider Villiers's proposal for founding an academy to educate the children of nobles and gentlemen, had subjects under consideration that were not likely to cause Hay much political trouble.[3]

Once again his prudence paid off. Though he had to give up one patent, it was Francis Bacon and not James Hay who was sacrificed to the discontented Commons. It is, perhaps, not without significance that it was Lord Denny, still Hay's good friend and a fellow patentee, who moved the Lords to have the Great Seal taken from Bacon.[4]

Another event of the 1621 Parliament in which one might detect some behind the scenes activity by Hay concerned his current father-in-law. On 18 May the Earl of Northumberland petitioned the Lords to receive a writ of summons for this parliament. As he had already granted Hay his proxy,[5] this petition may seem like a technicality, but it was more than that. If the Lords approved, the earl could leave the Tower for the first time in a decade and a half. Through the Earl of Pembroke, James signified that he was willing for the Lords to consent to the petition.[6] On an afternoon late in July 1621, riding in a coach pulled by six horses and accompanied by his son-in-law, Northumberland departed from the Tower,[7] leaving behind a walk that still bears his name.[8]

The ride with his father-in-law was Hay's last public appearance in England that summer. He had another extraordinary embassy in France to mediate a peace between Louis and his Protestant subjects.

Just after Hay had left France the last time, there was a palace *coup* that should have made a major difference in that country. Louis, the shy, sensitive tool of Marie de' Medici, suddenly asserted his right to rule the nation. Inspired by his favorite, the Duc de Luynes, the French king had Marie's favorite, Concini, executed. In the wake of this act he had to fight

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[1] Manuscript Minutes, 1621, pp. 7ff., H.L.R.O.; and *Journal of the House of Lords, 1621*, 3: 7–155.

[2] Conrad Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics 1621–1629*, 92, 129; and Committee Appointment Books, 1621, fo. 4[a], H.L.R.O.

[3] Committee Appointment Books, 1621, fos. 4[b] and 8[b], H.L.R.O.

[4] Minute Book, 1621 Parliament, p. 47, H.L.R.O.

[5] *Lords Journal*, 3: 4.

[6] Ibid., 128–29.

[7] Chamberlain, *Letters*, 2: 390.

[8] *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 9: 479 note.

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a rather embarrassing civil war with his own mother for control of the royal government. In a way these occurrences all looked very promising. France could apparently grow strong again under genuine monarchical control, but as events demonstrated, the Duc de Bouillon was right in his more negative appraisal, "The tavern's the same; 'tis but the sign that's changed."[9]

In 1620, in an effort to disprove the *duc's* opinion and to begin asserting a claim to the title of Catholic Europe's most faithful monarch, Louis led a royal army into the semi-independent province of Béarn, annexed it to France and reestablished Roman Catholicism in what had been a Huguenot area. The combination of this action and the defeat of the Bohemian rebels roused fears among the French Protestants, and by early 1621 they had called an unauthorized General Assembly. It was only a short step from there to civil war, and Louis found the country in as much turmoil under his rule as it had been under the worst years of his mother's regime.

Through French contacts, especially those in the Cadenet mission, Hay kept informed of the situation, and so did James.[10] As early as February 1621, Tillières picked up stories from sources close to Hay that some intervention on behalf of the Huguenots was contemplated.[11] While parliament was in session (until 4 June 1621) nothing further was done and even the rumors ceased. Hay did, however, continue to receive information from such prestigious contacts in France as the Huguenot grandee, the Duc de Rohan,[12] and requests for aid from those in the besieged city of La Rochelle.[13]

By early July, however, the pace of English interest quickened, and Tillières was reasonably certain that James would send an embassy to France. At that time three candidates were mentioned: Hay, and the earls of Rutland and Pembroke. Though the Frenchman recognized Hay was a strong Protestant, he felt his anti-Spanish commitment and basically pro-French outlook made him the most desirable of the three possibilities.[14] By 18 July James had decided to follow the comte's advice and wrote letters of credence for Hay.[15] The ambassador left only three days later.

The reasons for English meddling in what was largely a French internal dispute are not difficult to imagine. France in turmoil meant that the Habsburgs' influence in Europe was strengthened by default. It would be a return to the days of Catherine de' Medici when Philip II was able to dominate, if not control, the continent. Insofar as England could hope to exert any pressure, it was only by acting as the balance between virtually equal Bourbon and Habsburg interests. Of more immediate concern, Lord

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[9] V. C. Tapié, *France*, 97.
[10] *C.S.P. Ven., 1619–1621*, no. 698, p. 534.
[11] Tillières to Puisieulx, 1 March 1621 (N.S.), London: PRO 31/3/54, no folio, P.R.O.
[12] Rohan to Hay, 21 May 1621 (N.S.), Rochelle; Eg. MS. 2594, fo. 37ª, B.L.
[13] I. Blandin to Hay, 1 June 1621 (N.S.), Rochelle; ibid., fo. 40ª.
[14] Tillières to Puisieulx, 12 July 1621 (N.S.), Leytonstone; PRO 31/3/55, no folio, P.R.O.
[15] James to Puisieulx, 18 July 1621, Theobalds; ibid., f. 171ª.

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Digby had left in May in an attempt to negotiate Frederick's reinstatement with the emperor and the Spaniards. Digby's known pro-Spanish sentiments made the mission slightly suspect, and the parliament had begun to push for more effective anti-recusancy legislation,[16] presumably to guard against any secret deals he might make. The Commons had also indicated their interest in preserving French Protestantism in their Declaration of 4 June.[17] Under the circumstances, it was useful for James to demonstrate his concern with European Protestantism. Though it would have suited him if the Hay mission succeeded, here it was the gesture that counted; it did not really matter if it failed. Hay understood the nature of this task,[18] but undertook it anyway.

It may seem strange that he would accept an embassy that had a good chance of failing, but he had his reasons. Quite unexpectedly for him, money certainly was not one of them. The scale of the mission was very modest, with a staff of only five or six gentlemen and their servants.[19] Most likely a combination of other factors influenced Hay to tilt with more windmills.

He was genuinely devoted to Anglo-French unity, and a weakened France did not aid his cause. With the pro-Spanish interest and Gondomar clearly holding predominance at court, it was an advantageous time to leave. He might just possibly strengthen his cause from a continental vantage point. Residing on the European side of the Channel, Hay could obtain a better feel for the events, and he would have the opportunity to tap sources of information before they reached England. One instance of this approach was the great interest he exhibited in the progress of the Digby embassy. He had Nethersole make copies of the baron's dispatches and other communications that came through The Hague, along with other information about Germany; Hay read the lot.[20] He also used French sources to obtain information on the progress at the papal court of the dispensation for the Spanish match. This news was forwarded to James.[21] Hay was still working diligently for the Protestant cause and Frederick's restitution; he was, however, a realist and had temporarily adopted an oblique approach.

None of these factors should, however, lead one to believe that he entered into this peacemaking mission in an off-hand manner. He intended to do everything possible to make it succeed. Just before he departed in late July, he unsuccessfully tried to arrange for a show of naval force by English warships off the French coast with the clear object of impressing

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[16] R. Zaller, *1621*, 130–33.

[17] Samuel L. Adams, "The Road to La Rochelle: English foreign policy and the Huguenots, 1610 to 1629," 22 (1975): 422–23.

[18] *C.S.P. Ven., 1621–1623*, no. 126, p. 105.

[19] Tillières to Puisieulx, 23 July 1621 (N.S.), Leytonstone; PRO 31/3/55, fos. 172^{b}–178^{a}, P.R.O.

[20] Nethersole to Hay, 22 August 1621; SP 81/21, fo. 232^{a}, P.R.O.

[21] SP 78/69, fo. 222^{a}, P.R.O.

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Louis with the necessity of paying attention to James's proposals.[22] Such a gesture is not the sign of one who takes his work casually.

Once in France, Hay delayed in Paris only long enough to collect information, gather up his train of followers, who were outfitted locally, and borrow the Venetian ambassador's coach. He then journeyed toward the king's camp outside the besieged Huguenot stronghold of Montauban.[23]

Traveling through a country engaged in a civil war is never an easy task. Doing so in seventeenth-century France was difficult in the extreme. The French communications network, even in peace, was not good, and Montauban, located on the far edge of the Massif Central to the south, was especially difficult to reach. The roads, such as they were in that area, were among the worst. There was even the problem of finding a means to travel these primitive trails. With all available vehicles commandeered for the transport of war materials, and with the horses that had been at the postal relay stations hitched to munitions wagons, just obtaining transport was a major undertaking. The Venetian ambassador's coach alone could not hold Hay's modest train of fifteen to twenty people.[24]

Matters were made a great deal worse by the weather. Actually from the beginning of 1621 the gods of the climate had done their best to play havoc with the inhabitants of Europe. The winter had been one of the coldest in living memory, which said a great deal. The spring, at least in the north, proved wet and so was the early summer. As Lucy Hay commented from Spa that July, the place had a habit of raining that would not be easily removed.[25] In the south, where her husband was, it proved more like Morocco than any place else. Heat, dust, bad roads, worse horses and a circuitous route stretched the length of Hay's journey to nearly three weeks.

Somehow, in spite of all these hazards and problems, the ambassador contrived to maintain the dignity that went with his title of an extraordinary. It is possible to catch a glimpse of his train as it approached the town of Agen, just over forty miles north of Montauban. Hay arrived with two coaches, three wagons (containing the baggage) and outriders. There were also lackeys carrying the armorial bearings of England and France emblazoned on placards in silver. Upon entry into the town, he was received by the resident dignitaries, and all the Huguenot nobles dined with him that evening.[26]

Though such a succession of greetings sounds like a pleasant enough way to travel across France, by the time Hay arrived at the royal camp in Moissac, fifteen miles from Montauban, in late August 1621, he was

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[22] Villiers to Hay, 21 July 1621, Ampthill; Eg. MS. 2594, fo. 54[a], B.L.

[23] *C.S.P. Ven., 1621–1623,* no. 126, p. 105.

[24] Hay to Calvert, 8 August 1621, Châtellerand; Eg. MS. 2594, fo. 63[a], B.L.

[25] W. Woodford to Trumbull, 31 July 1621, Trumbull-Downshire MSS., 49: no. 28, Berkshire Record Office.

[26] G. Ser, "Henri de Rohan: son Rôle dans le parti protestant, de 1617–1622," 475–476 note.

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exhausted and frustrated. He was also showing signs of an illness that came close to killing him.[27]

It was a full month before Hay recovered from this illness, and his recovery is a testimonial to the basic soundness of his constitution. The disease he contracted was called the purple fever, and it killed two members of his staff, a young gentleman named Mr. Fairfax and Mushy, the cook.[28] It also killed numerous Frenchmen of high rank, and within two months would kill the Duc de Luynes, throwing the French government into even greater confusion than it was already.

At the beginning of the summer, however, it was the Huguenots who were in disarray. Unlike the days when Henri IV as king of Navarre had led their cause, there was no natural or recognized leader. The result was a massive fragmentation and deep suspicion. Many of the Huguenot nobles, such as Bouillon, were holding themselves aloof from the rebellion. Others, such as Châtillon, were not unwilling to actively betray their co-religionists in order to earn the king's gratitude. As a result the rebels in the besieged towns were as suspicious of their aristocratic brethren as they were of their Romanist enemies. The only exception to all this divisiveness was the Duc de Rohan who, from his territories in the Cevannes near the Mediterranean, was making a genuine effort to aid those in Montauban.[29] Thus, given the rebels' confusion, from the beginning Louis was able to take them on piecemeal, and his campaign had come to resemble a triumphal progress. Unless something changed, Hay's mission would become one of begging mercy for the Huguenots rather than mediating a peace.

Even upon his first arrival in the war zone, the ambassador recognized where he and his mission stood:

> If the Duke of Rohan can passe with his succours, or the towne hould out till the raynes fall, the kinges army which [is] lodged in a playne and glutinous soyle will be ho[lly inun]dated, as they will not be able to lodge in their trenches, upon these contingents doth depend the safety of this towne and therein the subsistence of the whole body of those of the religion, and if I mistake not the issue of my negociation, it being very probable that I must expect no effectuall and satisfactory answer unlesse the fortune of the kings affaires receave some checke, but in such case it is as likely that they may not be unwilling to be taken fairely of[f] and therefore if I thought it should not be misconstrued, I would adventure to say that the busines which I am to negociate will suffer the lesse preiudice by the necessary delay, which (to my unspeakable greif for that I knowe not how much I may suffer therby) the hande of God hath beene pleased to lay upon mee.[30]

A month later, as the ambassador began to recover his strength, he found his predictions coming true. The royal war machine was beginning to lose momentum. Montauban had successfully resisted attempts to mine

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[27] Hay to Calvert, 28 August 1621, Moissac; SP 78/69, fos. 176[a]–177[b], P.R.O.
[28] J. Woodford to [Nethersole], 5 October 1621, Castle Sarcin; ibid., fo. 236[a–b].
[29] Eg. MS. 2594, fos. 63[b]–64[a], B.L.
[30] SP 78/69, fo. 179[b], P.R.O.

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it, and Rohan had managed to slip some reinforcements into the town. Finances were also becoming a major problem, and the royal army was showing the effects. Desertions, illness and the fighting had reduced the besieging forces to a meager six thousand. As a result, negotiations had begun between Rohan and Luynes for a general peace covering all the Huguenots under arms, and Hay had the opportunity to legitimately offer his services as a mediator. He did not receive any reply at this stage, but he felt with the situation worsening, eventually they would have to come to him.[31] Meanwhile James had decided to apply some pressure and agreed to the earlier suggestion of a show of naval force in the Channel. He also permitted a collection in English churches for the Huguenot refugees.[32]

In combination all these factors began to have their effect on Louis. In mid-October 1621, after Luynes had tried unsuccessfully to make a separate peace with Rohan,[33] Hay was granted three successive audiences with the French king. It was clear no one was prepared to send the ambassador away empty-handed. At the second of these audiences Hay made a lengthy presentation explaining the reasons for his presence in France. He also made certain that Louis understood he was willing to play an unobtrusive role in any mediation and would see to it that the English received no public credit for the final settlement.

Present at all these conferences was Luynes. Reading between the lines, it appears that the French interest in Hay's services came in large measure from him. He certainly wanted the ambassador to feel there was reason to remain at court and to talk.[34] The motivations for his actions are not difficult to discover. Luynes was a middle-aged man who had a reputation for caution (his enemies would have said cowardice). He had been appointed titular leader of the royal armies as Constable, and he was striving to consolidate the victories that had been won rather than gamble on further success. What is more, he more than anyone must have realized how poor his generalship was at Montauban. As for Louis, he was very much concerned with finding an honorable way of disengaging himself from the Montauban situation, and his favorite was able to play on this desire in order to procure an increased role for Hay.

While the talks progressed at the royal camp, the ambassador was making contact with the Duc de Rohan. There was no way the contact could be a personal one; Louis would have taken such a meeting as evidence of plotting with rebels. What was needed was an intermediary. The man chosen was John Woodford, Nethersole's replacement as Hay's secretary.[35] Woodford was the brother of the Reverend William Woodford, the Hay family chaplain. John had formerly worked as secretary to Sir Thomas

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[31] Hay to Calvert, 24 September 1621, Moissac; SP 78/69, fos. 214[a]–216[b], P.R.O.
[32] Calvert to Hay, 22 September 1621, Whitehall; Eg. MS. 2594, fos. 117[a]–118[a], B.L.
[33] Jack A. Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior: The Life and Times of Henri de Rohan, 1579–1638*, 91.
[34] Hay to Calvert, 26 October 1621, Castle Saracin; SP 78/69, fos. 262[a]–268[a], P.R.O.
[35] Hay to James, 13 November 1621, Toulouse; ibid., fo. 288[b].

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Edmonds when he was ambassador to France. He was a man of sharp intelligence who had good French contacts. Upon taking up his position, Woodford was somewhat appalled at the pace at which his new master lived; as he put it to Nethersole, ". . . I finde your wordes true, that I should spend the better parte of the yeare in a coache upon the highway."[36] Yet he managed to adjust and did a credible job for the peace mission.[37]

Amazingly, as the winter progressed, Hay's efforts seemed more and more likely to succeed. Even the death of Luynes in December did not make a significant difference, nor, initially, did the increased influence of Condé or Marie de' Medici. The resulting confusion in the French government was probably of marginal aid to Hay, as it made coordinating the war more difficult. But the greatest help was the continued Huguenot military success, especially the capture of the town of Royan. From this town vessels left the Bay of Biscay, entered the Garonne estuary and traveled up river to the royalist center of Bordeaux. Then as now Bordeaux was the center of the French wine trade, so when the Huguenots of Royan imposed a tax on the merchantmen traveling to and fro, they had the means to finance their rebellion indefinitely.

Using the excuse that English as well as French vessels were being taxed, Hay convinced Louis to let him send Woodford to La Rochelle to remonstrate. Both the king and the ambassador knew the stated reason was no more than a cover for peace negotiations, but, at that stage, matters were going so poorly for Louis there was little at which he could balk.

Woodford presented himself to the Assembly in late December 1621, and after making the *pro forma* complaint about taxing English ships, he moved on to discuss the real purpose of his mission, the peace treaty. Initially he made two proposals: that La Rochelle send deputies to Louis XIII for negotiating the peace, or that they utilize Huguenots already outside their walls for the same purpose. Since the deputies did not trust Louis to speak with one of their number in good faith without first having a royal safe conduct and since they were uncertain as to how someone could negotiate for them who did not know their desires, both proposals seemed like non-starters. The Assembly was, however, willing to make a humble submission to the king asking for forgiveness.[38] That gesture was enough to break the deadlock. By mid-January 1622 Woodford had returned with the humble submission from the town and the Assembly.[39] At the same time the Assembly appointed Rohan as chief peace negotiator for the

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[36] J. Woodford to Nethersole, 13 September 1620; SP 81/18, fo. 74[a], P.R.O.

[37] Hay to Calvert, 14 November 1621, Toulouse; SP 78/69, fo. 291[a–b], P.R.O.

[38] Proceedings of the Huguenot General Assembly, 7 January 1622 (N.S.); MS. 2613, fos. 7[a]–11[b], Bibliothèque Mazarin.

[39] Hay to Calvert, 17 January 1622, Paris; SP 78/70, fos. 12[a]–14[a], P.R.O.; and J. Woodford to Trumbull, 21 January 1621; Trumbull-Downshire MSS., 49: no. 31, Berkshire Record Office.

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Huguenots.[40] They were inches away from having successfully mediated a peace.

Interestingly enough, from December 1621, after the second session of parliament had met, and in the wake of the failure of Digby's peace efforts, James showed little interest in the mission to France. The parliament was making difficulties over the Spanish match. The smoke screen of the French mission had therefore lost its purpose for the king. On 4 December, the day after James had sent an angry letter to the Commons about their protestation, he informed his ambassador that he could return home any time he thought fit.[41] A few weeks later James tried to divert Hay's energies to Lorraine in an effort to prevent recruiting there for the Habsburg cause.[42] Clearly the king had written off the mediation.

The irony is that, if James had shown his usual persistence with this peace mission as he had with earlier efforts and conveyed a sense of urgency to Hay, the agreements almost certainly could have been signed before the spring campaigning season began. But he did not. When the agreement looked close to completion in February 1622, the ambassador took temporary leave of Louis and went back to England.

Despite the slackening of royal interest, Hay's departure nonetheless seems strange. It is true that one of the reasons for the journey was that his wife's death appeared imminent,[43] and it is likely that Hay's return contributed to her recovery. It is also true that Louis was most anxious to see Hay return to France quickly,[44] for the young French king had developed a genuine liking for this middle-aged Scot with his innate sense of tact and exquisite taste. Yet, even with all of these explanations, there was almost certainly political motivation as well: renewed prospects for a French match.

As Hay was on the verge of leaving France, the Venetian resident in Paris picked up rumors that Marie de' Medici and her faction were not averse to having such prospects explored by the English ambassador when he returned home.[45] Upon Hay's arrival in London and during his stay there, the same rumor reached the ear of the Venetian resident in England.[46] Even Tillières, who was ordinarily the great skeptic about any English approach concerning a match, after talking with Hay advised Secretary Puisieulx to listen very carefully to anything the ambassador might have to say upon his return.[47]

What Hay was trying to do was take advantage of the change in the political atmosphere that had taken place over the course of the last year.

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[40] 21 January 1622 (N.S.); MS. 2613, fos. 23[a]–24[b], Bibliothèque Mazarin.
[41] Calvert to Hay, 4 December 1621, Whitehall; Eg. MS. 2594, fo. 183[a], B.L.
[42] SP 78/70, fos. 14[b]–15[a], P.R.O. and *C.S.P. Ven., 1621–23,* no. 287, p. 210.
[43] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 424.
[44] *C.S.P. Ven., 1621–23,* no. 338, pp. 244–45.
[45] Ibid., 245.
[46] Ibid., nos. 369 and 375, pp. 261 and 266.
[47] Tillières to Puisieulx, 7 April 1622 (N.S.), London: PRO 31/3/56, fo. 24[b], P.R.O.

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The beginnings of the change lay in the announcement Digby brought back at the end of October 1621 that the Austrian Habsburgs had rejected his peace initiative. James was understandably uneasy about finding himself completely dependent upon what Spain would grant in the marriage treaty. In December the Commons had petitioned him to drop the Spanish match. He let them feel the weight of his offended majesty, but he also recognized the depth of feeling from which that petition came. The dissolution of parliament in January 1622 did nothing to change this fact of life. As a result, he was willing to consider alternatives.

In early 1622, even without more parliamentary subsidies, trying to strengthen Frederick militarily did not seem an impossibility, especially in the Lower Palatinate. Pockets of resistance to Spinola's army still remained, including the capital, Heidelberg. As the Dutch made communications difficult for the Habsburgs via the northern sea route, they relied mainly on moving troops and supplies through the Duchy of Milan northward across the Alps to Germany and the Spanish Netherlands. The weak point in this route, as everyone knew, was the Alpine pass of the Valtelline. It was also well known that the French were not happy about masses of Spanish troops passing close to their borders. If the Huguenot wars were ending, Louis might be tempted into capturing the pass, and a royal bridegroom for his youngest sister, Henrietta Maria, could serve as the final necessary inducement.

The length of time Hay stayed in England during the winter and spring of 1622 can be attributed to many factors. Lucy was slow to recover from her illness; Lionel Cranfield, the Lord Treasurer, who favored the Spanish match, was reluctant to provide money for the trip back to France.[48] Yet most likely the ambassador was trying to hammer out some arrangement with James concerning offers he could make the French. Thus it was two months before he set out again to find the French king. No doubt Hay went with the idea that he would arrive in time to witness the final and general peace between Louis and his Huguenot subjects.[49] The new proposals then could be received in a favorable atmosphere with Louis, who fancied himself a soldier-king like his father, looking to regain his lost honor on a foreign battlefield.

What turned the whole situation to dust was that the royalists began winning the war again. Royan was retaken, so was the Ile de Ré on the approach to La Rochelle. As spring turned into another hot summer, the list of besieged and taken towns continued to grow: Ste. Foy, Moissac and Agen. Negrepelisse was not only taken, but sacked and burned.[50]

Though in a sense Louis's victories might have been useful to Hay, as they meant France would become a more unified country, in fact they spelled the end of his mediation. The peace agreements of the winter were

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[48] Ibid., fo. 24ª.
[49] *C.S.P. Ven., 1621–23*, no. 453, pp. 317–18.
[50] V. L. Tapié, *France*, 125.

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torn up, and all the ambassador's and Woodford's work was undone. Louis seemed to have in mind the total destruction of Huguenot military power and was prepared to spend the summer at it. Thus all of Hay's plans became meaningless.

Once again he went through all the motions, but this time to no avail. In early May 1622 he reported on his first interview with Louis. As he had done before, the ambssador said all the right, flattering things and ended by offering his services as mediator. The king's reply, once all the politeness was scraped aside, was no thank you. What is more, Hay quickly perceived that Louis was unlikely to offer the Huguenots any terms at all, if he could conquer them. Further evidence of the new, harsher policy soon appeared. The king dismissed his loyal Huguenot attendants who refused to attend mass.[51]

By mid-May James realized it was no use and gave his ambassador permission to return home as he had plenty for him to do there.[52] A few days later Hay reached the state of mind of a man who had built graceful sandcastles by the sea, only to discover they were not quite out of reach of the tide. He pleaded with James to give him some advice that might enable him to at least protect the Huguenot cause or to make some effort on their behalf, even though the affairs of Germany were obviously the king's primary concern.[53]

From that stage onwards Hay became enmeshed in side issues. The French began interfering with foreign ships carrying wine from Bordeaux. Unlike the Huguenots, who had simply taxed the cargoes at two crowns per ton, the royalists were actually restraining the ships, claiming that they were supplying money to the rebels.[54]

Hay had personal reasons for becoming involved in this matter. He held the monopoly for collecting the customs on wine exported to Ireland. Any restraint of that trade would be a serious financial blow to a man who, under the best of circumstances, lived very close to the edge of bankruptcy. Yet, if he was suffering, he was not alone. Some of the merchants had gone so far as to request the privy council to grant them letters of marque against the French.[55] The council itself clearly felt that the treatment of the English was a poor return for the mediation efforts and wanted the ambassador to correct the situation.[56] As May 1622 ended, he was able to do so, but his basic pessimism remained.[57]

By the last days of June Hay had had enough. He procured one last audience with Louis, said his farewells and, without any open bitterness, left for England.[58]

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[51] Hay to Calvert, 4 May 1622, Xaintes [sic]; SP 78/70, fos. 105^{b}–107^{a}, P.R.O.
[52] Calvert to Hay, 14 May 1622, Whitehall; Eg. MS. 2595, fo. 96^{a-b}, B.L.
[53] Hay to James, 19 May 1622, ibid., fo. 105^{a}.
[54] Hay to Calvert, 19 May 1622, Bordeaux; SP 78/70, fo. 116^{a}, P.R.O.
[55] *A.P.C. 1621–1623*, 6 May 1622, 211.
[56] Ibid., 14 May 1622, 220.
[57] Hay to Calvert, 22 May 1622, Bordeaux; PRO 78/70, fo. 142^{a-b}, P.R.O.
[58] Ibid., 26 June 1622, fo. 162^{b}–163^{a}.

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During the second, barren phase of the French mission, Tillières kept up a steady drum-fire of dispatches to Secretary Puisieulx begging him not to send the ambassador home empty-handed.[59] That, however, is exactly what happened. Thus when the French ambassador saw Hay in early August, the effects of this slight were very much in evidence. Though it was out of the question for a man with Hay's diplomatic experience to accuse anyone of having sabotaged his mission, he nevertheless made it clear to Tillières that he was profoundly hurt and embittered by his experience.[60] In the short run his discontent showed in uncharacteristic behavior; he became embroiled in a dispute with his brother-in-law, Robert Sidney (now Lord Lisle), and they had to be reconciled.[61] In the long run Hay's twenty-year love affair with France was all but over. The country and its people had betrayed his hopes, and, when he came back again for the most important negotiations of his career, he would remember his treatment and see to it that the French did too.

All of these travails did have some reward. In September 1622 Hay became the Earl of Carlisle, the title by which he is best known, but problems and resentment remained. He spent that autumn and winter trying to help his friends, such as Naunton, who was still suspended from office because of the abortive French marriage negotiations of the previous year.[62] He also refused to be placated about his treatment in France.[63] It is interesting that during this same period in a conversation with Tillières, Carlisle claimed that he was looking more favorably upon the Spanish than he had ever done before.[64] Here he was playing the weathercock and the realist. Even before the ambassador left France, he was one of the few people who knew that Buckingham had planned a voyage to Spain, perhaps with the role of escort for the Infanta in mind, perhaps with more serious plans.[65] The completion of the Spanish match apparently would undermine everything for which Carlisle had been working. But unlike Naunton, the earl had the sense to realize that in politics and war, unalterable gains were rare. At times retreat was necessary. Besides with Buckingham preparing to go to Madrid, an unexpected gain was a genuine possibility.

Of all the fiascoes in which James, Charles and their favorite were involved either collectively or individually, this journey is often singled out for special attention. It appears totally useless and utterly detrimental to English interests. It is given as proof positive of James's senility and of the two younger men's failure to grasp reality.

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[59] Tillières to Puisieulx, 18 May 1622 (N.S.) London; PRO 31/3/56, fo. 36^{b}, P.R.O.; and ibid., 25 June 1622, fo. 58^{b}.

[60] 13 August 1622, ibid., fo. 91^{a-b}.

[61] Chamberlain, *Letters*, 2: 451–52 and *Letters and Memorials of State . . . Collected by Sir Henry Sydney*, 2: 354.

[62] Chamberlain, *Letters*, 2: 455.

[63] Tillières to Puisieulx, 1 September 1622 (N.S.), London: PRO 31/3/56, fo. 103^{b}, P.R.O.

[64] Ibid., fo. 104^{a}–105^{a}.

[65] Carlisle to Buckingham, 20 August (1623), Cranborne; Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 332^{b}, B.L.

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That the prince and his favorite were playing the role of knights errant is undeniable, but it should be kept in mind that it was a role commonly accepted at the time. Just a few years earlier, the Lion of the North, Gustav Adolph of Sweden, had wooed and won the sister of the Elector of Brandenburg despite the differences in their families' religions. Even James, no greater lover of women or the knightly image, had gone in person to fetch Queen Anne from Denmark across the unpredictable North Sea. If the two young men had been successful in their venture, their contemporaries would have applauded their actions.[66]

As for the king's approval of the voyage, his feelings were ambivalent. On the one hand, he knew the marriage negotiations were extremely delicate, especially in the area of toleration for English Roman Catholics. Without some provision on Romanist worship neither Frederick nor Charles could expect satisfaction from the Spaniards. There was now no option but to tie the two men's hopes together, even though the Habsburgs were unwilling officially to do so. This marriage treaty seemed like James's only hope. The last Protestant strongholds in the Lower Palatinate surrendered in September 1622. Even the wholly ineffectual Protestant Union of Germany put itself out of business by formally dissolving. With all Frederick's hereditary lands conquered and his native allies withdrawn, the Winter King did not even have a base from which to operate. If James was going to reestablish him, or at least some member of his family, the marriage negotiations were the only readily available means.

The other side of the problem was the attitude of the English towards trading Frederick's future for the Protestant religious monopoly in their country. They would never permit it, at least not in any open or systematic manner, such as suspending of the recusancy laws. There was even doubt whether the majority of the privy council would approve a modified toleration in the form of individual dispensations for each Roman Catholic. If they did not, most likely the Spanish, and surely the papacy, would never permit the marriage. It was an impossible situation.

It is conceivable that, from James's point of view, the Madrid journey was the gamble that might break the stalemate. The heir to the throne and the crown's most influential minister would be in Spain when the privy council was asked to approve the marriage treaty. Would the councillors dare risk Spanish retaliation against these two men if the approval was denied? In the event they did not.[67]

On the other side of that equation the presence of Charles and Buckingham in Spain meant there was a danger the terms of the treaty might be made more stringent. They could virtually be held for ransom. Yet by this stage James must have decided the risk was worth the dangers. The problem was that by nature he was not a gambling man. Thus it is hardly

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[66] For a detailed discussion of the motivation for the Madrid journey see Roger Lockyer, *Buckingham*, 134–39.

[67] Conway to Buckingham, 17 July 1623, Theobalds; Harl. MS. 1580, fo. 309[a–b], B.L.

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surprising that he changed his mind at least once, an act that led to a famous confrontation with Buckingham. As Clarendon reports the incident, it was the king who backed down.[68] He was being forced to play against the grain of his own nature, and if tears and indecision were the result, such behavior need not be taken as evidence of a mind in its dotage. Few can risk all on one throw of the dice without flinching.

Carlisle's involvement in the Madrid odyssey was an outgrowth of James's general nervousness. The prince and the favorite had decided to travel the land route to Madrid via Paris. They were *incognito* under light disguises that would fool no one. There was always the chance that the French might decide to interfere with the venture, either out of pique at not being asked for passports or for political reasons. Who better than the former ambassador *extraordinaire* to deal with this contingency?

James had more concerns than just what the French might do; he was also concerned about what his son might do. Specifically he worried about Charles's ability to withstand the blandishments of Spanish Catholicism in all its glory. The king had given Buckingham instructions to look after the Protestant cause, but he also wanted an experienced diplomat of confirmed Protestantism somewhere within reach in case the prince began to waver.[69] Perhaps James was already aware of his son's "Arminian" tendencies, or perhaps his nickname for the prince, Baby Charlie, says all that needs saying about his estimate of the man's abilities. Whatever the cause, by 24 February 1623 Carlisle found himself in Dover shadowing the movements of his future monarch.[70]

Though this time Tillières claimed that Carlisle received all the embassies that were for show and Digby all those that were of substance,[71] this mission was far from just requiring the Scot to strut decoratively at a distance. He had to watch his actions most carefully. As ambassador, he could not give the impression of preparing the way for Charles and Buckingham, or he would destroy the illusion of a knightly errand they were trying to create. Yet Carlisle was there to pick up the pieces if anything went awry; his very presence bespoke James's lack of confidence in those involved. In France he could smooth some ruffled feathers. In Spain, together with Charles, Buckingham, Digby and their associates, he was one more cook with a spoon in an already well-stirred broth.

Very seasick, Carlisle arrived in Boulogne on 24 February 1623, the same day he left Dover. He realized that it was important to move quickly in order for Charles and Buckingham to hear of his mission from him rather than through the rumor mill, so a messenger was sent ahead to offer his services.[72] He also had the resident ambassador, Sir Edward Her-

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[68] Clarendon, *History of the Great Rebellion*, 1: 21–22.

[69] Tillières, to Puisieulx, 12 and 21 March 1623 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/57, fos. 179[a–b], 183[a], P.R.O. and Lockyer, *Buckingham*, 145–46.

[70] Carlisle to Calvert, 24 February 1623, Dover; SP 78/71, fo. 41[a–b], P.R.O.

[71] Tillières to Puisieulx, 24 April 1623 (N.S.), London: PRO 31/3/57, fo. 198[b]; P.R.O.

[72] Carlisle to Conway and Calvert, 24 February 1623, Boulogne; SP 78/71, fos. 43[a], 45[a–b]; P.R.O.

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bert, notify Secretary Puisieulx of the purpose of his journey and make preliminary enquiry about Louis's willingness to issue passports. Carlisle then requested that the French do nothing one way or the other until he arrived in Paris. The secretary thought it was all a little strange, but agreed to help.[73]

As Charles and Buckingham had already left Paris when Carlisle arrived, he immediately set about arranging for a royal audience. There was a delay for a few days as Louis was out of town hawking, but the ambassador was eventually received graciously by the French king who "willingly and cheerfully assented" to all requests. In making a report of the incident, Carlisle could not resist passing on to England the sense of lost opportunity that Marie de' Medici felt as she saw Charles going to woo someone else's daughter. He also passed on a warning that he received from Secretary Puisieulx that the agreement on the Spanish match was not as near completion as everyone was then presuming.[74] This dispatch shows that Carlisle was still a man in limbo; the French had betrayed both him and themselves the previous year, but somehow that did not make the Spaniards seem any more attractive.

Whether he liked them or not, the ambassador was going to visit the Spanish on their ground, and by late March he arrived in Madrid. It was an uncomfortable situation for all concerned. The Spaniards were well aware of Carlisle's anti-Habsburg sentiments[75] and having him look over everyone's shoulder and report back to James did not appeal to them very much. Digby no doubt felt the same way. The two ambassadors were periodically cordial to one another, but they were rivals in diplomacy and had decidedly different viewpoints about religion and international relations. Charles and Buckingham (who became a duke while in Madrid) were anxious to prove their capabilities as negotiators as well as knights errant; they also did not desire Carlisle's help.

All the indications are that the ambassador did not wish to remain and make himself obnoxious. Though James may have hoped that Carlisle would stay to defend his religion, he did not order him to do so. As John Woodford put it, it was no part of their charge and less of their desire to meddle with public affairs.[76] As Carlisle saw his mission, he was there to discreetly pick up any mess the two young men made while in transit; Digby would have to take his turn now that they were in Madrid.

What everyone needed was a face-saving method of sending Carlisle home, and in early April it arrived. The dispensation for the match (minus the attached conditions) was delivered by a courier from Rome. Buckingham and Charles decided that Carlisle could have the honor of being the first

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[73] Herbert to James, 26 February 1623, Paris; ibid., fo. 55[a].

[74] Carlisle to Calvert, 4 March 1623, Paris; ibid., fos. 68[a]–70[a].

[75] Colma to Phillip, 1 March 1623 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/12/25, fo. 25[b], P.R.O. and Junta de los cassaimentos con Inglaterra, 15 April 1623, Madrid; PRO 31/12/28, fo. 124[a], P.R.O.

[76] J. Woodford to Trumbull, 2 April 1623, Madrid; Trumbull-Downshire MSS., 49: no. 40, Berkshire Record Office.

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to publicly announce the event back in England.[77] The excuse fooled no one, least of all the ambassador, and he did not exactly race home by the quickest means with the document in hand. In late April he arrived in Paris, not London, and proceeded to stay there for nearly a month.[78] It is difficult to tell exactly what Carlisle was doing during this time, but around the middle of the month he wrote Buckingham that the French were preparing to make trouble over the Valtelline and were secretly gathering troops.[79] In all likelihood the earl was not beyond encouraging the French to cause trouble. If nothing else, a distracted Spain meant a stronger English bargaining position, and they had little enough to work with as it was.

When the ambassador did return to England, he found it advantageous to assume a certain Hispanic air and to profess his devotion to the Conde de Olivares, Spain's chief minister.[80] He was accepting what he presumed was the inevitability of the marriage and trying to make his way in the world as he found it. James, however, was not prepared to let Carlisle sit about and be strictly ornamental. The negotiations on the match were far from ended, and the king had need of his tactful Protestant watchdog.

By the end of July the council had given its approval to the treaty and the accompanying relaxation of the recusancy laws, but the problems with the Spanish seemed to multiply rather than diminish. Carlisle's diplomatic skills were therefore focused on the two Spanish extraordinary ambassadors, Don Carlos de Coloma and the Marquis de Inojosa. The latter of the two men was an especially prickly individual who was convinced his home government had been entirely too easy on the English, much to the detriment of indigenous Roman Catholics.[81] All Carlisle's finesse was required to uphold the English side. With this in mind, the earl began his contact with the two Spaniards in his traditional manner; he threw one of his monumental banquets. According to Secretary Calvert, it had the desired overawing effect.[82]

Before the real business began, there was a pause in early August as the court moved to the West Country, following the royal progress. Upon arriving in Salisbury, the talks resumed with Carlisle and the new secretary, Sir Edward Conway, Naunton's replacement, representing the English side. What they had to do was convince the Spanish ambassadors that James had fulfilled all his promises respecting the easing of the anti-recusancy laws so that they would write a favorable letter to Philip. The Spanish king in turn would then give the final approval for the marriage. The problem was that the pardon that James had issued created as many

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[77] Buckingham to Conway, 8 April 1623, Madrid; Harl. MS. 6987, fo. 65[a], B.L.
[78] *C.S.P. Ven., 1623–25*, nos. 36 and 42, pp. 25 and 28.
[79] Carlisle to [Buckingham], 13 May 1623, Amiens; Harl. MS. 1580, fo. 191[a], B.L.
[80] James to Charles and Buckingham, N.D.; Harl. MS. 6987, fo. 80[a], B.L.
[81] Conway to Buckingham, 5 August 1623, Salisbury; Harl. MS. 1580, fo. 321[b], B.L.
[82] Calvert to Conway, 26 July 1623, St. Martins Lane; SP 14/149, no. 53, P.R.O.

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difficulties as it answered.[83] Inojosa objected to the fact that all confiscated Roman Catholic property was not automatically restored, to the shame non-Protestant scholars faced in the universities and to the handicaps they suffered in seeking office. Carlisle and Conway gave elaborate explanations to all of these problems and called upon George Gage, an English Roman Catholic involved in the negotiations, to support their contentions. Although Gage did so to the Englishmen's satisfaction, the Spaniard was still far from pleased. When asked about what he would say in the letter to Philip,

> hee answered with an earnest (allmost a Chollerick[)] franknes that hee ought and would write that the King had fulfilled every jott of that hee was bound too, and more, but wherein more (though hee would write into Spaine) he would not tell us,. . .[84]

Ultimately, after much more argument, Inojosa agreed to hasten to London, and swore on the cross of Carlisle's sword that he would rapidly send a copy of the pardon and the needed covering letter to Spain.[85] The man was true to his word, and a week later, under his and his fellow ambassador, Coloma's, signature, the dispatch was sent.[86] However reluctantly and with whatever vagaries, the English side of the marriage contract was considered fulfilled. The Spanish side was another story.

From James's point of view the linchpin of the match was the restoration of Frederick to the Palatinate. The English king would not have tampered with the religious settlement in England for any other reason. Yet from the Spanish point of view the unrestricted restoration of the Calvinist elector to his hereditary lands was as politically dangerous and religiously undesirable as toleration was to the English. By the end of August 1623 the best formula they could reach was to have Frederick's ten-year-old son marry the emperor's daughter. The young man would then go to live with his in-laws (where presumably, despite precautions against the contingency, he would convert to Roman Catholicism). Frederick would then receive back his lands as a reward, and his son would receive the honors. Whether the Palatine was reinstated into any or all of the honors in his lifetime would depend upon a mediation effort by unnamed parties.[87] What the Habsburgs were doing was establishing a Roman Catholic, Habsburg connected line with a legitimate claim to the English throne. All that stood in their way was Baby Charlie and his child bride. It was Mary Tudor all over again. The alternative was to leave matters as they were with the Roman Catholics making gains in England and nothing to show for it.

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[83] SP 14/150, no. 47.
[84] Harl. MS. 1580, fo. 321[b], B.L.
[85] Ibid., fo. 322[a].
[86] Inojosa and Coloma to Philip, 22 August 1623 (N.S.); Harl. MS. 1583, fo. 321[a–b], B.L.
[87] Charles and Buckingham to James, 29 August 1623, Madrid; Harl. MS. 6987, fo. 159[b], B.L.

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The astonishing thing about this irrational situation was that the Spanish almost brought it off. Had the Infanta returned to England with Charles and Buckingham in early October, they probably would have succeeded in bringing about one of the seventeenth century's most one-sided diplomatic *coups*. Their reluctance to send the young princess was all that prevented it. In a sense the Spaniards' behavior is understandable. As the marriage was not finally concluded, she would have been the same kind of hostage as the prince and the favorite had been. Yet sending the two men back home discontented and with nothing to show for their prolonged stay in Spain was equally dangerous. They were likely to seek revenge against those who had robbed them of their triumphs as knights errant and diplomats. The wheel was thus spinning toward Carlisle's natural interests.

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II. BUCKINGHAM AND CHARLES

The French Match—First Efforts

The Spanish match did not collapse all at once but by slow stages. Its main prop was still James. He had set his mind on the link with Spain and a peaceful settlement of the Palatine's difficulties. Publicly he had risked a great deal to bring off the match, and the prospect of a breakdown was not at all agreeable to him. Yet the pivot of the whole operation, the restoration of Frederick or one of his family, just was not going to turn in the desired direction. As the king himself reputedly said, he would not have his only son marry if the price was "a Portion of Tears to his only Daughter."[1] He had given up too much to the English Roman Catholics for the reward of a royal marriage alone. The result of this situation was that James fought a slow, rearguard operation with every backward step, trying to demonstrate to the Spaniards that they, too, would have to pay a major price for breaking off the marriage. The whole time he was pressed vigorously by Buckingham and Charles on two fronts: to stop the Spanish match while beginning negotiations for a French one, and to call a parliament.

In all of these maneuvers Carlisle had a significant role to play. Indeed he became involved very early on. The return of Charles and Buckingham in October 1623 traditionally marks the beginning of the end for the Spanish match. In fact Carlisle must have had reason to suspect that all was not as well as it seemed even before they returned. The Venetian resident in France reported two weeks earlier that the earl had made contact with the Duc de Chevreuse with the presumed intention of re-opening marriage negotiations.[2] The plan was for the French nobleman to come to England as rapidly as possible and to explore the possibilities. Tillières was inclined to go along with the idea if there was any chance that Carlisle was acting as an intermediary for Charles.[3]

If the earl was to succeed in substituting the French match for the Spanish one, he could greatly benefit from Tillières's aid. If the ambassador balked, however, there was likely to be trouble. On the surface all looked promising. Carlisle had been carefully cultivating him for some time, and unquestionably the Frenchman was very much aware of the deteriorating situation in Anglo-Spanish relations through the autumn and winter of

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[1] Robert E. Ruigh, *The Parliament of 1624*, 18. Chapter I gives a concise record of the breakdown of the Spanish match.

[2] *C.S.P.Ven., 1623–25*, no. 155, p. 124.

[3] Tillières to Puisieulx, 22 October 1623 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/57, fo. 259ª, P.R.O.

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1623–24. As early as November he had asked for specific instructions on how to turn the situation to French advantage.[4] Yet Tillières's Catholicism was at war with his nationalism. He did not trust English Protestants to aid French interests. By December, as the prospect of serious proposals for a French marriage became an increasing likelihood, Tillières found he did not have the stomach for them and asked for permission to return home, permanently.[5]

Given his reaction, the only alternative was to send an Englishman to France. Unfortunately for Carlisle, at this stage, he began to lose control of his liaison with the French. Buckingham chose Sir Henry Rich for the mission.

Rich was a man ten years younger than Carlisle. He was handsome, ambitious and by 1624 showed signs of having positioned himself for major advancement. He had been with Buckingham and Charles in Madrid and clearly made himself acceptable to them. In some respects the use of Rich should not have been entirely unwelcome to the earl. The two men had been acquainted for some years, and, if Clarendon is correct, the younger man was something of a protégé of the elder's.[6] In 1621 Carlisle certainly took an interest in Sir Henry while he was a gentleman volunteer fighting in the Netherlands.[7] It is even likely that Carlisle procured the title Lord Kensington for Rich before he left for Madrid.[8]

Yet, despite their close connections, the earl may not have entirely trusted his friend for this mission. On 18 December 1623 he had a conversation with Tillières during which he asked the ambassador what he thought of the proposed French journey by Rich. Carlisle tried to make it sound as though Buckingham was the source of the question, but as the Frenchman and the duke had conversed on the subject shortly before, the ploy was all too transparent. In Tillières's opinion the earl was upset because the mission was complimentary and exploratory rather than substantive. There is at least the hint that it was the man rather than the mission that bothered Carlisle.[9]

Whatever the jockeying for position within the group of anti-Spaniards, the battle for royal approval for the French marriage still needed winning or the Spanish match might never die a natural death. Carlisle remained one of the spearheads of the struggle that was now carried to the privy council. As late as 20 January 1624, there were reports that the council's committee on foreign affairs was split five to three in favor of the Spanish match, with four neutrals. Buckingham (in absentia), Secretary Conway

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[4] Ibid., 26 November 1623 (N.S.), fo. 265[b].
[5] Ibid., 21 December 1623 (N.S.), fo. 273[a]; and Tillières to Marie de' Medici, 29 December 1623 (N.S.), fo. 279[a].
[6] Clarendon, *History*, 1:78.
[7] Nethersole to Hay, 7 August 1621, The Hague; SP 81/21, fo. 202[b], P.R.O.
[8] March 1622/23; IND 6746, P.R.O.
[9] Tillières to Puisieulx, 29 December 1623 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/57, fo. 282[b], P.R.O.

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and Carlisle were the three negative votes.[10] It was the intervention of Charles that finally produced the anti-Spanish vote needed, and at the end of the month Carlisle and Conway took the news to James at Newmarket.[11]

Just what this vote meant is difficult to say. It was certainly not a declaration of war against Spain, nor was it a mandate for a French marriage. To the king, initially, it was most likely only additional ammunition to make the Spanish come to more reasonable terms on the Palatinate. New proposals from Philip were, however, not forthcoming and parliament was scheduled to meet in mid-February. By the very nature of things James would be dragged further away from a Spanish alliance and closer to an alternative which meant a French match.

Parliament would exert a pull of its own upon the king, but unless their relations were relatively unblemished by clashes involving the royal prerogative, this major force might pull in the wrong direction. Judging by subsequent actions, Carlisle's experience with the previous parliament had convinced him that the parliamentarians were in the first instance concerned with domestic grievances. If these complaints remained unredressed, no subsidies would be granted to finance a strong foreign policy. Their failure to vote supplies would, in turn, weaken England's bargaining position abroad. Therefore just as the 1624 Parliament was scheduled to open in February, after consultation with various unnamed members of the Commons, the earl wrote James a long letter in which he advised him to "Cast but away some crummes of your Crowne amongst them, and your Matie. will see those crummes will worke a miracle, they will satisfy many thousands."[12] Little did Carlisle realize at the time that his own patent to search out concealed lands would be one of these "crummes."[13]

Nevertheless he offered good advice, both domestically and internationally, but as had been the case with the previous parliament, there was the chance that the earl himself might be devoured by the House of Commons. There were his usual well-founded fears about his patents, but now more than ever his management of the wardrobe was a potential target. His successor in that post, Cranfield, was a principal target of Buckingham and Charles. As Lord Treasurer, the financial implications of the break with Spain appalled Cranfield, and he was about as unpleasant on the whole subject as he could be. The prince and the favorite had therefore decided to use their influence to have him impeached by the Commons on charges of corruption. One aspect of Cranfield's defense would almost certainly be a comparison of his management of the wardrobe to Carlisle's. This approach would offer the prosecutors a substitute target,

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[10] Chamberlain, *Letters*, 2: 541–42 and Ruigh, *Parliament of 1624*, 4 and note.
[11] *C.S.P.Ven., 1623–25*, no. 263, p. 211.
[12] Carlisle to James, 14 February 1624; Harl. MS. 1580, fo. 195^{b}, B.L.; and Ruigh, *Parliament of 1624*, 150–52.
[13] *C.S.P.D., 1623–1625*, no. 10, p. 266.

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and if it succeeded, would be a blow at a major figure in the anti-Spanish party.

There are indications that Carlisle recognized his vulnerability and tried to make some kind of deal with the beleaguered Lord Treasurer. In April 1624 he wrote Cranfield requesting a meeting.[14] It is interesting to note that on 10 April their names were the last ones entered in the attendance records of the House of Lords' minute book,[15] indicating they walked in late and may well have come in together.

In May, when the impeachment proceedings began against the Lord Treasurer, Carlisle was not listed as attending the House of Lords and, with one exception, he stayed away until the day upon which the peers voted on the impeachment. That day his name was the last one entered in the minute book.[16] If, however, there was a deal made between the two men that they would not attack one another, Cranfield broke it. In his defense before the Lords he lambasted Carlisle's management of the wardrobe and implied that there was something improper about a sum of £3,000 that changed hands between the two men. The situation was serious enough to force Carlisle's appearance at the Lords to defend himself.[17] Luck (and probably Buckingham and Charles) were on the earl's side, and matters were pursued no further. The Lord Treasurer was not so fortunate, and with his removal the pro-Spaniards received a serious blow. Genuine preparations for the embassy to negotiate a French match were now inevitable, and Carlisle was only two weeks away from leaving.

At first it was not at all certain it would be Carlisle who left on the mission, and it was not until March that his appointment was confirmed. Prior to that time the earl was convinced that Buckingham placed more trust in Rich than in him[18] and that he would be excluded from the embassy. What he succeeded in obtaining was a joint commission with his former protégé. James still had faith in Carlisle, whatever Buckingham's reservations might have been.

The long gap between the ambassador's appointment and his departure was much commented upon by contemporaries and a variety of reasons put forth to explain it. They ranged from his reluctance to leave Madame de Tillières with whom he was reputedly having an affair,[19] to his desire to obtain the Order of the Garter vacated by the death of the Duke of Lennox.[20] One can always add a shortage of money. Though none of these reasons should be totally discounted, it seems most likely that Carlisle's

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[14] Carlisle to Cranfield, April, 1624; Sackville MS., ON 289, Kent County Archives Office. My thanks to Roger Lockyer for this reference.

[15] Manuscript Minutes, 1624, fo. 13^{b}, H.L.R.O.

[16] Ibid., fos. 40^{a}–73^{a}.

[17] *Journal of the House of Lords*, 3: 377.

[18] Tillières to Puisieulx, 18 January 1624 (N.S.); PRO 31/3/58, fo. 13^{b}.

[19] *C.S.P.Ven., 1623–1625*, no. 459, pp. 360–61.

[20] Tillières to Villeauxclercs, 30 April 1624 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/4/1, fos. 58^{b}–59^{a}, P.R.O.

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principal concerns were to insure his own safety from parliamentary attack and to be certain that James publicly broke with Spain. Parliamentary pressure and the single-minded pursuit of Cranfield gave him satisfaction on both counts. His domestic sins were ignored, and James made a public recantation of the Spanish match. Yet it was not until May 1624 that these ends were achieved.

The delays caused no small amount of discomfort to Rich who had been in France since February. Whatever Carlisle's opinion of the man, he was well suited for matters concerning romance and the emotions. He succeeded very well in exciting the young Henrietta Maria with the prospect of a royal marriage,[21] and in encouraging Marie de' Medici, who still had considerable influence in such "family" matters and had been keen for sometime on the project. The problem was that by the time Carlisle was chosen as extraordinary ambassador in March, romance was no longer at issue. The French began to expect concrete signs of sincerity in the English approach. By the early weeks of May, Rich was having serious difficulty convincing them that the whole effort was not a sham to put pressure on the Spanish for better terms. About this time Lord Digby appeared in Paris on his way home from Spain and did what he could to encourage such suspicions.[22] As for Tillières, he went right on proclaiming that James would reverse his course.[23]

It is true the draft instructions for Carlisle and Rich were drawn up by early April,[24] but the king continued to back away from Spain one step at a time. Yet finally James had to face reality. Without allies England had no hope of helping Frederick, and despite Dutch and Danish willingness to form some sort of anti-Habsburg league, the French remained a necessary ingredient for a successful combination.

That the French were at all receptive to the English at this time had as much to do with chance as anything else. The Huguenots were recuperating from their recent wars, and though they were watchful of everything the royal government did, especially in the way of raising or moving troops, they were not engaged in overt hostilities. At its center, the French government was undergoing changes. In January the aged chancellor, Sillery, and his son, Secretary Puisieulx, who were sympathetic to maintaining peace with the Habsburgs, were forced from the government.[25] Two months later the efforts made by the former chancellor's brother to settle the Valtelline peacefully with the Spanish were disowned by Louis, and the negotiator was recalled in disgrace.[26] Thus the pro-Spanish element in the French govenment was placed very much in the shadows. Coming forward

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[21] Rich to Charles, 9 March 1624, Paris; Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 24[a–b], B.L.
[22] Rich to Conway, 9 May 1624, Paris; SP 78/72, fo. 188[a], P.R.O.
[23] Tillières to Villeauxclercs, 16 June 1624(N.S.), London; PRO 31/4/1, fo. 236[a–b], P.R.O.
[24] Dudley Carleton Jr. to Dudley Carlton, 4 April 1624, London; SP 14/162, no. 13, P.R.O.
[25] Herbert to Carlton, 30 January 1624, Paris; SP 78/72, fos. 19[a]–20[b], P.R.O.
[26] Kensington to Conway, 23 March 1624; ibid., fo. 76[a].

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to the places of these fallen ministers were such figures as the Marquis de Vieuville, the ambitious superintendent of finance (a French version of Cranfield) and the new secretary, Villeauxclercs, or Brienne, as he was later known, who was equally as ambitious but ultimately better at the game of survival.[27] Though there is no evidence they were prepared to recommend that Louis declare war on Spain immediately, these men were concerned that France play a more prominent role on the international scene than it had done to date. If France was to grow in power, it would have to be at Habsburg expense.

Overshadowing all the new men was the minister who would ultimately make his reputation as the hammer of the Spaniards—Cardinal Richelieu. He was a late arrival in the government, being admitted as president of the French privy council in April.[28] He was still considered a representative of Marie de' Medici and her faction and Louis accepted him at that time with some reluctance. Richelieu had last been in the government during the brief Concini regime of 1616–1617 and had been forced to retire to his bishopric of Luçon with his patron's violent removal from office. He had largely been there ever since and was thus something of an unknown quantity. Nonetheless, even at this early stage, Sir Edward Herbert, the retiring English ambassador in France, considered Richelieu more likely to put the interests of state before those of religion than the other cardinal on the council, Rouchefoucault.[29]

In May 1624, as Carlisle prepared to travel to France, the lines of French and English policy were beginning to intersect. Both monarchs were reluctant to engage in all-out hostility with the Habsburgs, Louis because he lacked the power, and James, because he lacked the will and the power. Yet, each for his own reasons was looking for a way to administer a check. At that time the most appropriate means for doing so beyond the marriage treaty lay in the hands of the Count Mansfeld, or so it seemed.

The count was a first class military organizer and a third class battlefield commander, a fact that his contemporaries were amazingly slow to perceive. He created and commanded three or four armies during the early years of the Thirty Years War and lost them all. As the campaigning season approached in April 1624, he appeared in France offering his services to help reconquer the Valtelline. Louis sent him on his way with a few thousand crowns and a recommendation that he try England.[30] Within a few days Mansfeld appeared on the northern shore of the Channel and convinced Buckingham of the advantages of adopting his cause.[31] When he returned to France shortly before Carlisle's arrival in mid-May, it was clear the English had embraced the count as their general to recover Fred-

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[27] Herbert to James, 23 February 1624, Paris; ibid., fos. 37[a]–38[a].
[28] Herbert to Calvert, 24 April 1624; ibid., fo. 163[a–b].
[29] Ibid.
[30] 14 April 1624; ibid., fo. 130[a–b].
[31] Conway to Kensington, 17 April 1624, Whitehall; ibid., fo. 146[a].

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erick's German lands and would desire the French to adopt him with the same degree of affection.[32] Here was a compromise that would appeal to both kings: Mansfeld could attack the Habsburgs while they could deny his actions were any of their doing.

As these ideas were taking shape, Carlisle left for France with a reasonably modest train. He had only twenty or twenty-five followers of whom, as the contemporary phrase goes, five or six were gentlemen of quality.[33] It was a collection of men designed for dependability rather than show, but any time Carlisle was concerned, display was never lacking.[34]

Two sets of instructions were directed at Carlisle and Rich. The first one concerned an offensive-defensive alliance between the two countries. The focus of this document was the recovery of the Palatinate by Mansfeld and linking his efforts with the French conquest of the Valtelline. James preferred that this portion of the negotiations take place first with the marriage held in abeyance, but if worse came to worst, he was even prepared to see the marriage take place without the military treaty.[35] After all, at age twenty-four, with two broken "engagements," Charles was getting a bit shopworn as a potential bridegroom.

The directions for negotiating the marriage treaty went through at least two drafts before they were finalized, and the document bears the unmistakable imprint of James's fussy, self-defensive and practical mind. He began with the topic of religion and went into an extended discourse on the mistakes the Spanish made in dealing with their marriage negotiations, as well as the lessons taught by Louis's treatment of the Huguenots. Perhaps using Elizabeth I's courtship of the Duc de Anjou as a model, he ended by promising to use English Roman Catholics with all favor, provided that they observed their religion privately and caused no scandal. He made plain his unwillingness to suspend or disobey the recusancy laws. As for Henrietta and her court, they would be assured private worship with the details spelled out in separate, confidential articles.[36] From there the instructions went into financial matters involving the dowry, the form of the marriage ceremony itself and the princess's renunciation of her inheritance rights in France. These latter issues had prevented the previous attempt at a French match, and it is an indication of how much the world had changed since 1616 that in 1624 they were never a major consideration for either side. Religion was the dominant issue and remained so for the whole of the marriage negotiations.

In issuing these instructions James was reacting to his previous unsuccessful experience in marriage negotiations. He was tacitly acknowledging

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[32] Kensington to Conway, Whitsunday (16 May) 1624, Compiègne; ibid., fos. 204^{b}–205^{b}.
[33] Tillières to Villeauxclercs, 25 May 1624 (N.S.), London PRO 31/4/1, fos. 146^{b}–147^{b}, P.R.O.
[34] *Mémoires et Négociations de Mr. de Rusdorf,* 1: 295.
[35] SP 78/72, fos. 271^{a}–272^{b}.
[36] Ibid., fos. 216^{b}–217^{a}.

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that in the earlier contract he had pushed the French too hard. He was also indicating that the Spanish had wanted too much from him: non-enforcement of the recusancy laws followed by parliamentary repeal. James was willing to correct his former mistakes, but he did not want the French repeating those Spain had made.

The question for the French was a combination of religious zeal and national prestige. If the English had been willing to grant massive concessions to native Roman Catholics and to a Spanish bride, the French, if they were to maintain the respect of the Catholic nations of Europe, were by no means prepared to accept any less.[37] In a manner of speaking it was an even more important matter to Louis than it had been to Philip. The French were negotiating to engage in military operations, by whatever indirect means, in aid of the Protestant Prince Palatine. Louis had to guard against charges from both in and out of France that he was selling out his religious interests for the sake of secular advantages. He was indeed a devout son of the Church and, before he would act, had to be convinced that his actions were not in any sense anti-Catholic.

When Carlisle first arrived in France in mid-May 1624, all of this potential for conflict was kept well in the background. He was given an appropriately grand reception by the Duc de Chevreuse and two hundred French gentlemen. In return he and Rich bowed low enough to kiss the hem of Henrietta's skirt, a gesture that made a particularly good impression on the French.[38]

The first step from the French point of view, after all the ceremony had ended, was the appointment of a commission to deal with the English ambassadors. It was composed of all new men: Vieuville, Etienne d'Aligre, the chancellor, Secretary Villeauxclercs and Richelieu.[39] It was the selection of the cardinal that caused a delicate problem for the negotiators. Since the English did not recognize the Roman Church, it could hardly give any kind of precedence to a prince of that institution. On his side Richelieu could not let the sensibilities of heretics prevent him from taking his rightful place in the hierarchy. If either party was looking for a way out, this issue provided it. The sincerity of both sides was proved by the compromise reached: the cardinal would claim he was ill, and the meetings would take place at his bedside.[40]

Under this somewhat original arrangement, the bargaining finally began in late May. The French were uncomfortable because Carlisle and Rich were in a position to present their proposals first and to force their counterparts to make a response.[41] At the initial meeting with the commissioners

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[37] Villeauxclercs to Tillières, 21 April 1624 (N.S.), Compiègne; PRO 31/4/1, fo. 14[b], P.R.O.
[38] Carlisle and Rich to Conway, (2/?) May 1624, Compiègne; SP 78/72, fos. 241[a]–242[a], P.R.O.
[39] Villeauxclercs to Tillières, 8 June 1624 (N.S.), Compiègne; PRO 31/4/1, fo. 183[a], P.R.O.
[40] Nethersole to Carleton, 7 June 1624, London; SP 14/167 no. 28, P.R.O.
[41] Villeauxclercs to Tillières, 5 June 1624 (N.S.), Compiègne; PRO 31/4/1, fo. 181[b], P.R.O.

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the English ambassadors announced their wish to consider the marriage and military alliances simultaneously, but they would begin by discussing the marriage. Evidently they had decided to soften James's instructions. Yet, as far as they were concerned, the negotiations would start from their closing point eight years earlier when Madame Christine was the prospective bride. The commissioners reminded the ambassadors that the world had not held still and that especially in matters of religion, they were not content to simply repeat what had been done previously. After further conversation the French decided to put their demands in writing and to base them upon both the previous Anglo-French and Anglo-Spanish negotiations.[42]

Their eleven-point proposal, by the time it was delivered to Carlisle and Rich, had two key sections from the English perspective: that Henrietta should have control of the children's education until age twelve and that those Catholics of property should have the private practice of their religion and security in their property. This last point would come as a public favor granted to Henrietta by James in honor of the marriage.[43]

The French sent these articles to England, and it was understood that Tillières would do his best to obtain approval for them.[44] The attempt to rely upon Tillières is an early indication that the commissioners were finding that Carlisle and Rich were not nearly as flexible as they hoped and were reduced to going over their heads. Eventually that procedure became a consistent pattern.

As for this first effort, if Louis thought he could easily outmaneuver the English, he received a quick and unpleasant education in the fine art of negotiations. During the early days of June the two ambassadors pulled a variety of tricks out of their diplomatic bag that were designed to keep their counterparts off balance. When Secretary Villeauxclercs tried to contact them one morning, their secretaries claimed they were still sleeping. Yet, upon arising, they demanded an immediate audience with Louis. When they were refused the interview, they maintained that they did not have the power to grant the requests made by the French on the subject of religion. Villeauxclercs was then forced to call an emergency meeting of the commissioners to deal with the situation.[45] The following day Carlisle and Rich announced to the secretary that they had not written James about the French proposals,[46] and the day after they were making noises about going back to the Spanish after all since the commissioners required them to do impossible things.[47]

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[42] Ibid., 2 June 1624; fos. 201^{b}–203^{a}. The dispatch is most likely written on 10 June rather than the second as indicated in the transcript.
[43] Ibid., fo. 206^{a}.
[44] Ibid., fos. 207^{a}–208^{a}.
[45] 11 June 1624 (N.S.); ibid., fos. 208^{a}–210^{a}.
[46] 12 June 1624 (N.S.); ibid., fo. 212^{a}.
[47] 15 June 1624 (N.S.); ibid., fos. 214^{b}–215^{b}.

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It was all part of a softening up process, but it was also a reflection of Carlisle's previous experience in France. He was not just trying to negotiate a treaty; he was attempting to make the French acknowledge that the English had the superior bargaining position, regardless of the objective truth of the situation. He would not be humiliated by these people again.[48] As Carlisle saw it, the only technique that worked with the French was to maintain a tenacious grip on the central issues while giving up inconsequential ones to enable them to save face. During the whole process they had to be kept off balance.[49] At the root of this approach was the feeling that the French wanted this marriage so much that they would sacrifice a great deal to obtain it. Louis had already married one sister into the quasi-royal House of Savoy. Carlisle felt he would not willingly choose the lesser path again.

Despite Richelieu's subsequent reputation, at this stage all the French commissioners were inexperienced at these complex diplomatic games. Therefore it is not surprising that Carlisle's approach had its desired effect. The combination of the ambassador's rock-like stance and James's well-known hankering after a Spanish agreement put the French in a panic that the negotiations would come to an abrupt end. Their cries to the more experienced Tillières became quite shrill.[50]

On the English side it was, of course, all just a bluff. Carlisle and Rich had no intention of sitting on the French proposals. By mid-June Carlisle's secretary Woodford, returned to England with the propositions and the ambassadors' opinion of what the appropriate reactions would be.[51] The tone of a letter written by Rich at this time indicates that he and his colleague felt the French must make a certain amount of noise to please the pope and the other Romanist princes, but that it was just that, noise, rather than genuine reluctance to agree to the English terms.[52] Evidence for their optimistic reading surfaced when Louis commissioned the formation of three ten-thousand man armies to operate along the eastern border.[53] Surely this was a good faith measure indicating the French would be cooperative.

Meanwhile a variety of factors, besides Carlisle's and Rich's devices, were causing the French to soften their stance. After seeing the eleven articles concerning the marriage, even Tillières was inclined to think that the provisions concerning the children born to Henrietta and Charles were too harsh and needed moderation.[54] About this time Villeauxclercs spoke with the Catholic Earl of Nithsdale, a Scot friendly to Buckingham. The earl emphasized the need to put provisions relating to the Roman Catholics

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[48] *C.S.P.Ven., 1623–25*, no. 437, p. 344.
[49] Carlisle to James, 14 June 1624, Compiègne; SP 78/72, fos. 351[a]–353[b], P.R.O.
[50] Villeauxclercs to Tillières, 15 June 1624 (N.S.), Compiègne; PRO 31/4/1, fo. 216[a], P.R.O.
[51] Carlisle and Rich to Conway, 14 June 1624, Compiègne; SP 78/72, fo. 289[a], P.R.O.
[52] Rich to Conway, 14 June 1624; ibid., fo. 291[a].
[53] 15 June 1624; ibid., fo. 293[a].
[54] Tillières to Villeauxclercs, 16 June 1624 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/4/1, fo. 232[a], P.R.O.

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in a separate and secret treaty.[55] Several days before Woodford left for England, Louis wrote Tillières modifying and explaining his position. He remained firm on some areas such as providing a chapel at the Savoy rather than St. James's palace for large scale worship by Henrietta's suite and on having a bishop act as her almoner and supervisor of the other clergy, but he gave ground on the issue of his sister's control of the children's education. He also agreed to have toleration for the Roman Catholics in a separate treaty on that subject only.[56]

Once again Louis's concern was that Tillières should explain the French terms to James, Charles and Buckingham so that they would order the ambassadors to accept. He was relying on his ambassador's ability to convince the English of the French point of view. Unfortunately for Tillières about this time, or perhaps slightly earlier, doubts were raised whether such reliance was well placed. On 16/26 June 1624 the first letter was drafted recalling him.[57]

As mentioned previously, Tillières had volunteered his own recall when it looked as though the English were becoming serious about the negotiations. From that time on, though he had occasionally given good advice on how to handle individual points at issue, he acted mainly as a purveyor of pessimistic news from England. So far as one can tell from his dispatches, he did not push the French side of the negotiations with the king, prince or favorite. He mostly confined himself to reporting their attitudes. The ambassador never had any real trust in James or his intentions. Therefore the marriage seemed an unnecessary risk since, in Tillières's view, the same political ends could be achieved if Louis acted as a mediator between the Bavarians and the Palatines.[58] As it became clear to the French that Carlisle and Rich were rather more than they could handle, the importance of a forceful, convincing representative in England became overwhelmingly apparent. So did their ambassador's failure to fill this role.

Interestingly enough, Nethersole, who most likely got the information from his friend, John Woodford, claimed it was Carlisle who pushed the French into making the recall. They had been considering the idea ever since Chancellor Sillery and Secretary Puisieulx had been dismissed.[59] Whatever Carlisle's relations with the countess, he recognized that her husband was fundamentally opposed to the marriage. Without the aid of a favorably inclined ambassador in England, an advantageous treaty was unlikely if one was signed at all. Therefore a new man was a necessity.

The person chosen as Tillières's replacement was Antoine Coiffier de Ruzé, the Marquis d'Effiat. In most histories of the period Effiat's principal

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[55] Villeauxclercs to Tillières, 15 June 1624 (N.S.), Compiègne; ibid., fo. 214[a]; and Nithsdale to Buckingham, 22 June 1624, Compiègne; SP 78/72, fos. 309[a]–310[a], P.R.O.

[56] Louis to Tillières, 19 June 1624 (N.S.), Compiègne; PRO 31/4/1, fos. 240[a]–246[b], P.R.O.

[57] Louis to James, ibid., fos. 279[b]–281[a].

[58] *Mémoires . . . de Rusdorf*, 1: 307.

[59] Nethersole to Carleton, 4 July 1624, London; SP 14/169, no. 14, P.R.O.

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distinction, if that is the name for it, is having fathered Louis's last, treasonous favorite, the Marquis de Cinq-Mars. Contemporary diplomats certainly had no high opinion of him. The Venetian ambassador in England described him as a recently titled aristocrat, a new man to political affairs who was most noted for three things: being a creature of Richelieu's, having a reputation for insincerity, and playing the courtier.[60] To these sins Tillières's brother-in-law, Bassompierre, added that the marquis was a friend and most likely a tool of Carlisle's.[61]

But they were all wrong. Effiat was easily the rival of Gondomar in his ability to manipulate the English for his country's advantage. Like the Spaniard, he was particularly effective with James, but unlike him he was able to work his magic on Charles and Buckingham as well. Effiat probably did more to undermine Carlisle's version of the treaty than any other individual. He and the earl fought a long distance duel for the minds of James, Charles and Buckingham, and its victor was unquestionably the Frenchman.

He came to England under confused circumstances. Tillières's recall had been sudden and done with some embarrassment. It was dated June 18/28, 1624.[62] Effiat's instructions were dated two days earlier.[63] The new ambassador went from the status of extraordinary to resident and back to extraordinary all within less than a month. His situation was further complicated in that he left France in the wake of Rich's unexpected return home. The Englishman ostensibly was concerned about money to finance the embassy, but in fact he came over to explain the status of the negotiations to the king and council.[64] It may well have been Carlisle's idea to have the English approve the modified form of the French proposals before Effiat ever arrived. It is also worth noting that it was the diplomatically inexperienced Rich who risked James's displeasure by leaving his post without royal permission.

As for the new French ambassador, he was sent on his mission to support the modified French proposals. Louis emphasized to his ambassador that he should remain firm on some of the points, particularly on James and Charles swearing not to tamper with Henrietta's religion (a truly ironic concern given her eventual career in England), but he could relent on the education of the children. More importantly, he could do the same on the toleration proposals; provided they were in writing to satisfy the pope, Louis would not insist on publication.[65]

This theme of satisfaction for the pope became the growing focus of

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[60] *C.S.P.Ven., 1623–1625,* no. 495, p. 382.

[61] Bassompierre, *Journal de ma Vie,* 236; See also Lockyer, *Buckingham,* pp. 200, 206 for an equally negative view of Effiat.

[62] Louis to Tillières, 28 June 1624 (N.S.), Compiègne, PRO 31/4/1, fo. 285^{a-b}, P.R.O.

[63] Ibid., fo. 286^{a}.

[64] Conway to Carlisle, 26 June 1624, Greenwich; SP 78/72, fo. 321^{a}, P.R.O.; and *C.S.P.Ven., 1623–1625,* no. 477, p. 373.

[65] PRO 31/4/1, fos. 289^{b}–293^{a}.

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future events. Without papal approval in the form of a dispensation the marriage was unlikely to occur. Yet Carlisle was receiving assurances, principally from Vieuville, that the French were more concerned with the form of the treaty than the substance of what happened later.[66] It could have been a device to trap the English, but Carlisle did not think so. As subsequent events proved, when the French wanted genuine substance in an article, they were not shy about saying so.

As all of these affairs began to sort themselves out, Effiat arrived in England. He landed in late June and, even before his first royal audience, showed his ability to avoid the embarrassments and dangers to which a diplomat on his first assignment is subject. He came over on a Dutch vessel to prevent a French one from having to dip its flag to the English warships in the Channel. He managed to cope with an amazing premature visit from the departing Spanish ambassador that farcically involved hiding Rich in an adjoining room. In addition, though the French may have regretted it later, he effectively placed on the defensive some Roman Catholic priests who had come to complain about their harsh treatment since the French marriage negotiations had begun.[67] Yet these matters were of no real import. What mattered was that with basically conciliatory terms in his diplomatic pouch, Effiat received a fine welcome from the English.

His first audience with James occurred on Sunday, 4 July at Windsor and was successful from both men's point of view. Effiat had the wit to perceive that beneath the fussiness and the gruffness the king had a sense of humor and indeed enjoyed being entertained. So during their first encounter, James promised to communicate the ambassador's message of friendship to everyone and to excommunicate all the English who were not as French as Effiat. The Frenchman replied, presumably in mock conspiratorial tones, that he could see the pope in all of this. James roared with laughter.[68] The lines of communication were opened and remained so until the day of the king's death.

Throughout the whole course of Effiat's embassy, these personal contacts with James remained important, indeed, vital to the Frenchman. Unlike a whole series of modern-day historians, the ambassador never considered the English king a senile old man, long in his dotage. He understood that he was faced with a still formidable adversary who had a mind of his own and who could be a dangerous opponent when angered.

Yet, as important as James was to Effiat, Buckingham represented an absolutely vital link in the chain of French interests in England, for even more than Charles, he had the ability to influence the king. The exact nature of the bond between James and his favorite was complex, containing an uncertain brew of sexual and psychological elements. Effiat himself witnessed intimate moments between them,[69] but the favorite was not

[66] Carlisle to Conway, 21 June 1624, Paris; SP 78/72, fo. 373[a], P.R.O.
[67] Effiat to Louis, 18 July 1624 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/4/1, fos. 329[a]–337[a], P.R.O.
[68] Ibid., fo. 343[a].
[69] Effiat to James, 14 July 1624 (N.S.), [probably the 24th], London; ibid., fo. 377[a].

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that certain about how long this relationship would last if the French negotiations failed. In one of the most extraordinary displays of ingenuousness and frankness in seventeenth-century diplomacy Buckingham confessed to the marquis in a private conversation at Windsor that, in order to wean James away from his Spanish plans, certain guarantees had been given him about what would come from a French marriage alliance. The favorite was the guarantor, and should the projected treaty fail, he was sure the king would call him to account, and as a result, his career would be ruined. He therefore asked for Louis's promise of protection.[70]

There was, of course, art here as well as innocence on the duke's part, and Effiat was careful to play down what Buckingham had said. He claimed modestly that he was in the duke's boat rather than the other way around.[71] Yet, the damage had been done. If the French decided to remain firm, or worse yet, to increase their demands, the favorite had to support them because he literally had no place else to go. After the Spanish fiasco, all his options but the French one were closed.

On the surface, at least, none of these considerations seemed that important in July 1624. Both sides were giving some ground on the issues that mattered, and as a result, the eleven articles were well on their way to approval. Louis now felt the time had come to approach the pope for the dispensation. Whereas in April he had made very circumspect mention of the English marriage in his instructions to Monsieur de Bethune, the French ambassador to Rome,[72] in July he gave his representative there detailed directions on how to proceed for a dispensation.[73] To act as Bethune's assistant the French king sent Father Bérulle, one of the leaders of the Catholic revival in France, with the instructions as well as letters to others who might be helpful in the negotiations.[74] Carlisle was kept informed of his procedure and made a point of speaking to Bérulle before he left. The Savoyard ambassadors, the Count of Verrue and his brother, the Abbé Scaglia, were also especially helpful.[75] It looked as though the marriage would take place by September or October 1624 and that Mansfeld and the French armies could begin operating at an even earlier date.

In late July, however, Carlisle began to pick up hints that the relative quiet and stability on the French side were misleading. On the twenty-first he wrote that great changes were expected at the French court, but he was reluctant to give the details,[76] probably because their nature was still unclear. A week later he mentioned libels about Vieuville and rumors of his disgrace, but at the time the story seemed to emanate from the Duc

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[70] Ibid., fo. 345[a–b].

[71] Ibid., fos. 346[b]–347[a]; See Lockyer, *Buckingham,* 200 for a more positive view of the duke's actions.

[72] Add. M.S. 5459, fo. 44[b], B.L.

[73] Louis to Bethune, 31 July 1624 (N.S.), PRO 31/4/1, fos. 383[a]–386[b], P.R.O.

[74] Louis to Cardinal of Savoy, 31 July 1624 (N.S.)., ibid., fos. 390[b]–393[a].

[75] Carlisle to Conway, 28 July 1624, Paris; SP 78/72, fo. 389[a], P.R.O.

[76] 21 July 1624, ibid., fo. 362[b].

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de Sully, Henri IV's old leading minister. When Louis greeted the *duc* coldly and publicly affirmed his faith in Vieuville, it looked as though the whole matter was a false alarm.[77]

But it was no false alarm. On 6 August Carlisle wrote Buckingham from St. Germain that Vieuville had fallen and that the French were already beginning to disavow previous assurances given in the negotiations. He advised James to agree to the proposals in hand immediately and to permit the earl to make a secret journey to England in order to throw the French off balance with fears of a diplomatic reversal.[78]

The problem was that the earl was moving too fast for his masters. With Rich just returning to France, they would not approve such a bold move. Carlisle understood that without such aggressiveness the bargaining initiative would pass to the French. He realized further that the modified version of the eleven articles was as acceptable an agreement for a Roman Catholic princess as the English were likely to obtain. Any changes from this stage on would create a less favorable treaty, and in that, too, he was a prophet on the order of Cassandra.

The French Match—Conclusion in Bitterness

In early August 1624, Cardinal Richelieu began performing a most unusual feat, a successful return to power in which he became a true prime minister. Carlisle and Rich rapidly perceived the new relationships within the French government and applied to the cardinal for an audience. Rich opened the interview by stating that, if a change in ministers had not meant a change in policy, he had some good news to impart; James and the council had approved the eleven articles. Richelieu immediately started to back away. Though he gave every assurance of continued French interest in the match, he felt Louis was preparing to disavow some specific points of Vieuville's negotiations. Then, in an effort to mitigate the impact of that statement, the cardinal unconvincingly claimed that he would deal with the English ambassadors as though he were English himself. He thereupon proceeded to read the agreed-upon articles with a satisfied smile on his face. He kept on smiling until he reached the eleventh article. Here he stopped, saying the pope would never be content with the promise of toleration in this form. The ambassadors replied that the pope's contentment was a French affair; they were perfectly willing to have a marriage without a dispensation. They went on to say that Vieuville had assured them that a "bare letter," as opposed to an article on toleration in the treaty, would be enough. Richelieu immediately seized on this point, and asked them to put that statement in writing. Sensing a trap, Carlisle and Rich refused, and the interview ended.[1]

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[77] 28 July 1624, ibid., fo. 388[b].
[78] SP 78/73, fos. 1[a]–2[b], P.R.O.

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[1] Carlisle and Rich to Conway, 7 August 1624, St. Germain; SP 78/73, fos. 5[a]–6[b], P.R.O.

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At their subsequent audience with Louis, the English ambassadors were even more aggressive. They pressed the king to acknowledge that he had specifically approved the articles that Rich had taken back to James and the council. The French king would not be drawn and only acknowledged knowing of Vieuville's actions in the most general way. When Rich continued to probe, Louis cut him short by saying that the articles were not the only matter upon which Vieuville had lied.[2]

During these encounters, it was Rich who pushed the hardest. His reputation even more than Carlisle's was at stake here. After secret conversations with Vieuville,[3] he had made the unauthorized voyage home with the marquis's assurances on the articles. That situation led Rich into the position of upholding Vieuville by forcing Louis to admit an error. Such a line of attack was at best self-defeating and at worst a reason for a diplomatic break. The French king was in no position to take back his charges against the fallen minister, nor was he about to reinstate the man. Perhaps at Carlisle's prodding, Rich eventually abandoned this line of approach and moved to more fruitful grounds.

With a degree of reality that was rare in an age dominated by dynastic consideration, the ambassadors put forth the proposition to Louis that marriages were only the "garbe and grace" with which alliances were concluded. They must not lose sight of the important matter here which was the political agreement between France and England. They went on to point out that no one should be more aware of this situation than Louis, who had been involved in a double marriage treaty with Spain. The political consequences of this action had been nil whereas here James was showing his good faith, and the French should act accordingly. "His reply was short, even this; *On verra.*"[4]

The cardinal, however, remained as adamant as ever on the subject of toleration for the English Catholics. Call it what the English would, an article or a letter, it had to be signed and sworn to by James on his faith as a king.[5]

As Carlisle and Rich jockeyed for position with Richelieu in a deteriorating situation, those in England were still under the delusion that the marriage was on the verge of completion. Effiat was busy trying to improve his relationship with the English Catholics and trying to convince them that their dependence on Spain was misplaced.[6] He was relaxed enough to risk testing his none too certain hunting skills in Theobald's park and to drain an oversized royal chalice of wine that the English king offered him, a dual feat of bravery that cost him a two-hour nap in Buckingham's apartments.[7] Virtually to the day of Vieuville's dismissal Effiat did not

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[2] Ibid., fos. 6^b–7^a.
[3] Carlisle to Conway, 22 August 1624, Paris; ibid., fo. 94^a.
[4] SP 78/73, fo. 7^a.
[5] Ibid., fo. 8^a.
[6] Effiat to Louis, 31 July 1624 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/4/2, fos. 6^a–12^a, P.R.O.
[7] Ibid., fos. 12^b–13^b.

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receive so much as a hint in his official dispatches that any changes were contemplated. On 7 August (N.S.) Louis wrote his ambassador a prosaic letter that was mainly concerned with pensions and favors for various Englishmen.[8] It even contained one remark indicating Vieuville's continued influence. After reporting that Father Bérulle had been sent to Rome to help procure the dispensation, the king wrote that in case of extremity he was willing to marry Henrietta to Charles without the document.[9]

Somehow, perhaps even from English sources, Effiat began to pick up rumors that changes were contemplated in the French government. He was embarrassed by the situation because his hosts kept asking him questions he could not answer.[10] Though he made it a point to display his ignorance on the subject in his dispatches, the ambassador may well have guessed what was happening because he did complain that Vieuville had not written him the whole time he had been in England.[11]

It was mid-August before Louis officially informed Effiat of his former minister's dismissal and imprisonment. In the letter he mentioned nothing about changes in the treaty terms, but simply encouraged the ambassador to obtain letters from English Roman Catholics to help procure the dispensation. In addition he was to assure James, Charles and Buckingham of Louis's continued good faith.[12]

It was a very poor performance on the part of the French. Surely they must have known Carlisle would inform James of any rumored changes in their government, and they should have given Effiat something to say even if it was less than the full truth. The same criticism is valid for any alterations in the treaty, only more so. If the English received word from their own sources first, James would make the French pay the full measure for their carelessness.

The events unfolded slowly in England as the dispatches arrived from France. The dispatch of the 3/13 of August that announced only Vieuville's dismissal reached Effiat by the 8/18, and he set out immediately to find James, Charles and Buckingham. The ambassador discovered the duke first; professing surprise at this turn of events, he in turn went to tell the king.[13] Eventually all three English leaders met with the ambassador to hear him out. What mattered most to James was whether or not the change in ministers meant a change in policy. Effiat gave him effusive reassurance that the marriage and the alliance were still desired.[14] The ambassador felt compelled to go further and defend Louis's actions by pointing out that even Carlisle had remarked privately about Vieuville's instability. Seeing that the Frenchman was on the defensive, James could not resist

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[8] Louis to Effiat, 7 August 1624 (N.S.), St. Germain; ibid., fos. 45[a]–47[a].
[9] Ibid., fo. 44[b].
[10] Effiat to Villeauxclercs, 4 August 1624 (N.S.), London; ibid., fo. 54[a].
[11] Ibid., fo. 55[a].
[12] Louis to Effiat, 13 August 1624 (N.S.), St. Germain; ibid., fos. 62[a]–65[a].
[13] Effiat to Louis, 21 August 1624 (N.S.), Stamford; ibid., fos. 162[a]–163[a].
[14] Ibid., fos. 164[a]–165[a].

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expressing his doubts about whether a government as unstable as France's would be able to procure the dispensation from Rome. All Effiat could do was offer further protestations of good faith.[15]

In the course of the conversation the ambassador must have sensed that the English king was not genuinely upset, and he proceeded to prove it by joking with him about his recent hunting failures, claiming they were the true cause of his ill-humor. The device worked so well that James began making sly remarks about an open hunting season this year on former financiers who became Lord Treasurers. With more than a little exaggeration he assured Effiat that his hunt was successful in that it netted 100,000 ecùs in fines from Cranfield. He accepted the sum when he was assured that the fallen minister had not stolen more than 500,000.[16]

Despite the light-hearted nature of these interchanges, a good deal was occurring on a deeper level. The Frenchman was frightened that Vieuville's fall would drag him down as well. He was under such tension that he ended a letter to Louis by giving a long, complex defense of his own actions at the climax of which he actually lost his nerve and asked permission to return home and give up his role as ambassador.[17] His real problem, as he expressed it in a separate letter to Villeauxclercs, was that he felt cut off and ill-informed. With justifiable bitterness he claimed that Carlisle knew of the changes in the French government before he did.[18] He could not be expected to act as the French representative in England if he did not know what or even who he was representing. Buried in this complaint was the suspicion that there was another shoe yet to drop and that it would hit the ambassador in a tender place.

On the English side their easy acceptance of Vieuville's fall was predicated on Effiat's assurances that the French were still desirous to conclude the treaty. What went unsaid was James's assumption that the negotiations were basically concluded with his approval of the eleven articles and that he had shown sufficient good faith by easing the enforcement of the recusancy laws to cause Louis to initial the agreement as well.

It was the reception of Carlisle's and Rich's dispatch of 7/17 August that shattered the illusions on all sides and started a series of events that came dangerously close to ending the whole negotiation. In the process the deep divisions that existed on the English side surfaced and demonstrated graphically how delicate the structure was that held together the anti-Spanish faction.

Part of the difficulty in coping with the changed circumstances arose because August was the time when the English court tended to disperse. Even so it took Tom Coke, Carlisle's servant and messenger, only four days to reach Secretary Conway at his country estate. He brought with

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[15] Ibid., fos. 166[a]–168[a].
[16] Ibid., fos. 169[a]–170[a].
[17] Ibid., fos. 181[b]–187[b].
[18] Effiat to Villeauxclercs, 21 August 1624 (N.S.), Stamford; ibid., fo. 193[a–b].

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him the dispatches announcing the change in the French attitude toward the treaty. On the next night, 12 August, the secretary wrote Buckingham making some sarcastic comments on the new situation; he also indicated that letters on the subject had reached the duke as well.[19] From there Coke went to find the king who was on progress at Belvoir Castle in Rutland.

Upon receiving word of just what was happening in France, James immediately wrote an angry retort to Carlisle and Rich. As far as anyone can tell, the king did not consult with anybody of importance before he wrote his heated reply. Undoubtedly, had it ever been received, this provocative letter would have caused the collapse of the negotiations. Significantly, Buckingham was away from court, drinking the waters at Wellingborough in Northamptonshire when the king sent Coke back to France with the dispatch. Either through his own sources of information or because of the contents of Carlisle's letter, the duke may well have suspected how James would react to the French news. By whatever means, when he found Coke rapidly heading south, the favorite obtained and opened the dispatch case so he could read the offensive letter. He then ordered the messenger and his violated diplomatic pouch to accompany him to Derby where the court then resided.[20]

By coincidence Effiat had gone to search for Buckingham at Wellingborough at the same time Coke was riding for Belvoir Castle. He arrived just as the duke was preparing to travel to Derby at which point he received more than an inkling of just how serious the situation was. Effiat followed Buckingham to the court, meanwhile having read Conway's cryptic note to the favorite indicating the changes in the French view of the treaty. This was not really sufficient information for the ambassador if he was to face James, and so, upon arriving at Derby, he asked the duke if he could see the original letters from Carlisle and Rich. Buckingham agreed without demur.[21]

When the favorite arrived in Derby, he found the court in an uproar about the apparent break in the negotiations. As a result, he must have kept Coke hidden for fear of revealing his hand. It was the evening of his arrival in a meeting with James and Charles that Buckingham broke the news of what he had done. One can only imagine the scene that must have ensued, but it was the results that mattered. Not only did the duke succeed in defending his acts of *lèse majesté,* but he also managed to convince James to edit his original dispatch, cutting out nearly two-thirds of it.[22]

Despite all Buckingham had accomplished to save the treaty, Effiat still was not pleased with even the edited version of the dispatch intended for

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[19] Conway to Buckingham, 12 August 1624, Rufford; SP 14/171, no. 38, P.R.O.

[20] Nethersole to Carleton, 19 August 1624, Essex House; ibid., no. 60.

[21] Effiat to Louis, 28 August 1624 (N.S.), Northampton; PRO 31/4/2, fos. 215^{a}–218^{a}, P.R.O.

[22] Ibid., fo. 219^{a-b}.

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Carlisle and Rich. He pressed the duke to have it toned down even more, but he met with no success. If Buckingham pushed further, he could see an attack from an angry parliament, and he did not want to face it. All he would offer Effiat was the suggestion that the ambassador request an audience with James to see if he could obtain further easing of the terms as a personal favor.[23] The Frenchman knew his master well enough to see that even James's modified language was still too harsh for the negotiations to continue. He therefore had to ask for the audience.

The mid-August encounter between these two men, surrounded by the cool, green hills near Derby, was one of the classics of diplomacy. The king felt betrayed by the French and was certain he would receive no more satisfaction from them than he had gotten from the Spanish. Though Buckingham had forced him back from making an immediate break in the treaty negotiations, he was by no means satisfied with the situation and was not beyond provoking Louis into making the break. The ambassador was working on very scant knowledge, derived almost completely from English sources. He was not even sure he had the support of the leading French ministers or, indeed, who those ministers were. He was forced to act almost entirely on his instincts about what James would be willing to do.

Upon Effiat's entrance, the king wasted no time with niceties and at once began venting his anger. Being laid up with an attack of gout that prevented him from hunting must have done nothing to improve his disposition. In so many words he said he was now in a position where he either had to disavow his ambassadors or believe Louis's initial assurances concerning the treaty were false. He was suffering great public humiliation for having agreed to deal with Effiat's master, and he was sure that henceforth no other man would do so.[24] The French king, in his view, was not a man of honor.

The ambassador let James expend his rage and then began to haul in some of the line he had lost with this first, furious run. He started by asking the king if he was distressed with the whole treaty or just the eleventh article. James replied that he was content with all the treaty but that article. In that case, countered Effiat, there was no problem because no final agreement had been reached about its form. He then took the king through a step by step review of the negotiations prior to Vieuville's dismissal.[25] At the core of what he had to say was the lack of any written documentation in English hands to indicate that Louis had ever relented on the eleventh article, either in form or substance. It all went back to assurances Vieuville had given Rich, and in Effiat's view the former minister was a proven liar.[26]

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[23] Ibid., fo. 221^{a-b}.
[24] Ibid., fo. 224^{a-b}.
[25] Ibid., fos. 224^{b}–226^{a}.
[26] Ibid., fos. 226^{b}–227^{b}.

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Initially the ambassador's response just seemed to frustrate James all the more. He charged that, as a minister in Louis's confidence, Vieuville spoke with his master's voice and could not be disavowed so simply without reflection on the source of his instructions. In the heat of the moment he went so far as to say he would command Carlisle and Rich to confront the fallen minister in his prison cell before witnesses in order to find out the truth of the matter.[27]

It was this last outburst by the king that enabled Effiat to reel in his catch. They sparred back and forth on other matters, and then the Frenchman suddenly agreed to recommend that Vieuville speak with the English ambassadors before witnesses. Effiat perceived that, if the witnesses were well chosen, to save his neck, the marquis might say what the French now desired of him.[28] The ambassador's ploy had the desired effect. Mollified by the offer to recommend his proposal, James was willing to let Effiat see his dispatch to Carlisle and Rich and have it altered in accordance with his wishes.[29] There would be no immediate break; the negotiations would continue.

It was a splendid victory for Effiat, but it must be kept in perspective. The issue of toleration was not yet settled. The treaty would be preserved, provided that the French did not require the English king to violate the law by publicly avowing toleration for Roman Catholics as part of the marriage treaty. James could never face another parliament if he did so, and therefore he could never obtain the subsidies needed to finance Mansfeld's army for the recovery of the Palatinate. As far as the king was concerned, that was still what the negotiations with the French were all about. If Louis and Richelieu did not realize their ambassador had only bought them time, the whole exercise was futile.

Effiat and Buckingham were further concerned about limiting Carlisle's influence. Neither of them was keen on seeing the earl return to England for fear that he would harden James's anti-French feelings. Rich was therefore written secretly to keep his fellow ambassador on the southern shore of the Channel.[30]

The potential for a general split in the English side of the negotiations was developing here, with Buckingham and Rich on one side and James and Carlisle on the other while Charles wavered someplace between the two.

Carlisle's position in mid-August 1624 was a dangerous one. The French from Louis on down were upset with his determination to change nothing on the toleration article. Buckingham was convinced that the ambassador's attitude might actually bring about his own downfall, and Rich proved more than willing to claim credit for having saved the treaty despite his

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[27] Ibid., fo. 228[a–b].
[28] Effiat to Villeauxclercs, 24 August 1624 (N.S.), Northampton; ibid., fo. 242[a].
[29] Effiat to Louis, ibid., fos. 233[a]–234[a].
[30] Effiat to Villeauxclercs, ibid., fos. 240[b]–241[a].

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former mentor's inclinations. What is more, Carlisle chose this inopportune time to solicit support for obtaining the membership in the Garter vacated by the death of the Duke of Lennox.[31]

What looked like the beginning of the end for the earl came when Rich decided he alone could negotiate a deal with the French. Though on his sick bed, Rich sent his secretary, Thomas Lorkin, to Richelieu in order to begin secret talks. Fortunately for the English, the cardinal was in no position to ascertain if the approach actually indicated a split in the English side or only was a device to entrap the French. He therefore treated the contact with some care, though he could not restrain his expressions of happiness that a private channel of communication had been opened.

A close scrutiny of the report of Lorkin's conversation with Richelieu and the other two commissioners, Villeauxclercs and Marèchal Schomberg (the soldier/diplomat who took Vieuville's place on the commission) shows that he gave nothing away to the French, nor did he indicate his master's willingness to do so. There was no reason for such action. As Rich later admitted, he had it from a good source that the original articles were already on their way to Rome and all the French were trying to do was buy insurance against Spanish trouble.[32] Despite all these qualifications, the fact remains that Rich had attempted to take over the negotiations, and that he had the naive idea Carlisle could be prevented from finding out what he was doing.[33]

At this point James reasserted his authority. Through Conway, he delivered a sharp rebuke to Rich. By the end of August Buckingham had written Louis in support of Carlisle's position on the eleventh article.[34] Most likely he did so to satisfy the king. Talks could begin again with a defined and unified English position.

There was still, however, one potential source of danger that could have caused Louis to reject any further contact with the English. Effiat had been extremely frank in reporting what James had said about the French king. Louis's sensibilities were no less tender than his brother monarch's, and being called a man without honor with whom no one would ever negotiate again, in seventeenth-century terms, was about as offensive as one could get. It would have been ironic indeed if, after the danger that Buckingham had run to preserve the French king's honor, his own ambassador had been the cause of its violation. It was Villeauxclercs who prevented this catastrophe by intercepting Effiat's letter to Louis and giving his master only a summary of it.[35] The latitude that ministers took in dealing with their divinely ordained, absolute monarchs was amazing indeed.

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[31] Carlisle to James and Carlisle to Charles, 15 August 1624, St. Germain; SP 78/73, fos. 46[a]–51[a], P.R.O.

[32] Rich to Conway, 18 August 1624, Paris; ibid., fos. 65[a]–67[a]. The date is more likely the eighth.

[33] Ibid., fo. 67[b].

[34] Carlisle and Rich to Conway; 28 August 1624, St. Germain; ibid., fo. 105[a].

[35] Villeauxclercs to Effiat, 1 September 1624 (N.S.), St. Germain; PRO 31/4/2, fos. 258[b]–259[b], P.R.O.

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Though there was still tension between Carlisle and Rich (which was not resolved until Buckingham sent over their mutual friend, Sir George Goring, to reconcile them in mid-September), they both appeared at a meeting with the commissioners during the last days of August 1624. Given the rebuff that Rich had just received, Carlisle evidently was in control of the discussion. He opened by asking if James's reply concerning the English Roman Catholics and the article relating to them was satisfactory. They were told no, they were not. The English ambassadors then put the whole negotiation on the line and said that in that case, they were instructed to end the discussions and return home. If they were guessing that the French were not ready to throw everything away, they guessed correctly. The commissioners indicated they were willing to make adjustments.

Everyone had known that this session would be difficult and that there was the possibility that nothing would come from their meeting. As insurance, the Venetian and Savoyard ambassadors were called in to mediate.[36] It was presumed by the English that both sides had accepted the principle that the article on toleration would be in an *escrit particulier,* that is a separate, secret agreement; its exact phrasing was what was at issue here. Would James swear on his faith and word as a king to uphold the toleration or upon the holy apostles? Would the Roman Catholics granted toleration have the liberty to practice their religion or the favor of being able to practice their religion? In the end a formula was reached that satisfied both sides, and a recommendation of approval along with the new version of the *escrit* was sent back to England.[37]

The agreed upon version was in the form of a separate memorandum, to be signed by James, Charles and a secretary of state, in which James promised on his faith and word as a king that he would permit all his Roman Catholic subjects to enjoy increased freedom and liberty in all that concerned their religion. Further the *escrit* stated that the French were obtaining better terms than the Spanish would have received by virtue of their proposed marriage agreement. In addition the wording of the *escrit* promised that the Roman Catholics would not be disturbed in their persons or property provided they rendered obedience and were good and true subjects to the English king. Finally there was agreement that James would permit the Catholics to abstain from any oath that was contrary to their religion.[38] It was understood that the oath of allegiance was not such an oath.

From the English perspective this statement on toleration committed them to very little. It did prevent them from inventing an oath with which to persecute Roman Catholics, a device that would not come into use until nearly half a century later with the Test Acts. Aside from this one feature, it is difficult to see specifically what the English were obliged to do. By

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[36] *C.S.P.Ven. 1623–1625,* no. 577, p. 437.
[37] SP 78/73, fos. 105^{b}–106^{b}.
[38] PRO 31/4/2, fo. 329$^{a–b}$.

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no stretch of the imagination did the Romanists have the same rights as Protestants. As matters then stood, the French were saving some face and reputation but little more.

Despite these limitations, Villeauxclercs and Louis wrote their representatives in Rome vigorously defending the marriage articles and the *escrit* as well as advancing a variety of reasons why the pope and the cardinals should be pleased with the arrangements. The tone of the letters indicates that the French felt that they had gotten all they could from the English and were convinced they had in no way betrayed the Roman faith.[39]

By 1 September 1624 James gave his final approval to the expanded version of the marriage treaty, now grown to twenty-six articles, and was ready to send orders to Carlisle and Rich to signify this approval to Louis.[40] Yet there was a residue of uneasiness that never vanished.

Reverberations over the late crisis were still passing through the English court as well. Continued resentment over Buckingham's place as the king's most influential minister surfaced again when, somewhat belatedly, the Marquis of Hamilton and the Earl of Pembroke tried to use the faltering marriage negotiations as a means of embarrassing and hopefully ousting the duke.[41] Had their efforts been linked to the division between Carlisle and Rich, it might have provided fertile ground to undermine Buckingham's authority. All of these factors combined, now that the treaty had been approved in England, to demonstrate to Effiat the virtues of Goring's mission of reconciliation.[42] Yet nothing seemed to be able to lift the atmosphere of sullen apprehension that continued to prevail.

Though the marriage treaty looked as if it would slip into the background, as Villeauxclercs began to discuss his journey to England to make the final arrangements for the treaty,[43] yet it never entirely vanished. Hovering in the distance was the dispensation that the pope had not yet granted. What is more, the relationship between the marriage treaty and the recovery of the Palatinate took on increasing importance, especially since the Bavarians were making proposals they hoped would prevent French intervention.[44]

James, at least, had not lost sight of the purpose of all the grief over the *escrit*. He now wanted the military and marriage treaties signed at the same time. At the very least he wanted some commitment out of the French on the recovery of the Palatinate before the marriage treaty was given final approval. The king pointed out the advantage to the French of reaching an agreement on the military aid before the dispensation arrived.

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[39] Ibid., fos. 332[a]–365[a].
[40] Effiat to Louis, 11 September 1624 (N.S), London; ibid., fos. 365[b]–366[a].
[41] Ibid., fos. 370[a]–371[a].
[42] Ibid., fo. 378[a–b].
[43] Villeauxclercs to Effiat, 17 September 1624 (N.S.), St. Germain; ibid., fo. 391[b].
[44] Ibid., fos. 397[a]–403[a], and Carlisle and Holland to Buckingham, 22 September 1624, Paris; Eg. MS. 2596, fos. 31[a]–32[b], B.L.

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In that way the marriage and the offensive alliance would appear unrelated and Louis would not lose face with his fellow Catholic monarchs.[45]

What James had to say was reasonable enough; however, the negotiations were reaching the stage where all the parties, especially Carlisle and Holland (the title of the earldom Rich was granted in mid-September) were becoming psychologically exhausted. The ambassadors were especially vulnerable to feelings of uncertainty. They were never sure whether their negotiations would be upheld by their home government. In addition, thanks to the procedure of receiving their instructions second-hand through Conway, they were never entirely certain what their orders were. The secretary was a well-meaning man, but his mind at times was no clearer than his handwriting,[46] which is saying a great deal. The ambassadors also were increasingly irritated by Effiat's ability to bring James, Charles and Buckingham to agreement on the French proposals after a better deal had been struck in France.

In order to mitigate some of these pressures, Carlisle went so far as to request that Charles try to help put an end to the *de facto* undermining of the negotiations.[47] The earl must have known his plea was timely, for, even though parliament recently had been prorogued from November to February,[48] it was much on everyone's mind. A bad treaty could cause acute distress for all concerned with it.[49] Yet the fact remained, even if his plea was successful, much of the underlying tension would not go away. The hostilities ran too deep.

With this background in mind, the clashes of October become more comprehensible. Despite the fact that the marriage was supposedly a foregone conclusion, these autumn disputes came as near to ending the negotiations as those of August had done.[50] The Venetian ambassador, at any rate, thought the English had the stronger bargaining position and that, if James remained firm, his ambassadors would succeed.[51]

Through November and December of 1624 the English king was anything but firm. In the process of his wavering, he succeeded in stirring up suspicions among the French about the sincerity of his intentions that had not existed since the beginning of the negotiations. Though a compromise was reached about the nature of French support for Mansfeld and though Carlisle and Holland finally initialed the marriage treaty, James appeared to develop qualms about having troops that he was financing pass through

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[45] Conway to Carlisle and Holland, 25 September 1624, Whitehall; SP 78/73, fos. 199^{b}–200^{a}, P.R.O.

[46] Lorkin to Carlisle and Holland, 11 October 1624, London; Eg. MS. 2596, fos. 57^{a}–58^{b}; B.L.

[47] Carlisle to Charles, 7 October 1624, Paris; ibid., fos. 45^{a}–46^{a}.

[48] *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, 1: 606–607.

[49] Effiat to Villeauxclercs, 21 September 1624 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/4/3, fo. 5^{a-b}, P.R.O.

[50] *C.S.P.Ven, 1623–1625*, no. 619, p. 460; Carlisle and Holland to Conway, 9 October 1624, Paris; SP 78/73, fos. 229^{a}–232^{a}, P.R.O.

[51] *C.S.P.Ven., 1623–1625*, no. 619, p. 461.

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Spanish-held territory.[52] (Technically he was supporting an army against the Austrian Habsburgs and not the Spanish branch of the family.) Such reservations were a serious problem in themselves, but coupled with recent rumors that Gondomar was returning to England,[53] the continuous pressure that Carlisle and Holland were trying to assert for French intervention in Germany was thoroughly undermined.

Not without cause the French began to wonder if Mansfeld's forces were indeed intended for Germany and if not, whether a productive use could be found for this army elsewhere. The answer that increasingly appealed to Louis was for the count to render assistance to the Dutch in relief of the siege of Breda.

The siege of this Dutch city was viewed by contemporaries as a clash of major importance. Its loss apparently would pave the way for Spanish reconquest of the Dutch Republic and was thus greatly feared by the French. The English were much more ambivalent in their approach to the Netherlands. James wanted to give them as little direct aid as possible. On the other hand, there were those in and out of parliament who, though certainly were more concerned with Frederick's fate, could see the advantages of a diversionary war in the Low Countries.[54] Herein lies much of the difficulty with the period. The conflict then encompassing Europe is generally known as the Thirty Years War. That title gives it a unity it did not possess. It was a series of related conflicts between various countries that tended to fall in and out of alliance with each other. Though the Austrian Habsburgs began fighting Frederick in 1619, they had finished him by 1623, while the Spanish forces began fighting the Dutch in 1621 and continued to fight through the 1640s and beyond. The Dutch did provide a home for Frederick and encourage him to recover his lands in Germany in hopes the Habsburgs would be forced to spread troops and money over too wide an area, yet the Netherlanders were far from being totally committed to the Palatine's cause. The French, who had public scruples about supporting the heretical Prince Palatine, were not nearly so reticent about his Protestant brethren in the Republic. Perhaps it was a matter of whether they wanted to ally themselves with a proven winner or a known loser. Whatever the motivation, Carlisle and Holland saw this deemphasizing of Frederick's cause for the Republic's sake as a betrayal of the treaty arrangements. As matters developed, these first tentative steps were only precursors to the French proposal in late December 1624 that the English forces intended for Mansfeld should not land in France at all but go directly to the Republic.[55] From the ambassador's perspective that move was a virtual negation of all they had done over the past year. From

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[52] Effiat to Villeauxclercs, 30 November 1624 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/4/3, fo. 263[a], P.R.O.
[53] Charles to Carlisle, 19 October 1624; SP 78/73, fo. 250[a], P.R.O.
[54] Samuel L. Adams, "Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624," *Faction and Parliament,* 151.
[55] Carlisle and Holland to Conway, 31 December 1624, Paris; SP 78/73, 380[a–b], P.R.O.

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the French point of view it was only a realistic acknowledgment that the English, led by King James, were uncertain military participants in the recovery of the Palatinate.

While these military matters were coming to a head, the dispensation once again moved to the center of attention. Although the French would never have admitted it to the English in the early stages of the negotiations, it was by no means certain they could convince Pope Urban VIII to grant the dispensation. At least some of his Holiness's servants thought Henrietta would have been better employed as the bride of Philip IV's brother, Carlos, than of the heretic Prince of Wales.[56] The use of Father Bérulle as Louis's special representative was designed to counter these largely Spanish ideas. As one of the major figures in French religious life of the period, no one could suspect him of being a tool of the heretics. The same might not be said of the other French ambassador in Rome, Bethune, who was the brother of the Huguenot Duc de Sully. The French were well aware that their marriage contract fell short of the Spanish proposals, and they also were aware Urban knew that some form of military conflict between Europe's two leading Roman Catholic dynasties was most likely linked to this match. What tilted the balance ever so slightly in favor of granting the dispensation was the pope's uneasiness, as an Italian prince, that the Habsburgs would dominate the peninsula on which he lived and thus renew the dangers of the Babylonian captivity.

After Bérulle's arrival at the Roman Curia in late September, Louis began receiving assurances that the pope was favorably inclined toward granting the dispensation, but that there would be delays.[57] The problems, as Father Bérulle explained them, were more political than theological, for, as was standard in such cases, a congregation, that is, a committee, of cardinals, was formed to examine the matter.[58] Before the congregation met, Bérulle and Ambassador Bethune set out to convince the pope of the virtues of their position. Their plan was to demonstrate that the French marriage treaty was sufficiently demanding of the English to warrant a dispensation. They did not want to become involved in having to prove their treaty was the equal of the ill-fated Spanish agreement.[59]

Yet both with Urban and the congregation there was a major struggle to win their final approval for the dispensation. The pope raised a variety of objections to the marriage treaty including questioning the validity of heretical baptism for Roman Catholic children born in England.[60] The congregation then made it plain that they did not trust James to keep his word with respect to English Roman Catholics and would require Louis, just as they had required Philip IV, to make guarantees as well.[61] It was

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[56] M. Houssaye, *Père de Bérulle et L'Oratoire de Jesus 1611–1625*, 470–471.
[57] Bérulle to Louis, 2 October 1624 (N.S.), Rome; PRO 31/4/3, fos. 167^{b}–168^{a}, P.R.O.
[58] Bérulle to Villeauxclercs, ibid., fos. 175^{a}–176^{a}.
[59] Ibid., fo. 178^{a-b}.
[60] Bérulle to Villeauxclercs, 2 October 1624 (N.S.), Rome; Kings MS. 135, fo. 49^{a-b}, B.L.
[61] M. Houssaye, *Bérulle et L'Oratoire*, 153.

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Bérulle who ultimately seemed to hit upon the formula that insured success in the consistory. He divided matters into those which were necessary for the security of Henrietta and her court and those that would be useful but not vital to Roman Catholic interests. He thought he had managed to convince the cardinals that the first class of problems were already solved and that they should not demand the second category as a precondition for the dispensation.[62] Exactly what was to be done with these latter issues is not clear. The French thought they were a face-saving device. The Curia had other ideas.

It was late November before Bérulle was able to write the happy news that the dispensation had been approved by the pope and congregation.[63] Of considerable importance to the negotiations, Bérulle reported the dispensation had been granted without conditions. As he saw it, only minor language changes were recommended as additions, along with the other "optional" matters they wanted to add, if possible.[64] Had the French been able to present their accomplishment to the English in this form, the negotiations might have ended in a relatively pleasant manner, despite the vagaries concerning the military intervention in Germany. To the grief of both countries, the French were unable to do so.

At the heart of the problem was the desire of the Roman Curia, until the last possible moment, to keep pressing the French to act in a manner acceptable to papal interests. There was special concern that, as a result of the marriage, no open conflict with Spain would occur, especially over the Valtelline. As a result, Bérulle was sent back to France with an unofficial copy of the dispensation. When it came to the so-called "optional" provisions, the official version was a much less flexible document.[65] The papal nuncio in France was entrusted with making the official French copy and turning the document over to Louis once the appropriate promises were received.[66] Whether he was given special instructions about this harsher version is unclear. Perhaps none were needed since the nuncio, Spada, the Archbishop of Damette, had never been a great advocate of this marriage and needed very little excuse to cause trouble. If he required any motivation for such behavior, it was not long in coming.

Using the season of the year to mask their intent, the French chose this winter to move on the Valtelline Pass and drive out the papal troops who had held it since 1622. This sort of action was precisely what the Curia had feared. Spada therefore felt no need to apologize when his "copy" of the dispensation failed to distinguish between the matters necessary for security and those deemed as merely useful.[67]

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[62] Ibid., 520–21.
[63] Bérulle to Villeauxclercs, 3 December 1624 (N.S.), Rome; PRO 31/4/3, fo. 368ª, P.R.O.
[64] Ibid., fo. 370ª.
[65] Gordon Albion, *Charles I and the Court of Rome*, 73.
[66] M. Houssaye, *Bérulle et L'Oratoire*, 523.
[67] Ibid., 533.

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Louis and his ministers were now in a difficult situation that rapidly became impossible. In early January 1625, on the same day that Father Bérulle departed from Rome with his copy of the dispensation, Richelieu informed Villeauxclercs, who was then in England, that the Huguenots had seized the Ile de Rè. He wanted the secretary to explore the possibility of obtaining English ships to help put down the revolt.[68] From the beginning the French Protestants had viewed the negotiations for an Anglo-French marriage with suspicion. The English at least had given them moral support; if they were obligated to Louis, he would have a freer hand to deal with his dissident countrymen. This sense of uneasiness was magnified by the large royal armies supposedly being raised to fight the Habsburgs. These troops could just as easily be used to crush the Huguenots. Rohan and some of his coreligonists felt they had to force England's hand before the terms of the marriage treaty were actually put into effect.[69]

Significantly, as Soubize, the one active rebel general, pushed forward with his forces, there were rumors that an unholy alliance had been formed between the Huguenots, the Spanish and the ultra-Catholics led by Condé.[70] There is no question but that the last of these three groups was discontented and dangerous, but they were most unlikely to give aid and comfort to the heretics. Olivares, on the other hand, took whatever means was at hand and would not scruple to hand out money to French dissidents regardless of their faith. Anything that would distract Louis from his conquest of the Valtelline was legitimate in his eyes.

Faced with an internal war against the heretics and mitigating an attack on papal troops, it is not surprising that the French king and Richelieu decided they had no option but to accept the altered version of the dispensation and hope they could convince James to do the same. In doing so they sparked the last crisis of the negotiations and ended their work in such an atmosphere of bitterness and reproach that the political value of the marriage to both countries was virtually nil. That anything at all emerged from the burnt-out hulk of what had once been a promising vehicle is a credit to the good sense and moderation of Effiat and James.

It was mid-February when Carlisle and Holland became aware that their work was not yet over. They were just emerging from the dispute over Mansfeld's landing place when their suspicions were raised once again. On 4 February 1625 they were promised a copy of the dispensation in two or three days; it did not arrive for eight. Spada had been busy with his work. When Villeauxclercs did appear with the document, he announced that he was ashamed to read the articles as the pope would approve them. The next day the ambassadors requested and obtained an audience with Louis at which they asked if those newly designed articles had his approval.

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[68] Richelieu to Villeauxclercs, 12 January 1624 (N.S.), Paris; PRO 31/3/4, fo. 426[a–b], P.R.O.

[69] Léonce Anquez, *Un Nouveau Chapitre de L'Histoire Politique de Reformes de France, 1621–1626*, 128.

[70] R. Woodward to F. Windebank, 3 January 1625, Paris; SP 78/74, fos. 1[a]–2[a], P.R.O.

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He said they were the pope's conditions for granting the dispensation, and there was nothing he could do about them. Even Marie de' Medici was echoing the same official line. If this closing of French ranks was meant to intimidate the ambassadors, it failed. To all these parties Carlisle and Holland gave the same statement; they would not recommend approval of changes in a treaty that was already signed by both parties.

In the ambassadors' dispatch to Conway describing the altered state of affairs they were adamant on two points: James must give the French "a sharpe, stoute negative" and these new conditions for the dispensation were coming from Louis's government, not the Roman Curia.[71] The points were, of course, closely related, and the two men were as sure of the second as the first. Carlisle had developed an impressive private intelligence network that included among its members George Conn, who eventually became the unofficial papal representative in England. Conn was in France during the course of the negotiations[72] and he was undoubtedly supplying Carlisle with information. Unfortunately, in this case evidently he had gotten a look at the document in Bérulle's possession and not the one in Spada's. Thus the earl had his evil opinion of the French reinforced for the wrong reasons.

In the face of all these complications and confusion the French still clung to the hope that they could do what they had done all through the negotiations, override the English ambassadors through Effiat's influence at their master's court. Indeed Villeauxclercs was so proud of this facility, he was openly bragging about it.[73] What the ambassadors now needed was what they had singularly failed to obtain before: Buckingham's support for their position.

Goring, who was once again in France, was sent back to England with a series of letters written to the duke. The arguments used in these dispatches had two major thrusts. They played on the favorite's vanity by pointing out that the French ministers considered him a captive of their policy. As a result these foreigners had become virtually contemptuous of him. It was incumbent on Buckingham to end their presumptuousness by remaining firm about the treaty.[74] The final thrust was taken up by Carlisle. He pointed out to the duke that he had gained credit for breaking off the Spanish match. If he now produced a French marriage agreement that was identical or even worse than the Hispanic one, all that credit would turn into a massive debit. Digby, for one, would not be slow to point out what had happened,[75] and, though Carlisle does not say so directly, he

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[71] Carlisle and Holland to Conway, 14 February 1625, Paris; ibid., fos. 60[a]–61[b].
[72] Doncaster to Carlisle, 17 February 1629, Rome; SP 16/136, no. 9, P.R.O.
[73] SP 78/74, fo. 61[b].
[74] Goring to [Buckingham], 13 February 1625, and Carlisle and Holland to Buckingham, [14 February 1625], ibid., fos. 58[a]–59[a], 62[a].
[75] Carlisle to Buckingham, 16 February 1625, Paris; Eg. MS. 2596, fos. 114[a]–116[a], B.L.; see also Lockyer, *Buckingham*, 231–33.

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most likely thought it would be done in the forthcoming parliament. That was a possibility Buckingham could not have relished, especially given James's frustrations with the current state of affairs.

Whether the favorite's own delicately tuned political antennae were already picking up vibrations of trouble or the ambassadors' letters forewarned him, when Effiat approached asking for favors, he was kept at arms length.[76] By the middle of February the duke was willing to go even further. He actually protested to the marquis about the removal of a French army along the eastern border; Carlisle and Holland had informed him it was destined for La Rochelle.[77] Effiat could hardly have been surprised when, as the final confrontation was imminent in early March 1625, Buckingham retreated from the scene and refused to participate in further discussions.[78] His final gesture before withdrawing was to write James a lengthy, sarcastic letter in which he heaped scorn on the French desire to please the pope.[79]

Finally, as it so often had done, the whole matter came down to an audience between Effiat and James. With only Charles and Conway present, they confronted each other for the last time. James was as certain as he could be that the dispensation was granted free and clear of unacceptable stipulations.[80] He was thus inclined to give the French little, if anything. Should this tactic cause a breakdown of the negotiations, he would force the French to do the deed and then explain why. As for Effiat, he was aware his case was a hollow one at heart. He was also under considerable strain. Just as had been the case with Carlisle, the Frenchman was suffering from the diplomatic equivalent of battle fatigue. It was further complicated by the kind of problems with his wife one would expect after a lengthy separation and doubt over whether he would receive the Order of the Holy Ghost, the French equivalent of the Garter. He was hardly at his best for this final clash.

James clearly had the initiative and proved the most resolute. Though the ambassador went into a long discourse about the promises Louis had made earlier and the difficulties the French were encountering because they agreed to help in the Palatinate, when he reached the dénouement, the English were being asked to change the treaty for the sake of the pope.[81] At this point both the king and the prince angrily refused to alter so much as one word of the treaty for anyone's sake.[82] Effiat then switched to another tack and asked James to hear him not as the French ambassador, but as a humble servant. To some extent that approach took the heat out

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[76] W. Montague to Carlisle, [February 1625]; ibid., fo. 49^{b}.
[77] Buckingham to Effiat, 11 February 1625; Kings MS. 135, fos. 449^{a}–450^{a}, B.L.
[78] Effiat to Louis, 11 March 1625 (N.S.); PRO 31/4/4, fo. 236^{a-b}, P.R.O.
[79] Buckingham to James, [February 1625]; Harl. MS. 6987, fo. 237^{a-b}, B.L.
[80] Ibid.
[81] PRO 31/4/4, fo. 243^{b}.
[82] Ibid., fos. 244^{b}–245^{a}.

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of the argument, but it did not make the English any more willing to change the articles.[83] The conflict continued for five more hours. What finally emerged was an agreement by James to write Louis a letter on how the articles would be interpreted. The French could, if they desired, show the pope a copy of the letter, but not a single word of the treaty itself would be changed.[84] It was the best deal the French could get and Effiat knew it.

While Carlisle awaited the results of the conversations in England, he was actively convincing the French that he meant business about breaking off the treaty. He was so successful that during the second week in March, Villeauxclercs wrote Effiat a letter verging on hysteria. It ended with the frank admission that he had no idea what to do and left the matter to God's judgment.[85]

The pressures that had caused the French to take a hard line on the treaty were now in the process of being reversed. It occurred to them that the English might actively support the Huguenots, and Louis even accused Carlisle of consulting with his rebellious subjects.[86] Placating Condé and his party was not worth that price. Even if the English only withdrew their offer of the ships with which to fight the Huguenot privateers, the French would be in serious trouble. What is more, the pope was sending his nephew as special legate to France with the charge of patching up the Franco-Spanish quarrel in Italy. If the marriage and the alliance were actually broken before the papal representative arrived, Louis's bargaining position would be severely weakened. The result was that, when the messenger arrived with James's letter of explanation, Carlisle and Holland were able to put the final signatures on the marriage treaty without serious French opposition.[87]

None of these events explain what convinced Spada to finally grant the dispensation. Despite Urban VIII's support, it would appear that his nuncio's nerve cracked when the English stood firm. He was then faced with the prospect of what would have been widespread persecution of English Catholics as well as English and perhaps even Dutch support for the Huguenot revolt. What is more, Louis provided the face-saving device of promising that Henrietta would raise her children as Roman Catholics, presumably until they reached adulthood, regardless of what James and Charles said.[88] The king was even willing to have that promise placed in written form and signed by both him and his sister.[89]

Diplomatically and militarily Anglo-French relations were now filled with innumerable contradictions and hidden agendas. The Habsburgs and

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[83] Ibid., fos. 245^{b}–247^{a}.
[84] Ibid., fos. 249^{a}–252^{b}.
[85] Villeauxclercs to Effiat, 19 March 1625 (N.S.), Paris; ibid., fos. 298^{a}–299^{b}.
[86] Louis to Effiat, 21 March 1625 (N.S.); ibid., fo. 325^{a}.
[87] Goring to Conway, 11 March 1625, SP 78/74, fo. 107^{a}, P.R.O.
[88] Kings MS. 136, fos. 528^{a}–535^{a}, B.L.
[89] Ibid., fos. 7^{b}–8^{a}, 51^{b}–55^{a}.

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their allies had nothing to fear from this alliance, a fact of which Carlisle, regretfully, was only too well aware.

Bad as the situation was, it had not yet declined to its nadir. On 9 March 1625, shortly before the final agreement was made, Effiat wrote Villeaux-clercs that James had taken ill.[90] Before the month was out, the King of Great Britain was dead. Had he died a month earlier, there would have been no French match; had he died a year later, the English just might have avoided the humiliations that Charles, Buckingham and Carlisle managed to inflict upon them. To virtually his final days, whatever James might have been, a mindless old hulk he was not.

Decline into the Absurd

Despite James's death, the business of the embassy and the arrangements for the marriage progressed at a reasonable pace. It was now pretty much busy work and minutiae concerning the ceremony, but it was the kind of business in which both countries set great store and thus was performed with dispatch. Carlisle, however, had not lost sight of what he had striven to achieve in over a year's labor, a French alliance to help restore Frederick. The suffering he underwent on behalf of this cause did, however, have a profound effect on his approach to the question.

In late April 1625 the ambassador wrote a letter to Buckingham indicating how much his thinking had changed. He began by telling the duke that the French had been approached three different times to begin discussions about an offensive-defensive alliance; each time they had found reasons to put off the conversations. Using a metaphor which, in the wrong hands, had great potential for satire, Carlisle described Charles's reputation as "virgine" and saw no reason to risk its defilement by yet another refusal. He therefore came to the conclusion that the French should not be pressed to formalize an alliance at that time, but rather permitted to continue the informal support of Mansfeld and their active role in Italy.[1] Carlisle ended the letter with a marvelous burst of patriotic enthusiasm. It is significant because it reflects a genuine sense of British, as opposed to English, sensibilities, but it was also designed to flatter Buckingham, as well as Charles, in that the coming age would see the king as "the arbiter of the Christian world beinge soverayne of three warlyk people set a parte in a little world by themselves to give the lawe to all the rest by beinge Master of the Sea which giveth him accesse to all. . . ."[2] Despite this final visionary passage that anticipated reality by two centuries, throughout the letter, the earl's tone is relaxed and common-sensical, a far cry from the tense, hostile letters he was writing only a month before. Nonetheless, there are indi-

[90] PRO 31/4/4, fos. 331[b]–332[a].

[1] Carlisle to Buckingham, 21 April 1625; SP 78/74, fo. 192[a], P.R.O.
[2] Ibid., fo. 193[b].

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cations that he was not basically any friendlier to the French government in April than he had been in March. His prime concern was that the English place themselves in a position where they could choose more than one alternative, especially with respect to the Huguenots. In the near future it might serve Charles's purposes to aid his co-religionists in France, and a binding alliance with Louis might hinder such action.[3] For the rest, he was just being practical.

If outside observers are correct, the ambassador's feelings toward the French, and especially toward Richelieu, deteriorated further. Though it was Villeauxclercs who bore the brunt of Carlisle's wrath in the earlier part of the year, it was the cardinal who ultimately became the focus of his discontent. The Venetian ambassador in France reported secret offenses committed by the French prelate had hardened the earl's attitude.[4] Specifically what these offenses were is unknown, yet Richelieu's desire to establish good personal relations with Carlisle is apparent in all their dealings. So was the ambassador's reluctance to be placated.

In May and June of 1625 none of these tensions between the key parties meant that the English were any less keen to involve the French in the rescue of Frederick. As unobtrusively as possible, Carlisle and Holland tried to help mediate the problems with the Huguenots.[5] There was no reason to give the French the excuse of internal distractions. They were also encouraging the Venetians and the Savoyards to press for continued French military action in Italy. These efforts met with modest success, but they were very nearly canceled out by Carlisle's inability to keep his opinions of France and its ministers to himself. This pattern of bitterness and reproach continued even after Buckingham's arrival in mid-May to escort Henrietta to England. The earl had no reservations about imbuing the favorite with his own hostility.[6] His efforts were all too successful.

As will become apparent, what the French faced over the next two years was having to swallow a series of increasingly harsh insults from their so-called allies in England. Throughout it all Richelieu and Louis did their utmost to keep their erstwhile partners from becoming sworn enemies, and herein they failed.

In some ways the French were victims of their own cleverness. The agreements on toleration for the English Roman Catholics and those making Henrietta's suite a veritable center for Franco-Roman missionary endeavor in England put the French in the position of having to defend what for Charles was a politically impossible set of arrangements. To his credit Carlisle had warned everyone concerned of the dangers, but no one had paid him any heed. Now he would take great delight in helping to dismantle

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[3] Ibid., fo. 192[b].

[4] *C.S.P.Ven., 1625–1626,* no. 80, p. 60; Goring to Buckingham, 20 April 1625, Paris; Harl. MS. 1580, fo. 453[a], B.L.

[5] *C.S.P.Ven., 1625–1626,* no. 24, p. 18.

[6] Ibid., no. 89, p. 66.

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the disagreeable treaties he had been forced to sign. As the war with the Huguenots and conflicts with dissident French nobility increasingly distracted Richelieu from the struggle with the Habsburgs, he had much less to offer the English as an inducement to keep faith with their agreements. It is not difficult to see how Carlisle, and gradually Buckingham and Charles as well, saw the cardinal in the role of an ardent Romanist whose primary concern was the advancement of his religion through destruction of the Protestant forces on both sides of the Channel. Thus it became more and more attractive to score political points at home by humiliating the French and their chief minister.

Whatever personal reasons these men had to scorn the French, the advent of the 1625 Parliament gave them practical political reasons for acting in this way. From a royal point of view this parliament was a frustrating and confusing experience. Though the evidence on the subject is meager, it would appear that the court did very little planning beforehand and thus no organized program was developed to place before the Commons. What is more, they were especially weak when it came to placing talented debaters in the Commons. As far as government ministers were concerned, they had to rely mainly on Sir Robert Naunton and Sir John Coke. Neither of them was part of Charles's inner circle of advisers, and neither was a particularly convincing orator. In the Lords, Carlisle, who was the best informed about foreign policy and its needs, was rarely there.[7] The king and his advisers had created a vacuum into which the discontented parliamentarians rapidly stepped.

Unlike 1624, when feeling against the Spanish match gave the Commons a secular overlay to a religious concern, in 1625 an unalloyed concern with religion was the primary interest of the House. The church was in danger. The combination of a newly arrived Romanist queen accompanied by hordes of French hangers-on and vague suspicions concerning Charles's religious tendencies, created an early ferment among the MPs. Until they received assurance on these issues, the king was unlikely to receive the supply he demanded for unnamed foreign ventures. As events developed, it was Sir Francis Seymour, two weeks into the session, who at last raised the topic of supply.[8]

After a fruitless month, the combination of the plague raging in London and parliament's unwillingness to cooperate by granting funds caused Charles to adjourn the body until the beginning of August when it would meet in Oxford. He now had time to work out a plan for gaining the cooperation of the parliamentarians. He did not do so.

There was undoubtedly some confusion about why the crusade for Frederick and Spain was not receiving a better response from the MPs. Yet the king and his ministers had only themselves to thank. As nearly

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[7] Manuscript Minutes, 1625, fo. 3[a] *et. seq.*, H.L.R.O.
[8] Harold Hulme, *The Life of Sir John Eliot*, 76–84.

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as it is possible to tell, they went on the presumption that their goals were clear and the tactics for achieving them universally understood. The granting of the subsidies, given this situation, was evidently viewed as a necessary, but *pro forma,* final step. Perhaps basically positive memories of the 1624 Parliament also lingered in some minds. Thus, despite the obvious signs of trouble in the first session, when parliament did reconvene, there was still no concerted royal plan. All that appeared was the idea of trading the enforcement of the anti-Catholic laws for a parliamentary subsidy. The idea came in response to a petition from the Commons that may have had inspiration from some of those about the court.

In Charles's presence the privy council met at Oxford to debate what reply should be made to the petition. It was decided that Buckingham would go to the parliament to satisfy the MPs on all counts and that meant doing so at the expense of the Roman Catholics. The decision was in clear opposition to the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreements with France, and it is certain that Carlisle played a major role in bringing it about.[9] When the duke did speak before the Commons, the words were supplied by the former ambassador. What Buckingham offered to do was throw out the French who were causing trouble and persecute the native Roman Catholics. When he informed the parliament that the concessions were only made to the French in order to procure a dispensation and that Louis knew they were never meant seriously, he was doing no more than echo one of Carlisle's favorite themes.[10] Indeed the earl stood up and personally said as much to the parliamentarians.[11]

Trading Roman Catholic persecution for money might have worked if Buckingham and Carlisle had pressed it from the outset of the parliamentary session. Coming in response to the MPs discontent, it proved less than convincing. In addition, the forces hostile to the influence of the favorite were spinning their plots again, and in the process the most alarming people were working together. When the stalwarts of moderate political puritanism, as represented by the Earl of Pembroke,[12] and a former member of the old Howard faction, as represented by Sir Robert Mansell, combined to launch an attack on Buckingham, the prospects for a successful parliament vanished, and Charles was forced to dissolve the body.[13] The duke had high hopes that better planning would produce a more amenable assembly in the not too distant future. He also realized that he had to

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[9] *C.S.P.Ven., 1625–1626,* no. 211, p. 143.

[10] Mende to Richelieu, 26 August 1625 (N.S.) [date is likely 6/16, based on internal evidence]; Add. MS 30,651, fos. 21^{b}–22^{a}, B.L.

[11] *Mémoires Inédits du Leveneur de Tillières,* 96; and *Mémoires de Cardinal de Richelieu,* 5: 146.

[12] My thanks to Dr. Brian O'Farrell for the information concerning Pembroke's parliamentary activities.

[13] Mende to Richelieu, 29 August 1625 (N.S.); add. MS. 30,651, fos. 26^{a}–27^{b}, B.L.; and see K. Sharpe, "The Earl of Arundel, His Circle and the Opposition to the Duke of Buckingham, 1618–1628," *Faction and Parliament,* 228–29 for details of the attack on Buckingham.

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create the proper atmosphere by continuing the persecution of the Roman Catholics[14] and by winning glory through the upcoming naval expedition against Spain. Both operations were hazardous at best and required more favor from the goddess of fortune than the favorite possessed.

Persecution of the Roman Catholics was, of course, a great embarrassment to the French, but they were singularly ill-equipped to deal with the situation. When Effiat left England in June 1625, no accredited diplomat was put in his place. As a result, the French lacked an official voice to speak for their interests. Instead Bishop Mende, a relative of Richelieu's who served as Henrietta's almoner, and Tillières, who had returned as the new queen's chamberlain, split the diplomatic chores between them. It was a terrible arrangement from every perspective. The last thing that the French associated with Henrietta should have wanted to do was meddle with political matters. Their religion, their numbers and their priests all made them suspect enough without flaunting their dual loyalties by attempting to speak for the French government. What is more, the voice with which they spoke was a weak one because they lacked official, diplomatic status. It is difficult to discover why the French allowed this situation to develop, and why it took them so long to correct it. In all justice the English fell into the same trap, but at least they had the excuse of a new and distracted monarch.

Interestingly enough, when an ambassador was finally chosen in late August 1625,[15] he was given the rank of an extraordinary rather than a resident. The man selected for the post was Louis's first gentleman of the bedchamber, Monsieur Blainville.

He was a poor choice. What the French needed was a diplomat and a mediator. What they sent was a spy and a plotter.[16] The problem was that they faced delicate situations on all sides. As part of his anti-Catholic stance, Charles was not only persecuting English Romanists. He was also permitting Monsieur de Soubize's privateering fleet to use West Country ports where they were resupplying and selling their prizes. Insofar as it is possible to determine, Soubize's coming was his idea, but once he and his fleet arrived, first Secretary Conway and then other ministers realized they had been given useful leverage in dealing with the French.[17] Any French ambassador coming into England would have the mission of correcting this affront to French dignity. In addition he would also have to quiet the difficulties that were arising between Charles and his new bride as a result of his anti-Catholic program. It was a task requiring great tact and discretion. Effiat at the full height of his powers might have coped effectively, and he was considered for the post.[18] Yet he was not chosen,

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[14] Tillières to Louis, 31 August 1625 (N.S.); add. MS. 30,651, fos. 33[a]–38[a], B.L.

[15] Richelieu to Villeauxclercs, 27 August 1625 (N.S.); ibid., fos. 23[a]–24[a].

[16] Lorkin to Buckingham, 20 August 1625, Paris; Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 64[b], B.L.

[17] *C.S.P.D., 1625–26,* nos. 47 & 49, p. 148.

[18] *Les Papiers de Richelieu, Section Politique Interieme Correspondence et Papiers d'Etat,* 1: no. 53, p. 200.

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so all the former ambassador could do was attempt to give Blainville the wisdom of his experience.[19] Unfortunately no one could save the new ambassador from himself; his efforts were largely misdirected, and his mission accomplished little of lasting value.

As for Blainville's relations with Carlisle, his instructions advised caution. The earl was described as hostile to Spanish interests, but overly attached to his religion and thus intent on doing harm to the English Roman Catholics through parliament.[20] At least in the initial stages of the mission, Carlisle kept his distance, and Buckingham and Holland were the ambassador's primary contacts.[21] As it turned out, the earl was not just showing his disdain of the French; he was involved with negotiating with Soubize for the return of captured French vessels.[22] He still harbored hopes for some benefit from cooperation with the French, or at any rate, he was unwilling to totally abandon the possibility. Yet there is evidence that France was no longer the center of his attention. What was increasingly on his mind was a firm alliance with the anti-Habsburg states of Italy, the Duchy of Savoy and the Republic of Venice. For this purpose, Carlisle hinted to the Venetian ambassador he was prepared to go to Italy, and Blainville also related a similar story in October 1625.[23] With Italian and Dutch help the earl hoped to prevent the Habsburgs from resupplying their troops in Germany. Now that Denmark was on the verge of invading Germany from the north and the English fleet was preparing to hammer the Spaniards in their home waters, the prospects for the restoration of the Prince Palatine seemed more promising than ever. In Carlisle's view one of the virtues of this complex scheme was that it could function regardless of French participation. Indeed if it did begin to succeed, the French could even be drawn in, however unwillingly, for fear of losing their influence with their Dutch and Italian allies.

Even before Buckingham left for the Dutch Republic in November 1625, where he planned to put the finishing touches on the northern flank of this alliance, it was obvious to observers at court that he had formed a close, working relationship with Carlisle.[24] He was the duke's most trusted confidant, and one of the few, influential men willingly left in personal attendance on Charles during the embassy.[25] Despite the antagonisms of the previous year, the two men seemed united on a common policy: Frederick had to be restored by war with Spain, and France had to pay the price of its earlier duplicity.

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[19] Lorkin to Buckingham, 7 September 1625; Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 66^{b}, B.L.
[20] Add. MS. 30,651, fo. 53^{a}.
[21] Blainville to Louis, 22 October 1625 (N.S.); ibid., fos. 126^{b}–127^{a}.
[22] Mende to Villeauxclercs, 15 November 1625 (N.S.); ibid., fos. 181^{b}–182^{a}.
[23] Blainville to Louis, 16 October 1625 (N.S.); ibid., fo. 134^{a-b}, and *C.S.P.Ven., 1625–1626,* no. 290, p. 199.
[24] Kelly to Mar, 22 October 1625, Windsor; *HMC Mar and Kelly, Suppl.,* 235.
[25] November 11, 1625; ibid., 236–37.

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Meanwhile, during Buckingham's stint as ambassador, Carlisle was thrust into what would have been the favorite's role. In late November 1625 the earl was sent to explain to Henrietta why her husband behaved as he did toward the English Romanists. The fact that it was Charles who sent him on this mission speaks volumes for the insecurity he felt in dealing with his teenaged bride. The fact that she needed the spiritual fortification from Bishop Mende before meeting the earl says as much for how uneasy she was in her new position.[26]

For the time being, at least, the situation between Charles and Henrietta had to move to the background as various parts of the grand scheme to defeat the Habsburgs failed to materialize in the hoped-for manner. The most important of these setbacks was the inability of the Anglo-Dutch fleet to inflict any notable injury upon the Spanish at Cádiz. Their lack of success meant that the duke and the king would be at a serious disadvantage when they faced the parliament scheduled to meet in February 1626.

In a vain effort to distract attention from the Cádiz fiasco, various public gestures were made toward the Huguenots,[27] but they did no good. What is more, the French were giving signs that they had had enough of playing the whipping boy and began to make friendly approaches toward the Spaniards.[28] By March 1626 they had a treaty. The month before even the Huguenots were temporarily at peace. With the mediation of Carleton, Holland and the Dutch ambassador, Louis signed a treaty with his rebellious subjects.[29] Charles and Buckingham would have to face a most single-minded parliament without any means of camouflage.

There is some reason to believe that Carlisle, too, had mixed feeling about facing the forthcoming gathering of parliamentarians. He was closely associated with Buckingham; he had negotiated the marriage treaty and alliance with France that had caused nothing but grief, and his financial affairs would still not bear close scrutiny by an inquisitive House of Commons. A French diplomatic representative in England believed he planned to leave the country before the parliament met.[30] After some thought, however, he must have decided it was safer to keep an eye on developments rather than trust intermediaries, for he stayed and attended the Lords in person.

Though efforts were made by Buckingham and the king to prepare for the 1626 Parliament, the careful selection of sheriffs being the most famous,

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[26] Mende to Villeauxclercs, 3 December 1625 (N.S.); add. MS. 30,651, fos. 264^{b}–265^{a}, B.L.

[27] Blainville to Louis, 22 December 1625 (N.S.); ibid., fos. 288^{a}–290^{b}, and ibid., 29 December 1625 (N.S.), fo. 300^{a}.

[28] Villeauxclercs to Blainville, 19 [December] 1625 (N.S.); ibid., fos. 282^{b}–283^{b}.

[29] Blainville to Villeauxclercs, 7 February 1626 (N.S.), and Louis to Blainville, 13 February 1626 (N.S.); ibid., fos. 368^{a}–369^{b}, 376^{a}–380^{a}.

[30] Bautru to Richelieu, 6 January 1626 (N.S.), Hampton Court; PRO 31/3/63, fo. 10^{b}, P.R.O.

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the body was unalterably opposed to their policies and to the person of the duke. As had been true in the previous parliament, the opposition was coming from various quarters. The renegade Vice-Admiral of Devon, Sir John Eliot, was leading the forces associated with the ultra-Protestant grouping (with Pembroke's tacit support), while the remnant of the pro-Spanish faction was led by Digby. Since Buckingham had made no effort to hide his desire to enforce the anti-Roman Catholic legislation or bring "order" to Henrietta's household, the French were certainly not beyond encouraging whatever opposition to the duke there was available.[31] These men had not agreed upon an alternate policy for the government. What united them was their desire to unseat Buckingham.

As Carlisle saw the situation, he had to place himself in a position where he could do Buckingham and Charles useful service while at the same time allowing an opportunity to step to one side if the favorite should fall from power. The earl's approach to this tricky situation showed that his two decades in Stuart England had not been wasted. He concentrated on the impeachment of the Earl of Bristol (Digby's current title), on the Earl of Arundel's imprisonment and on acting as an intermediary between the Lords and Charles. When it came to Buckingham's concerns, he said as little as he could manage.[32]

Concentrating on Bristol's impeachment was advantageous to Carlisle for a variety of reasons. Bristol was the other diplomat bred up by James for extraordinary missions. The man was intelligent enough and capable enough to challenge Carlisle's role as the government's chief foreign policy adviser. When the anti-Spanish program ended, as it inevitably would, Bristol would be the logical choice to negotiate the peace treaty. His impeachment could throw the work to Carlisle.

From the royal perspective, Bristol was also the one Englishman who was aware of the details of what Charles and Buckingham had said and done while they were in Madrid. No one knew better than the king and his favorite just how damaging his information could be. If Carlisle succeeded in discrediting Bristol before the royal image was damaged, he would earn tremendous credit with his masters.

The other two projects, involving Arundel and acting as an intermediary, put Carlisle in a position to win the goodwill of the House of Lords. Arundel's arrest for marrying one of his children into the branch of the royal family represented by the Duke of Lennox was an expression of personal concern by the head of the family. It was also, of course, an effort to weaken the anti-Buckingham faction in the Lords. In the long run the action caused more trouble than it was worth because the peers took the arrest as a violation of their privilege.[33] Although initially Carlisle

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[31] Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, 266–67.

[32] *Journal of the House of Lords, 1626*, 3: 627.

[33] Jess S. Flemion, "The Nature of Opposition in the House of Lords in the Early Seventeenth Century," 8, no. 1 (1976): 22, 28.

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had defended Charles's right to imprison Arundel for good reason (or no reason), once the house made its feelings known, he became more cooperative.[34] By serving as the emissary of the Lords to the king on this and other matters, Carlisle was able to identify his own interests with theirs. It made the peers less likely to view his actions unfavorably.

Carlisle was successful in his approach to surviving the 1626 Parliament. With respect to Bristol, he helped create an unfavorable atmosphere for the charges the former ambassador planned to present against Buckingham by playing on the very sensitivities that the Arundel case had aroused. Carlisle revealed to the Lords that Bristol had presented his information to the Commons before he had revealed it to their chamber and therefore asked the peers to consider how much this entrenched upon their privileges. As Carlisle presented his charge immediately before Bristol entered the Lords for his initial presentation, the dramatic effect, not to say the attitude of the listeners, was unfavorably affected.[35] Carlisle was also on the Lord's committee appointed to examine the Bristol case,[36] but there is no way to tell what influence he might have exerted behind the scenes.

When it came to the Arundel case, though it may have been a coincidence, it was in the wake of Carlisle's and Dudley Carleton's (now Lord Carleton) mission to Charles that an answer was returned pleasing to the Lords.[37] Their effort had not been the first seeking such a response. Thus whether it was by foreknowledge or diplomatic skill, Carlisle earned himself great credit with the other peers. He needed to have a fund of goodwill because there were times, such as over the arrest of Digges and Eliot, when he felt obliged to side with the small minority of court peers in support of the king's unpopular actions.[38]

From the royal point of view, however, the 1626 Parliament was an unmitigated disaster. By early June it was obvious even to Secretary Conway that nothing could or would be gained from this assembly.[39] Given Carlisle's information about the hopelessness of continuing the body, his participation on the Lord's committee that went to plead with Charles to revoke his dissolution notice must have been only for show.[40] Yet from the earl's personal point of view, the disbanded parliament was one of his greatest successes. He had done useful service for Buckingham and the king while not alienating the parliamentary opposition. In many ways it was an amazing accomplishment.

With the dissolution of parliament the government was still faced with the original problem, the need to make war against the Habsburgs in order

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[34] Vernon F. Snow, "The Arundel Case, 1626," 338.
[35] *HMC Montagu-Buccleuch*, 3: 284.
[36] *Journal of the House of Lords, 1626*, 3: 648.
[37] Ibid., 650.
[38] Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, 306 note.
[39] Conway to Carlisle, 5 June 1626; Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 13ª, B.L.
[40] *C.S.P.Ven., 1625–1626*, no. 629, pp. 452–53; and Mende to Richelieu, June 1626; PRO 31/3/63, fo. 89ª, P.R.O.

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to force the restoration of the Palatinate to Frederick. Once again Carlisle's scheme of the previous year reemerged with its emphasis on bettering the ties with Savoy and Venice, but with this new aspect added. Carlisle and others were opening contacts with the anti-Richelieu members of the French aristocracy.[41] What eventually developed was a far-ranging international scheme to do away with the cardinal and hopefully restore France to the active anti-Habsburg fold.

It is against the background of the anti-Richelieu plotting that Henrietta's French attendants were literally thrown out. It was 7 August 1626 when Charles wrote an angry, emotional letter to Buckingham ordering the French to leave England and suggesting that, if they did not, they should be driven away like so many wild beasts and the devil should go with them.[42] There is some reason to believe that Buckingham and Carlisle played upon their young master's sensibilities so that he would do exactly as he did, and what is more, they did so at a time when it would aid their plotting against Richelieu.

Trouble had been the norm for the French in Henrietta's court ever since their first arrival in England. She had brought too many of her countrymen with her; she was too young and inexperienced to control them and among their number were some, especially Madame St. Georges, who delighted in plotting and scheming. On top of all these disadvantages, as the presence of Father Bérulle attests, they had come to England with a sense of missionary zeal that antagonized their hosts in the extreme. As early as August 1625, Bishop Mende was writing home trying to convince his compatriots to exert pressure on Henrietta to behave more discreetly.[43]

In the first instance it is unlikely that Buckingham and Carlisle wanted to oust all of Henrietta's French court. Rather, they wanted to make strategic additions. Buckingham's three closest female relatives were to act as a stabilizing influence as well as a source of current information (spies, if one prefers).[44] By July 1626 the list had been expanded to include the Countess of Carlisle.[45] It was at Lucy's name that Henrietta balked.[46] Someone could have been advising her that such a reaction would split Buckingham and Carlisle, but more likely the young queen did not care for the older woman. No one can quarrel with her reasons.

Over the past decade the countess had endured a series of trials that included at least one near fatal illness and the birth of a still-born child. Though after 1625 she would eventually suffer a serious bout with small-pox, her health seemed to stabilize, and from this point on she was seldom out of the public eye for long. Over the next fifteen or twenty years she

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[41] *C.S.P.Ven., 1625–1626,* no. 644, p. 467; and *Mémoires du Cardinal Richelieu,* 6: 178–79.
[42] Harl. MS 6988, fo. 11[a], B.L.
[43] [Mende to Villeauxclercs, 25 August 1625 (N.S.)]; add. MS. 30,651, fos. 13[b]–14[a], B.L.
[44] Richelieu, *Mémoires,* 5: 144 note. My thanks to Roger Lockyer for this reference.
[45] Mende to Richelieu, 24 July 1626 (N.S.), Greenwich; PRO 31/3/64, fo. 112[b], P.R.O.
[46] Ibid., fo. 113[a].

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was considered one of the "killing" beauties of the age, and men of all descriptions virtually worshipped her as a goddess. What is of more importance, she became a person who was fascinated by men of intelligence and power. For the remainder of her life she would cultivate and attempt to influence them. She met with a good deal of success.

Secretary Conway gave some hint of the effect the countess was having on the lesser men around her when he wrote to Carlisle in June 1625,[47] but perhaps the best impression of the profound impact she could make was given by the old Earl of Exeter when he wrote Lucy that:

> The night is the mother of dreams and fantoms, the winter is the mother of the night, all this mingled with my infermities have protracted this homage so due and so vowed to your ladyship, least the fums and vapors so arisinge shuld contaminate mie so sacred and pure an intention. But mutch more pleasure it were to me to performe this duty in your lodginge at Court when you see your perfections in the glasse addinge perfection to perfection aproovinge the boune mots there spoken in your presence, moderatinge the exscesse of compliments, passinge over a dull gest, without a sweete smile, givinge a wise answer to an extravagant question but why do I regrete these absent pleasurs, and find defects in my condition since it pleased God so to determine but were I yonge againe I shuld be a most humble sutor that you would be pleased to vouchsafe that your lodginge might be my academie quittinge to the rest both Italie and France . . .[48]

Under the circumstances it is no wonder that the teenaged queen was less than enthusiastic about having such a person at her court. She would have been far outshone by her supposed servant. She might even have found herself dominated by the older woman in the bargain.

One other factor was worth Henrietta's consideration as well; the countess might not have been intended to serve her alone. In Bishop Mende's opinion Lucy had ways of making herself useful to Charles as well.[49]

At first glance the idea that Carlisle would agree to have his wife act as bait to ensnare the king in a sexual relationship is a rather surprising one. Buckingham's involvement also has its interesting aspects, to put it no more strongly than that, for according to common report and in the Duchess of Buckingham's opinion, he was Lucy's lover.[50] The whole business has a kind of Restoration flavor to it.

Yet two interrelated sides of Charles's personality might explain this conundrum. The king was a shy, self-conscious man who was insecure in his personal and political relationships. A variety of reasons have been advanced to explain his state of mind, and they range from self-consciousness about a stutter to over-compensation for his unusually short

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[47] Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 13[a], B.L.

[48] Exeter to Countess of Carlisle; SP 16/280, no. 22, P.R.O.

[49] PRO 31/3/64, fo. 114[a].

[50] John Hope to ?, 20 April 1628; SP 16/101/6, no. 43, fo. 93[a–b]; David Mathew, *The Jacobean Age*, 305 citing *C.S.P.D., 1627–28*, 381 and Lockyer, *Buckingham*, 60.

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physical stature. Whatever the causes, it is worth pointing out that he probably had good reason to feel insecure. Charles did not have an inferiority complex; he was inferior, and he knew it. His elder brother and his father had both encouraged him in that view. An overpowering personality could dominate him, especially someone to whom the man had emotional attachments. The danger from Buckingham and Carlisle's point of view was that someone they did not control, such as Henrietta, might fulfill that role.

Directly related to Charles's feelings of insecurity was his secretiveness that in turn created the feeling that no one could fully understand him or, more importantly, trust him. Carlisle had known the king virtually since birth, and Buckingham was as close to him as any man would ever be. Yet both men still had an uneasy feeling their master was not dependable. Perhaps recent political developments such as the handling of the late parliament had intensified these feelings. In any case, a trustworthy mistress would certainly have helped allay their sense of uneasiness. As events were to demonstrate, they were a generation too early in providing a Stuart king with extra-curricular feminine companionship.

It is a measure of the extent to which Charles was able to hide his personal feelings that two men as perceptive as Carlisle and Buckingham could have misjudged his inclination so greatly. Like his unfortunate royal counterparts of later centuries in France and Russia, the English king was a devoted family man not much inclined to philander. If he had been interested in such an adventure, it is unlikely that anyone as obviously overpowering and intelligent as the Countess of Carlisle would have struck his fancy.

Despite their failure as procurers, the earl and the duke were able to play on Charles's suspicions of those around his wife to such an extent that he drove her French attendants from England. Both Tillières in his memoires and an anonymous Frenchman connected with Henrietta's court pointed out that Carlisle and Buckingham pushed their master into the deed by emphasizing that a man who could not control his own wife could not hope to rule a nation.[51] For someone with Charles's sense of inadequacy, it was an intolerable slur.

When the break finally came and the French were sent home, only a minimum was done to placate Louis. Carleton was sent over to explain why the marriage treaty had been violated,[52] and a list of reasons was drawn up to justify the action.[53] According to French sources, Carlisle and Buckingham made it plain to all who cared to listen that they felt Richelieu and his master would be unable to do anything in retaliation for this deed.[54] Their certainty came from their knowledge of the plot against the

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[51] Tillières, *Mémoires*, 109; and PRO 31/3/64, fo. 195[a], P.R.O.; For the view that Charles was alone responsible see Lockyer, *Buckingham*, 334–5.

[52] Rudyard to Nethersole, 3 August 1626; SP 16/33, no. 30, P.R.O.

[53] SP 78/79, fo. 291[a–b], P.R.O.

[54] PRO 31/3/64, fo. 220[a–b], P.R.O.

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cardinal.[55] Indeed the violation of the marriage treaty, the vehicle by which Richelieu became France's leading minister, might have helped other Frenchmen justify their own, disloyal actions.

From the evidence collected by Richelieu and his agents, it is plain that Carlisle and his political allies in England were more than passive observers of the events across the Channel. If they had not provided any active participants, they had done everything possible to encourage those who were personally involved to perform their deed well. Carlisle brought his influence to bear on Louis's discontented brother, Gaston, with such amazing success that the young prince viewed him as Buckingham's natural successor as Charles's leading minister. A short time before the intended *coup* against Richelieu, Gaston received assurances from Carlisle that his cause was just, and he could depend upon English aid.[56] In practice the assurances were useless; the plot involved too many people and was successfully thwarted by the alert cardinal.

Back in England it was too late to undo the expulsion of the French from their household posts, and everyone had to make the best of it. To quiet Henrietta's fears, some exceptions were made from the general expulsion order. Among others, Madame Vantelet, one of the queen's dressers, her nurse and some of the ecclesiastics were permitted to remain. For the major posts vacated, Carlisle and Buckingham split the patronage. The Earl of Rutland, the duke's father-in-law, was made chamberlain, and the duchess and Lady Denbigh were placed in the bedchamber. Algernon, Lord Percy, Carlisle's brother-in-law, was appointed master of the horse, and Lucy was also placed in the bedchamber. George Goring, who had close ties with both Buckingham and Carlisle, became the vice-chamberlain. As for the rest of the places, the late Queen Anne's officials were reinstated.[57]

Though the loss of her personal attendants may have been distressing to Henrietta, there is no evidence that any attempt was made to degrade or humiliate her as a queen. Nonetheless, as word began to filter back to France with the embittered and outraged exiles, Louis was none too sure of just what the English intended to do to his sister. Richelieu was convinced that Buckingham had poisoned the Marquis of Hamilton and then arranged for the assassination of the poisoner. The same end could await the English queen;[58] her doctor and apothecary were among those dismissed. Even if they were not seeking to injure her body, they may have sought her soul. Two Protestant divines were appointed to the queen's household.[59] Louis and Richelieu felt they had to move both quickly and cautiously.

The safest French response to the English misdeeds was to send an

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[55] *Mémoires du Cardinal Richelieu*, 6: 215.
[56] Ibid., 178–79.
[57] SP 16/33, no. 30, P.R.O.
[58] *Papiers de Richelieu*, 1, no. 203: pp. 458–59 and no. 234: p. 478.
[59] Mende to Herbault, 3 August 1626 (N.S.), Somerset House; PRO 31/3/64, fo. 131[a–b], P.R.O.

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extraordinary embassy to deal with the outstanding differences between the two countries. They did just that. The man chosen for the task was Maréchal Bassompierre, a middle-aged contemporary of Carlisle's who periodically varied his military career with diplomacy. Originally Tillières was also named with his brother-in-law as ambassador, but he was dropped before the mission left. Presumably the presence of Henrietta's former chamberlain might have lessened the credibility of what was supposedly a mediation effort. The tone of the instructions was basically conciliatory and more than a bit defensive about Louis's failure to join England in the offensive alliance with the Dutch and the Danes. The agreement with the Spanish over the Valtelline was yet another source of discomfort.[60]

The French king really did not have many cards to play, and about the most that he could expect from the mission is that it might stop the rot in Anglo-French relations. Carlisle and Buckingham had gambled correctly; Louis and Richelieu could do nothing about the ouster of their countrymen.

On the surface, at least, the Bassompierre mission was a success. An agreement was reached concerning Henrietta's household, and Buckingham and Carlisle even served on the commission that negotiated the accord.[61] Yet from a variety of perspectives, this mission marked the beginning of the worst period of Charles's reign until the outbreak of the civil wars. It also marked the start of the decline of Carlisle's influence as one of the key foreign policy advisers to the king.

The core of both problems was the split that occurred between the earl and the duke. The origins of their differences are traceable to the period when the French were being driven from the court. In the midst of all the furor, Buckingham attempted to placate Pembroke and his faction. They had proved their power too dramatically in the previous parliament, and they could not be ignored. The deal they struck was that the duke's daughter would marry Pembroke's nephew, while the earl himself would become Lord Steward. The Earl of Montgomery, Pembroke's brother, would occupy the vacated position of Lord Chamberlain. The problem here was that Carlisle coveted this latter post and had done so for many years. Justifiably he felt he was being sold out in order to pacify the Pembroke group.[62] Sometimes in Stuart politics one received more by being an enemy than a friend, and Carlisle was fobbed off with becoming one of Charles's gentlemen of the bedchamber.[63]

Along with this personal grievance, there was a political problem as well. By September 1626 the failure of the plot against Richelieu and the massive defeat of Christian IV of Denmark by the imperialists left Carlisle much less willing to push the French. England was running short of useful allies, and there was no point in driving Louis further into the arms of

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[60] Add. MS. 5459, fos. 238[a]–255[b], B.L.
[61] Harl. MS. 4363, fo. 113[a–b], B.L.
[62] Mende to Herbault, 26 July 1626 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/64, fo. 118[a], P.R.O.
[63] *C.S.P.Ven., 1625–1626,* no. 685, p. 500.

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Spain. The favorite, on the other hand, was not inclined to leave the hardline policy. Their differing attitudes were reflected in the way they felt Maréchal de Bassompierre should be entertained while he was in England. Carlisle favored granting him the most generous treatment possible; the duke was much more inclined toward stringency.[64] Charles's frigid orders concerning the ambassador's reception are the evidence of whose views prevailed.[65]

When the maréchal was presented at Hampton Court, it was the earl who acted as his official escort,[66] and, as already noted, when the bargaining started, he was one of the commissioners who negotiated the agreement concerning Henrietta's court. Actually more than an agreement over the queen's court came out of Bassompierre's negotiations. He also mediated the differences between Buckingham and Carlisle as well as those between the earl and Henrietta.[67] As the maréchal left, an aura of goodwill finally seemed to have come to Anglo-French relations and to Carlisle's political career.

Early in the new year the mirage vanished. A French musician associated with the royal court named Jacques Gaultier was arrested and sent to the Tower. Initially he was charged with raping a nine year old girl,[68] but that was only a cover story. He had talked once too often about murdering Buckingham, and also, through the magic of his music, of placing himself in the royal bed,[69] whether he meant the king's or queen's is unclear. All the suspicions of the French were brought to the forefront again.

From Carlisle's own point of view the matter was immensely damaging. Under torture Gaultier admitted having a love affair with Lady Ann Hay, the earl's teenaged daughter.[70] Besides the embarrassment of having his family name associated with such a low-life character, there was the danger that Buckingham or even the king might suspect that the earl was in some way connected with the murder plot. He used his wife for political purposes; he might do the same with his daughter. Actually Carlisle was too wise a man to become involved in such schemes. Yet it seems that after this incident, his influence on policy was much reduced. It is perhaps a mark of how far the earl had fallen that Gaultier retained his post as royal lutinist along with his £100 annuity.[71]

Though Carlisle remained concerned with public matters, for the remainder of 1627 and into 1628 he was not closely associated with the decision making processes of the government. Two ventures increasingly

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[64] Ibid., no. 742, p. 547.
[65] Ibid., no. 753, p. 559.
[66] Ibid., no. 769, p. 573.
[67] *C.S.P.Ven., 1626–1628,* no. 34, p. 22 and Bassompierre, *Journal de ma Vie,* 256.
[68] Add. MS. 20, 921, fo. 57^{b}, B.L.
[69] *C.S.P.Ven., 1626–1628,* no. 109, p. 93.
[70] Ibid., no. 125, p. 107.
[71] *D.N.B. sub* Gouter, James; My thanks to David Barton for information on Gaultier.

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occupied his mind, healing the wounds his earlier actions had created with Henrietta and embarking on another extraordinary embassy to Europe.

During the summer of 1627 both the earl and the countess began traveling with Henrietta's court. What they had in mind was to exercise their very considerable charm over the young woman. Indisputedly they were thoroughly successful. Before the summer was out, they found themselves acting the role of intermediaries between her, her husband and Buckingham.[72] The Venetian ambassador was of the opinion that this stint with the queen's court was a form of exile, forced on Carlisle because the duke did not want him near the king,[73] especially not while the favorite was gone with the expedition against France to the Ile de Ré. But though the earl's absence from court and council may have had those aspects to it, others were more important to him.

Once the French officials were sent home, the relationship between Charles and Henrietta did improve. The king could even cast a benign eye over a fortune-telling session his wife had arranged after hearing mass.[74] The prospects were excellent that the queen's voice would come to mean something in the royal councils. Since Carlisle was no longer capable of influencing Buckingham either in person or through Lucy, here was an individual who presented an alternative path to the king's ear. What is more, the chances were great that she would remain a factor in court and government while who knew what fate was in store for the highly unpopular duke? All in all the careful cultivation of Henrietta made excellent sense.

So did keeping some distance from the court and the workings of the government. Buckingham and Charles remained obsessed with the idea that the overthrow of Richelieu would mean French cooperation against Spain. The result was the Ile de Ré venture, and the event that every English monarch since Henry VII had feared, simultaneous war with France and Spain.[75] Carlisle could see no reason to become identified with such a policy. Just as in 1621, after the pro-Spaniards had won their victory, the earl decided to put physical distance between himself and his opponents. The move to Henrietta's court was only part of the process. The extraordinary embassy to the continent was the final step. He still had hopes of salvaging his public career with an alliance that would restore Frederick to the Palatinate; to him that was even yet what the struggle was all about.

Final Embassy

Through late 1627 and into 1628, as Carlisle prepared for what would be his final extraordinary embassy, the unstable molecule of European politics was in the uncertain process of rearrangement. The Spanish and

[72] Charles to Carlisle, 29 July 1627, Alderton; SP 16/72, no. 37, P.R.O.; and E. Ashburnham to Buckingham, August 1627; SP 16/75, no. 83, P.R.O.

[73] *C.S.P.Ven., 1626–1628,* no. 436, p. 353.

[74] George Ballard, *Memoirs of Several Ladies of Great Britain,* 275.

[75] For actual Franco-Spanish invasion plans see Lockyer, *Buckingham,* 421.

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French were in a formal alliance, though both sides had no illusions about the length of time the arrangement would last. When the aged Duke of Mantua died, a Franco-Spanish confrontation over the succession to his territories was inevitable, and this clash could cause the Savoyards to change their alignment from French to Spanish in order to pick up some of the prize. The Dutch were allied with both the warring English and the French, but they were seriously considering peace with Spain. The English in turn sent out peace feelers to the Spanish in 1626 and the French in 1628. Simultaneously the English were exploring means of expanding their military alliance with the Dutch and the Danes to include the Lorrainers, Protestant Swiss, Huguenots, Savoyards and the Venetians as well. Amidst all of this shifting and suspicion the menace of Wallenstein was becoming all too real. He was winning entirely too much for the Emperor Ferdinand II. If these overlapping and contradictory options sound confusing to the modern reader, they were no less so for contemporaries, and for the next three years the international scene very closely resembled total anarchy.

In and among this whirling mass of political options Carlisle thrust his mission. Given the surrounding circumstances, it is not surprising that his final voyage simply was swallowed up in the maelstrom of flying debris without leaving any tangible mark. Nonetheless the motivation for the journey was not irrational nor entirely selfish. The problem was that the embassy had two contradictory purposes. The first was to weld a series of mid-European states into an alliance. The group would include the Dutch Republic, Lorraine, Savoy and Venice. In addition there was room for the Protestant Swiss.[1] The Huguenots also had a role, especially Rohan. The plan was an obvious extension of Carlisle's idea that came to the fore as Anglo-French relations deteriorated in 1625. By 1627 it was meant to threaten Spanish communications and the French borders and thus to indirectly affect the situation in Germany. If the parties could agree upon a common policy (a large "if" indeed), they could control or at least have a major influence upon the European balance of power. A favorable German settlement then was not out of the question.

This task was problematic enough, but joined to it was the extension of the Spanish peacemaking schemes with which Buckingham and Charles had played since the defeat at Cádiz. As early as August 1627, there were rumors that Carlisle would visit Brussels during the course of his embassy.[2] Besides weakening Franco-Spanish ties, the purposes of the visit would be either to forward a peace treaty with the Spaniards or to make the French uneasy enough to offer one themselves. It was a characteristic maneuver of this highly unstable period.

Each part of the mission had something to recommend it, but done together they worked at cross purposes. Why should a country join England

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[1] SP 92/14, fo. 259[a].
[2] *C.S.P.Ven., 1626–1628,* nos. 403 and 424, pp. 327 and 343.

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in a military alliance if a peace was likely? Why trust England's peace proposals if its alliance network was going to be extended? Practically speaking the two aspects of the mission cancelled each other.

In the summer of 1627, despite this obvious conflict, plans for the mission went forward in earnest. Buckingham left on the expedition to the Ile de Ré in mid-June. A month later "Wat" Montague was issued instructions to make a preliminary journey through several of the central European states in which Carlisle had an interest, especially Savoy and Lorraine. He was also to contact the Duc de Rohan and the Comte de Soissons, thus giving his mission a decidedly anti-French flavor.[3] It was no wonder, then, that Richelieu had no scruples about kidnapping Montague even though he violated Lorraine's sovereignty in carrying out the deed. At that point Carlisle was virtually forced to give up his project.[4] Either Montague or his papers told too much.

It was March 1628 before the embassy was definitely reinstated, and it was May before the earl actually left for the Dutch Republic. In the interim many delicate matters needed settlement. Carlisle's dispute with Buckingham was the major one. Because of their differences, regardless of its chances of success, both men had reasons for the embassy to get under way.

The upcoming parliament was one. With the failure of the Ile de Ré expedition added to an already impressive list of failures, the duke had no reason to view such a gathering with equanimity. A thwarted Earl of Carlisle, seated in the Lords, supplying the opposition peers with foreign policy information, could not have been a welcome thought for Buckingham. It took little imagination on the earl's part to see dangers for himself as well. He was in a position where he could not win. The favorite's survival would do him no good and his fall would either bring down the earl or alienate an already suspicious King Charles. Once Carlisle saw the path parliament was taking, he knew he was best off out of the way. The earl attended less than half a dozen sittings of the Lords, and before leaving, he gave Buckingham his proxy.[5]

This final gesture is evidence that, whatever might have been going on behind the scenes, both men wanted their relationship to appear free from strife. Earlier in the year Buckingham had even let Carlisle act as intermediary to restore the Abbé Scaglia to favor.[6] The abbé was an old friend of Carlisle's from the days of the French match negotiations and before. Initially, at least, he had come to England to mediate an end to the war with France. As the duke was preparing another naval expedition to La Rochelle, it is unlikely that the goodwill shown Scaglia had any more than

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[3] SP 92/13, fos. 81[a]–83[b], P.R.O.
[4] *C.S.P.Ven., 1626–1628,* no. 686, p. 544.
[5] Proxy Book, 1628, H.L.R.O.
[6] Salvetti Correspondence, 31 January 1628 (N.S.); *HMC 11th Report,* Part I, 138; Lockyer, *Buckingham,* 408.

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symbolic value. With respect to Buckingham's and the earl's relationship, few people were fooled by such gestures.

Once Carlisle was actually on the embassy, he felt no more friendly toward the duke than he had felt a year earlier. When drafting a letter that referred to Buckingham, he struck out the phrases "most noble & most loveing."[7]

With all these problems pushed to the background, Carlisle made his formal entry into The Hague during the first week in May 1628. He quickly showed that he had lost none of his sense of what was required of an extraordinary ambassador. He had delayed his official appearance for a day because the suit he had chosen to wear was not quite to his liking.[8] As for his official tasks in the republic, his instructions were the most detailed written directions he had for any stop on his embassy. They mainly concerned settling the continuing conflict between the English and Dutch merchants in the Far East and dealing with the dangers to Baltic trade that Wallenstein's northward march had created for both countries.[9]

The earl stayed in The Hague for over two weeks, but in concrete terms he accomplished little or nothing. There were rumors that he and the Prince of Orange discussed a truce with the Spanish, but even these vague stories were unconfirmed.[10] With Carleton's help Carlisle did manage to obtain money in order to rescue General Charles Morgan's English garrison that had recently been forced to surrender the besieged town of Stade in Germany to the imperialists. Though his efforts were no doubt appreciated, they are hardly the business of an extraordinary ambassador.

During the time the earl remained in the Dutch Republic, he had a lengthy conversation with the resident Venetian ambassador. The Italian's report indicated that, despite all the difficult circumstances of this mission, Carlisle had lost none of his ability to charm. The Venetian had approached his English counterpart with no great enthusiasm, but he could not help liking this flamboyant diplomat. After the preliminary compliments were exchanged, the center point of their conversation involved peace with France. Carlisle made it clear that he very much favored such action, provided that it was not at Huguenot expense. The key to any approach about a treaty was for the topic to be raised by an intermediary or the French.[11] The reputation of the English was too battered to stand making the first effort. Though the earl would never have said so, Charles's repute as a national leader had long since lost the virginity that had characterized it in 1625. He could stand no further humiliation.

Given the next phase of Carlisle's mission, making contact with the Spanish at Brussels, this conversation could be viewed as sheer hypocrisy.

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[7] Carlisle to Charles, July 1628; SP 99/30, fo. 58[b], P.R.O.
[8] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629,* no. 120, pp. 88–89.
[9] Harl. MS. 1584, fos. 178[a]–181[a], B.L.
[10] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629,* no. 127, p. 95.
[11] Ibid., no. 120, pp. 89–90.

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Yet such a judgment may be unfair. The journey to the Spanish Netherlands might have been the price the ambassador had to pay for being permitted to try out his idea of a middle European alliance. Carlisle also may have sincerely felt that the journey would have the effect of softening the French bargaining position. Whatever the true circumstance, the visit to Brussels was a graphic illustration of the pointlessness of having a mission with two contradictory aims.

A symbolic ballet was performed by Carlisle and the other diplomatic dancers around the theme of the Brussels' visit, and it was as predictably and rigidly choreographed as any court masque. The fact that the participants bothered attests strongly to the overriding importance of ritual in this highly formalistic age. The ballet divided itself neatly into four acts: I. The Accidental Encounter; II. The Courteous Response; III. The Outraged Cries; and IV. The Denial of Evil Intent.

Careful attention was paid to the meaning and effect of each act. In a document written in the hand of William Boswell, Carlisle's new secretary (John Woodford had died two years earlier), a series of questions and answers set out the reasons for and against the journey to Brussels. The paper was dated 1 May 1628, the day the ambassador arrived in the Dutch Republic. This document anticipated that there would be adverse reactions coming from both sides of the Channel and tried to set forth a reasoned defense. The principal argument given to satisfy all the critics was that events would prove to friends and allies that they would not be hurt by this gesture. Having disposed of the potential criticism in relatively short order, the primary emphasis was then the embarrassment the journey would cause the Spanish with their French allies. Moreover, if the gesture was not made, there was the danger of alienating the Infanta, the Spanish leader most favorably inclined toward the peace.[12]

If Carlisle had come over to the continent on the pretended excuse of visiting Spa for his health, and if he had gone no place else but the Spanish Netherlands, these reasons might have borne some weight. But put in the context of his overall mission, they were less than convincing. King James had never been shy about appearing to run two contradictory policies in tandem, but he had never been foolish enough to vest them both in the same ambassador. The parallel development of Digby and Carlisle was no coincidence.[13]

Nonetheless, the dance went on. The earl arrived in Antwerp in mid-May, supposedly enroute to Lorraine. He had a visa from the Infanta to pass through her country, but with a specific prohibition not to visit Brussels. He therefore waited in Antwerp for a change of heart. This town was chosen as a stopping place because it was the home of Peter Paul Rubens, the principal agent in the *sub-rosa* peace negotiations and, of course, one

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[12] SP 77/19, fos. 374[a]–376[a], P.R.O.

[13] Schreiber, *Sir Robert Nawnton*, 36–45 gives a full discussion of this point.

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of the leading artists of his day. Prior to Carlisle's appearance, Rubens's main contact with the English had been through Balthazar Gerbier, Buckingham's court painter and peripatetic art buyer. Though Carlisle was aware of these negotiations,[14] he had not been directly involved. Nonetheless, it was recognized by all observers that, if someone of the earl's rank and known anti-Habsburg sentiments was contacted by the Spanish while in the Netherlands, it could mean a serious up-grading of the negotiations.

Though the Spanish Netherlands was seriously distressed, the siege of Breda having virtually exhausted its resources,[15] Spanish officials there did not intend to make matters too easy for Carlisle. When he arrived in Antwerp, he discovered that Rubens and Don Carlos de Coloma, the former extraordinary ambassador to England, had left for Brussels the previous day. The earl presumed their sudden departure was not coincidental.[16]

They did not, however, make him wait too long. The next day, while Carlisle was dining at the home of the painter, Anthony Van Dyke, Rubens made a surprise appearance. At that point a long, elaborate portion of the dance was played out as each side tried to make it appear their opposite number was more desirous of the journey to Brussels.[17] Whoever did the most begging, Carlisle went to that city and was most graciously and publicly received by the Infanta and her court at two separate audiences. Act Two of the ballet was complete. To what end?

Again in practical terms, the results were meager. Rubens, who remained largely immune to Carlisle's charm, felt that the trip to Brussels had lessened tensions between the English and the Spanish and thus by implication made a settlement more likely. The problem was that from the painter-diplomat's point of view, the earl, despite his dislike of Richelieu, was still the leading member of the anti-Spanish party in England. It was therefore difficult to treat anything he said at face value, and the general purposes of his mission continued to mystify Rubens.[18] At this stage the painter felt that peace with England was not at all unlikely, but he was very doubtful that it would be accomplished through Carlisle's good offices. Perhaps to both men's surprise, he proved something less than a prophet.

Prince Frederick Henry of Orange almost spoiled the dramatic effect of his role as outraged ally in the third act. For he offhandedly mentioned, as Carlisle prepared to leave the Dutch Republic, that a journey to Brussels could always be justified as intended only as a compliment.[19] He almost

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[14] Gerbier to Carlisle, 6 August 1627, The Hague; Eg. MS. 2597, fos. 27ª–29ª, B.L.

[15] Scaglia to Savoy, 10 June 1627 (N.S.), Amsterdam; PRO 30/18/2/1, fos. 593–597, notebook 37, no. 287.

[16] Carlisle to Conway, 18 May 1628, Antwerp; SP 77/19, fo. 378ª, P.R.O.

[17] Carlisle to Buckingham, 27 May 1628, Brussels; ibid., fos. 381ª–384ª.

[18] Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 15 June 1628 (N.S.); *The Letters of Peter Paul Rubens*, ed. R. S. Magurn, 268.

[19] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629*, no. 128, p. 96.

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seemed to be saying that, if he were in the earl's position, that is the way he would behave. A month later the prince remembered his part and worked himself into an impressive rage over the visit.[20] Even as late as July, Frederick Henry still professed such anger over the deception that he would not pretend to believe the final act of the dance of diplomacy: Charles's statement that the journey was done without royal commandment. In doing so, the prince carried matters too far because the Venetian ambassador remarked that he detected artifice under the appearance of zeal.[21] The diplomat was, of course, correct. Frederick Henry's fear was that the English would endanger his own secret peace negotiations with the Spanish then taking place at Middleborough.[22]

The ballet having been danced to its conclusion, the next object of Carlisle's endeavors was Lorraine. This duchy was in the unenviable position of bordering both France and the Empire and having no natural defenses against either. The duke had been forced to permit both Habsburg and Bourbon troops free passage through his territories.[23] Its only hope for an independent existence was to play the two giants on its borders against each other, or at the very least to encourage internal dissent in both powers. In pursuing this latter policy Duke Charles was willing to harbor Gaston and to make the Duchess de Chevreuse his mistress. As a result of this philosophy of defensive neutrality, the Lorrainers made ideal participants in Carlisle's design for a middle European alliance. They in turn treated the ambassador quite cordially showing him every courtesy on his arrival at the capital of Nancy.[24]

Aside from ascertaining a generally favorable attitude toward the overall design, Carlisle achieved nothing noteworthy during his stay in Lorraine. Granted within fortnight there was some military activity instigated by the duchy that made the French nervous.[25] Yet since Carlisle stayed for scarcely more than a week, it would have been surprising if anything major had been accomplished. His scheming did not disconcert the French resident very much.[26] Perhaps all Carlisle was doing was testing his ideas with the hope of arranging something more concrete after he had talked with the Swiss and the Italians. Yet it is easy to understand why the old duke, François of Lorraine, considered the earl a troublemaker who would succeed in stirring up his already too excitable son.[27]

At the end of June and beginning of July the Protestant Swiss gave

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[20] Ibid., no. 176, p. 131.
[21] Ibid., no. 226, p. 174.
[22] *Correspondence Espagne-Pays Bas*, 2, nos. 1197 and 1198, pp. 377–79.
[23] Noel Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659*, 61. My thanks to Conrad Russell for this reference.
[24] Carlisle to Conway, 18 June 1625, Nancy; SP 78/83, fo. 93[a], P.R.O.; and Affaires Etrangères, Lorraine MS. 8, fo. 193[a], Foreign Ministry. Paris.
[25] *Papiers de Richelieu*, 3, no. 394: 385–86; no. 397: 387.
[26] Flavigny to Herbault, 1 July 1628 (N.S.); Affaires Etrangères, Lorraine MS. 8, fo. 198[a-b], Foreign Ministry, Paris.
[27] SP 78/83, fo. 93[b], P.R.O.

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Carlisle a most uneven reception as he hastily made his way through their cantons. Those of Basel treated him in such an off-hand manner that the ambassador declined to have an official reception.[28] He had better luck in Bern where he was given a full-blown reception. The small town of Nyon in that canton even provided him with an armed escort across Lake Geneva.[29] As the French had built a fort on the lake, and as Wat Montague had met an unfortunate fate at their hands, it was a wise precaution. Regardless of how Carlisle was received, all through Switzerland he left a series of excuses explaining why he could not stay to negotiate and giving assurances that he would make amends on his return.[30] Though the earl never said so directly, he apparently had come to feel that Savoy was the key to a successful mission. If he could convince the duchy's rulers a middle European alliance had merits, the other nations through which he had passed would fall into place.

Savoy was in a position not dissimilar from Lorraine's in that it was trying to preserve its independence with the Spanish-controlled Duchy of Milan to the east and France to the north and west. The one advantage that the Savoyards had over their northern counterparts was geography. The invasion and conquest of this predominantly Alpine nation would have required more undistracted energy than any of her neighbors then could muster. Nonetheless shifting sides and changing alliances had become a way of life for the Savoyards, and as Carlisle arrived in the lands of Duke Charles Emmanuel, he was in the process of making another alteration.

For the past ten years the Savoyards, with some wavering, had leaned in the direction of France. The heir to the duchy had married Madame Christine, the French princess originally intended for Charles. The Abbé Scaglia and his brother, Verrue, as mentioned earlier, had been very useful in mediating differences during the negotiations for the marriage with Henrietta. What changed Savoyard orientation was the death of the old Duke of Mantua in December 1627. His duchy was claimed by the French Duc de Nevers and so was the area of Montferrat. This marquisate, long coveted by the dukes of Savoy, was separated from Mantua proper by several miles of Milanese territory and lay against the borders of Savoy. Understandably the French were disinclined to split the inheritance, while the Spaniards and their imperial allies were willing to pay the price of Montferrat for Savoyard support. Charles Emmanuel was therefore prepared to switch sides.

His changed attitude was reflected by Scaglia. Though the abbé had dabbled in the Rubens peace initiative, in 1627 he was considered enough of a nuisance by Philip IV for him to order the Infanta to throw the

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[28] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629,* no. 229, p. 178; and Carlisle to Conway, 26 June 1628, Basle; SP 92/13, fo. 230ª, P.R.O.

[29] Carlisle to Conway, 28 July 1628, Turin; SP 92/13, fos. 270ª–271ª, P.R.O.

[30] Carlisle to the Mayor and Council of Bern, 4 July 1628, Geneva; ibid., fo. 241ª.

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Savoyard out of the Spanish Netherlands.[31] When Scaglia came over to England in January 1628, as was previously pointed out, it was with the idea of mediating a peace between the English and the French. By March, 1628, however, he had given up and decided the Spanish peace looked more promising, though he was willing to change back again if there were advantages to doing so.[32] There was something of the jackal about Scaglia, always sniffing the air for a kill, hoping to claim a small piece of it. In justice he was surrounded by lions and did not have much choice. Until Carlisle's arrival in Savoy, it is difficult to say how much, if at all, the abbé had tried to influence the earl's thinking toward Spain. In any case there was no evidence that he had been effective as yet.[33]

Nonetheless the Duke of Savoy intended to keep on trying. As part of the process, the path from the Swiss border to the Savoyard capital of Turin was strewn with honors for Carlisle. These included an honor guard composed of two troops of horsemen in black velvet with silver embroidery complemented by helmets that continued the black and white motif with their plumes. The duke had outfitted these men especially to greet the earl's embassy and had waited impatiently to parade them before a man of such renowned taste as Carlisle.[34] As this special treatment indicates, the Savoyards set great store by the earl and were determined to win him to their new manner of thinking.

Various signs indicated that they soon began to have some success. At the end of July the old Venetian ambassador to Savoy was on the verge of returning home before his replacement arrived and, as a courtesy, had an interview with Carlisle. He was impressed by the earl's prudence and courtiership and was particularly struck by one statement: "I shall always be more of a Frenchman than a Spaniard, but if the French take La Rochelle I do not know what we shall do, except make a complete rupture with France, because my king certainly must not fail his friends."[35] He was prepared to become pro-Spanish for the sake of the Protestant cause.

In early August, as Carlisle was on the point of leaving for Venice, he heard stories of French willingness to make peace with the English, provided La Rochelle was abandoned to its fate, and he reacted violently against such a move. The earl was convinced that the French were over-extended with the Mantuan campaign and that the Huguenots were far from a broken force since the Duc de Rohan was still active militarily in the south of France. If the English would just have patience, continue their attempts to relieve La Rochelle and remain faithful to their allies, the force of events would place Louis and Richelieu in a much weaker bargaining position.[36]

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[31] Louis P. Gachard, *Histoire Politique et Diplomatique de Pierre-Paul Rubens*, 54.

[32] Scaglia to Savoy, 15 March 1628 (N.S.), London; PRO 30/18/2/1, fos. 647–649, notebook 37, no. 303.

[33] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629*, no. 246, p. 185.

[34] SP 92/13, fo. 273^{a-b}.

[35] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629*, no. 271, p. 204.

[36] Carlisle to Conway, 6 August 1628, Turin; SP 92/14, fos. 8^{a}–9^{a}; and ibid., 7 August 1628, fos. 21^{a}–23^{b}, P.R.O.

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Though the French resident in Turin recognized it almost immediately,[37] it was some weeks before the earl consciously acknowledged that he was edging closer to the idea of a temporary alliance with the Spanish. Once he understood that his dream of a middle European alliance would remain unfulfilled, the only logical alternative in an all-out war with France was an alliance with Spain. But there was one more piece that had to fall into place before Carlisle began to move in that direction. He had to test opinion in Venice.

The test began on a negative note. Sir Isaac Wake, who was then resident ambassador in both Savoy and Venice, wrote from the latter city that there was some question about whether Carlisle's proposed visit was intended as an official or a private one.[38] Perhaps the Venetians still remembered his wandering their way in 1619; perhaps they were trying to please their French allies. Whatever the reasons, the earl was not at all happy, and the new Venetian ambassador in Turin received the full brunt of his anger: "I now see . . . that the republic thought I was a charlatan or mountebank, who wished to climb into St. Mark's Square in that character. I am not a false but an honest man, known as such in every Court where I have been to negotiate."[39]

Though this problem was settled very much to the earl's satisfaction, other issues were not so easily solved. As allies of the French, the Venetians had been most upset by the visit to Brussels.[40] As they were unsure of where England then stood, they were inclined to treat Carlisle politely, but in a non-committal fashion. Whether he realized he was doing so or not, the earl reinforced this tendency by remarks he made to the Venetian ambassador in Savoy just before he left. Though he continued to show no friendship for either the Spanish or the French, he spoke about how much the Emperor Charles V had gained from English friendship and of the special nature of the Huguenots' status in France. Though the Venetian felt the English, as represented by Carlisle, were more concerned with deposing Richelieu than permanently strengthening Habsburg interests,[41] the clear implication was that some kind of arrangement with Spain was a distinct possibility. As if all of that was not sufficient to make the mission to Venice seem like an exercise in tokenism, the earl stated that he planned to spend only ten days there and then would return to stay two or three months in Savoy.[42]

Despite the obviously futile nature of what became the final phase of the embassy, both the Venetians and the ambassador decided to put on a splendid show. Some initial confusion about whether Carlisle planned

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[37] Marini to [Herbault?], 21 July 1628 (N.S.), Turin; Affaires Etrangères, Sardaigne MS. 8, fo. 430[a–b], Foreign Ministry, Paris.
[38] Wake to [Carlisle], 5 August 1628 (N.S.), Venice; SP 99/30, fo. 54[a–b], P.R.O.
[39] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629,* no. 289, p. 220.
[40] Ibid., no. 204, p. 150.
[41] Ibid., no. 309, pp. 238–39.
[42] Ibid., 239.

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to travel overland or proceed by barge down the Po caused a farcical scene involving the shifting of elaborately clad Venetian personnel in order to make the official greeting at the proper place. But once all concerned were composed, the Venetians outdid themselves with honors and gestures of goodwill. On 18 August 1628, as soon as Carlisle touched Venetian-controlled territory, the appropriate gentlemen appeared together with coaches and the mandatory two troops of horses. At the gates of Venice a one hundred gun salute was offered, and all the way to the doge's palace there were great concourses of citizens, while musicians added to the general celebration. The next day virtually the whole process was repeated.[43] As a mark of special respect toward the ambassador and to make amends for the confusion concerning his greetings, the Venetians offered to begin housing him at their expense even before he had his first public audience with the doge and senate.[44] It was a singularly rare gesture, and the earl agreed to accept it. The palace chosen for him was near St. Antonio, an area noted for its healthful air. The palace itself was supplied with over one hundred and twenty servants who were extraordinarily well disciplined, seldom speaking above a whisper. Each of the twenty-four rooms had a special chamberlain assigned to wait upon its occupants. These men were so well trained that they seemed nailed to their stations. There was, in addition, a generous provision of food and drink.[45] One cannot help wondering if these arrangements were not intended as much to catch the unguarded words of the guests as they were to honor them.

Carlisle had his own way of making an impression amid all of the pomp. His generosity and charm were much in evidence, and so was the sense of order and discipline with which his whole train of servants behaved. It was a feature of the embassy that very favorably impressed the Venetians.[46] No one knew better than they did that their city was well on the way to becoming the seventeenth-century equivalent of Monte Carlo. The Venetian reaction also helps explain why English gentlemen of the period were so keen to send their sons on Carlisle's embassies.[47] It was hoped he would instill in these young men the discipline they could not.

Though it had its psychological uses, the main part of the diplomacy was not the spectacle but the negotiations, and on 26 August that process began. Accompanied by Wake, the earl made a series of appearances before the doge and senate, all of which highlighted how far the Venetians and Carlisle had drifted apart in their basic approach to the problems of the age. As for the earl, he certainly had no specific proposals to make. The main burden of his discourse was to emphasize how poorly the French

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[43] Wake to Conway, 9 November 1628, Turin; Add. MS. 34,311, fo. 232^{a-b}, B.L.
[44] Ibid., fo. 233^{a-b}.
[45] Ibid., fos. 235^{b}–236^{a}.
[46] Ibid., fo. 238^{a-b}.
[47] J. Bagg to Buckingham, 22 April 1628, Plymouth; SP 16/101/56. fo. 123^{a}, P.R.O.

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had treated the English, and he used some of his own earlier embassies to illustrate the point.[48] The Venetian response was to ignore the vituperation and to lay stress on the importance of England and France making peace for the sake of the Palatinate and the anti-Habsburg cause.[49] The reason for the earl's approach was presumably that he was attempting to discover just how secure the bond was between the Venetians and the French. Had he discovered any slackening of their resolve, had they made any negative comments about the French, further proposals concerning the middle European alliance then could have been made.[50] Carlisle must have realized that the chances of such a reaction were virtually nil. Given the power exerted by the Habsburgs in Italy and the danger this power represented to Venice, France was the one viable counter-weight. It would have taken more than the growing, but so far largely ineffectual, English navy to tempt them away from the French.

While Carlisle was in the process of confirming what he must have known for some time, that the middle European alliance was not a practical alternative to the existing political situation, he fell ill with a fever that lasted for nearly three weeks. During his recuperation through a prematurely cold September, one of his staff, Captain John Wood, was making an almost impossibly rapid journey from England to Italy: twelve days from London to Turin. He arrived on 18 September with the news that the Duke of Buckingham had been assassinated.[51]

Rumors of the duke's death seemed to move even more rapidly than the messenger. The day after Wood arrived in Turin, Wake was reporting from Venice that he had heard of Buckingham's death.[52] Confirmation must have reached Carlisle from Wood's own mouth a few days later. Though it would be four months before the earl actually set foot in England, his final embassy was over. As uncertain as English policy had been while the favorite lived, his death would mean an even more unsettled period. The earl could only hope for a rapid recall from what had been his most fruitless diplomatic endeavor since the 1616 mission to France. He quite literally had accomplished nothing of any genuine value for England. Yet in terms of his own thinking, the mission had changed a great deal. He had been forced to realize that, as matters then stood in Europe, there were only two choices for England if Frederick and his family were to have any hope of securing their lost inheritance. England either had to end the war with France and join in the harrassment of the Habsburgs on all fronts, or make peace with the Spanish and demand the reinstatement of the Palatine as their price.

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[48] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629,* no. 366, pp. 269–271.
[49] Ibid., no. 373, pp. 277–278.
[50] Ibid., no. 508, p. 361.
[51] Ibid., no. 431, p. 319.
[52] Wake to Conway, 29 September 1628 (N.S.), Venice; add. MS. 34,311, fos. 229^{b}–230^{b}, B.L.

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Though by October 1628 there was little question that Carlisle was tilting in the direction of a Spanish peace, several matters needed resolution before he showed his hand openly. With Buckingham dead there undoubtedly would be a major power struggle at the English court. Not only would men vie for the place next to the king, but a whole series of highly profitable offices would be subject to equally fierce competition. As events demonstrated, the earl was considered one of the leading candidates in both areas. Until all of these uncertainties were resolved, it was unsafe to assert a definitive position on the major issues of war and peace, especially from such a distance.

At the heart of all the queries was Charles. His mode of operation without the duke and his own attitude toward the peace treaties with France and Spain were as yet undetermined. However, as Carlisle approached closer to England during the winter of 1628, he felt he understood his monarch's position, and it became an open secret that the earl had opted for peace with Spain. By doing so he not only found himself in the minority position, but also at odds with many of his former friends and political allies. For once in his life, Carlisle made a poor weathercock. He was simply too far away and received too many contradictory indications of where matters stood for him to make a sound decision. Yet it says something for his integrity that, once he made his choice, he saw it through to the very end. The next year and beyond Carlisle used all his diplomatic and political skills to make peace rather than war. Ultimately he succeeded, as much because England had been exhausted by the rigors of a decade of involvement in continental warfare as because of any talents the earl himself possessed. Nonetheless, whatever proportion of credit he can claim, Carlisle paid a price for his actions. He found himself politically isolated and operating more on his own than he had ever done before. In the last years of his life he was very much his own man with all the dangers that position implied for a political figure of the seventeenth century.

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III. CHARLES I

Peacemaker

As Carlisle and his train of over one hundred attendants moved across northern Italy toward Turin in September 1628, he undoubtedly hoped for and expected his rapid recall by Charles. In fact the shock of Buckingham's death and perhaps the machinations of potential rivals delayed that event until October. Then, in the manner of such things, the messenger charged with the dispatch recalling him became lost in the Alps and exposed to the plague; more dead than alive, this postal rider did not find Carlisle in Turin until 1 November.[1]

During the month and a half that the earl impatiently waited for his instructions, he had an opportunity to think more about the international situation and to weigh further the virtues of peace with Spain as opposed to those of a French settlement. The Savoyards did their best to bring pressure to bear in the Spanish interest, but their habit of trying to cover all possibilities eventually got on the earl's nerves.[2]

While the Savoyards were attempting to work their wiles, someone on Carlisle's staff (or perhaps the earl personally) prepared a position paper on the relative advantages of peace with France or with Spain. It is interesting that even at this late stage, it is the disadvantages of dealing with both countries that stand out. Perfidy and its associated sins were used to characterize both nations. The paper showed a yearning, still, for a military solution in the Palatinate, but it did recognize that England could not afford to continue warring with the continent's two leading powers at the same time. Some consideration was given to the idea that it might be easier to obtain funds from parliament for the war against Spain, as it was begun originally with parliamentary cooperation. Yet the most significant fact of all about this document is that, even though it bore a date at the end of October, it reached no firm conclusions.[3]

From a personal point of view perhaps the most serious matter that played on the ambassador's mind was that he would arrive back in England to find all the diplomatic business settled and no role for him. He was particularly worried when he heard that Wat Montague had accompanied the English fleet on its final attempt to relieve La Rochelle and had been put ashore to negotiate with Richelieu. The rumor was that an agreement

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[1] Carlisle and Wake to Conway, 1 November 1628, Turin; SP 92/14, fo. 111[a], P.R.O.
[2] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629*, no. 543, p. 383.
[3] SP 92/14, fos. 72[a]–75[a], P.R.O.

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had been reached, very much to the detriment of the Huguenots and to Charles's honor as well. As a result of this story, the earl entrusted his speediest messenger, Captain Wood, with dispatches to Conway urging him not to permit the ratification of any agreement with the French until he understood the full story of the European situation. Charles was addressed in the same manner.[4]

Despite Carlisle's concern with returning home as speedily as possible, it took him nearly two weeks to organize his embassy well enough to leave Savoy. Before he left, he had one last interview with the Venetian ambassador, and what emerged once again was his total distrust of French intentions. The Venetian resident tried to convince the earl that the French were serious about fighting the Habsburgs. Carlisle simply was having none of it. He said Richelieu was trying to play the music in order to make others dance. France had too many frontiers to defend and would never break with the Spanish. He went on to ridicule the dependability of the French commanders, especially the Marquis de Coure and the Duc de Guise, who he considered thorough Hispanophiles.[5] In his own view he had been betrayed by the French not once but many times, and he had no reason to believe they would change their style, certainly not with Richelieu dominating policy.

The pattern that emerges from this interview and from others that the earl had during December 1628 was much the same. He never publicly avowed his favor for a Spanish peace. Over and over again he criticized, belittled and cast aspersions upon the French, but there is no recorded instance of his saying anything nice about the Spanish. Such behavior may have been a precursor to making positive gestures toward Spain, and most people he encountered treated them in that way, but on the return journey home, he did not do so. At this stage the only country about which the earl would say anything flattering was Savoy, Spain's newfound ally. Such talk only reinforced the already obvious conclusions.

During the last month of 1628, Carlisle made steady, if not always sure, progress towards The Hague. (He was almost drowned in the Rhine near Cologne.) He did stop in Zurich, briefly, and, as might be expected, caused the French trouble. He provoked the Swiss into demanding money and sureties from Louis before his troops could pass toward Mantua.[6] From Zurich he went to Basle where the embassy boarded the barges for the all too adventurous voyage down the Rhine. The earl did stop in Brussels on his way toward the Dutch Republic, but this time, by means of a dispatch from Conway,[7] he had written consent from Charles to do so.

While this journey was taking place, what can only be described as a

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[4] Carlisle and Wake to Conway, 1 November 1628, Turin; ibid., fos. 103[a]–109[b], and Carlisle to Charles, 12 November, 1628, Turin; ibid., fos. 113[a]–114[a].

[5] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629,* no. 571, pp. 400–401.

[6] Ibid., no. 630, p. 439; and Carlisle to Wake, 29 November 1628, Basle; SP 92/14, fos. 185[a]–187[a], P.R.O.

[7] [Conway] to Carlisle, 19 December 1628, SP 104/169, fo. 234[a], P.R.O.

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veritable blizzard of letters headed toward Carlisle with every dispatch rider. In the minds of those back in England, especially those with strong Protestant sympathies, he had become the hope for the future, the logical candidate to succeed Buckingham as the chief minister. They had several reasons for reaching that conclusion.

First there was Lucy; she had become Henrietta's prime favorite. Their attachment was so close that, when the countess caught smallpox in late August 1628, there was much ado to keep the queen from nursing her personally.[8] When the danger had passed and Lucy recovered sufficiently to receive guests, Henrietta was the first person to visit her and announce that she could have the privilege of appearing at court in a mask to hide the last vestiges of her illness.[9] Even before Buckingham's death, Charles and his queen had become reconciled. Now with the favorite gone, Henrietta became a major source of influence on her husband's life. It was clear that the queen's favorite would be a political force of some weight as well. His wife's position had obvious implications for Carlisle.

In truth, when the earl left for the continent the previous May, Lucy and her husband had parted under strained circumstances. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that the story concerning the stolen diamond necklace, related by La Rochefoucauld and used by Dumas as the basis for the *Three Musketeers,* was the reason for their coolness toward each other.[10] As the countess was the reputed thief, Carlisle would not have been pleased. Helping Richelieu, regardless of the consequences for Buckingham, was not what the earl had in mind. Yet, by the winter of 1628, their differences had been buried.[11] Henceforth they would work as a team.

As for the earl's own personal prospects, acquiring the staff of the Lord Chamberlain's office once more looked like a genuine possibility. The Earl of Pembroke wanted the duke's vacant post of Lord High Admiral. If he obtained it, his brother, the Earl of Montgomery, would undoubtedly move up to Pembroke's vacated position of Lord Steward. Montgomery's old assignment as Lord Chamberlain would then, hopefully, come to Carlisle.[12] It is worth noting that during November 1628 Pembroke wrote the earl regularly, and the theme of his correspondence was the necessity of an early return.[13]

Another factor in the numerous approaches made to Carlisle was the growing power and influence of the new Lord Treasurer, Richard, Lord Weston. Many people hoped that the earl would act as a counterweight to the new man's ever strengthening position. By the end of November 1628 Weston had taken on the aspect of someone who was more than

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[8] James Hay to Carlisle, 1 September 1628, SP 16/116, no. 4, P.R.O.
[9] Lucy Carlisle to Carlisle, 3 October 1628, Penshurst; SP 16/118, no. 15, P.R.O.
[10] La Rochefoucauld, *Mémoires,* 383.
[11] Goring to Carlisle, 22 November 1628; SP 16/121, no. 38, P.R.O.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., no. 66 and SP 16/122, no. 51.

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the first among equals.[14] In the process he frightened many people. Somewhat unjustly Weston has been characterized as an ardent absolutist, a pro-Spaniard and a secret Roman Catholic. In fact at this stage of his career he was none of these things, but that did not matter, for he was the focus of many fears. The effect of this situation was that Carlisle drew the attention of many political figures who were already or would become alienated from the court. Of these Sir Robert Phelips was not the least. He had dabbled with the opposition in the Commons more than once, though by the 1630s he would be reduced to publicly supporting Laud's anti-puritan measures in order to recover the king's favor. But for now Carlisle presented him with the attractive prospect of a staunchly Protestant courtier who was very much in the king's good graces: ". . . The service of the best King expects you and the interest of a good people craves your patronadge, and to your frends this place is left to wishe that you may prove . . . a profitable and a happy instrument. . . ."[15] As for the others on this side of the political spectrum, perhaps Sir Robert Naunton (now Master of the Wards) was the most characteristic in his approach when he sounded this restrained note of alarm: "My Lord, here is much good service to be done by such a servant of the state as your selfe, to God and his Church, to the king and his whole kingdome, to your selfe and your true frends that misse you most. . . ."[16]

Over the two and a half months that it took Carlisle to return to England, Weston no doubt became aware of what was expected upon his rival's return. He was nervous enough about the situation to have Tom Carey, a servant of Charles, write while the earl was still abroad and offer to form a political alliance.[17]

Along with these cries for help and the self-serving approaches came a series of letters that tended to reinforce Carlisle's views about France and the slim likelihood of peace with that nation. Just after Buckingham's death Carleton (now Viscount Dorchester and soon to replace Conway as Secretary of State), wrote that the Venetians had approached the favorite with proposals for a settlement with the French. The duke had proved receptive, provided the Huguenots were included in any agreement. Indeed it was after a breakfast meeting with Soubize and the other Huguenot leaders concerning the proposed peace treaty that Lieutenant Felton stabbed Buckingham. How receptive the Huguenots were to these proposals can be inferred from the fact that it was initially thought one of them had killed the duke. The most important feature of these negotiations was that Charles was only informed about them belatedly and that he was not

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[14] M. V. C. Alexander, *Charles I's Lord Treasurer, Sir Richard Weston,* 130.

[15] Phelips to Carlisle, 24 November 1628; SP 16/121, no. 28, P.R.O.; and see also D. Hirst, "Court, Country and Politics before 1629," *Faction and Parliament,* 119, for more on Phelips's political career.

[16] Naunton to Carlisle, 23 November 1628; SP 16/121, no. 44, P.R.O.

[17] T. Carey to Carlisle, 21 December 1628, London; SP 16/123, no. 3, P.R.O.

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enthusiastic about pursuing the possibilities they raised.[18] The King was still willing to keep England at war for the sake of the Protestant cause and his own greater glory. What he wanted most was a naval and military victory over the French, and, after the first session of the 1628 Parliament produced the Petition of Right, he may well have expected cooperation, that is money, from the Commons towards that end. In October 1628 Charles personally reiterated his views to Carlisle:

> My last by John Woode mentioned two ouvertures of peace from France, they wer bothe lyke the people from whence they came, of no waight & not to be trusted unto & that by the Venetian ambassador which I thought most fitt to bee harkened unto, I found most reason to reject; for I found the intent of that to bee ether to delay or disharten my fleete which I hope by this tyme hes mad an ouverture, ether to force a peace or to maintaine a prosporus warr, . . .[19]

Even after the earl's protest concerning the Montague negotiations during the last effort to relieve La Rochelle, both Conway and Charles wrote to reassure the ambassador that they would pay no attention to such scandalous proposals.[20] As late as mid-December the king was writing Carlisle not to tell Frederick and Elizabeth about how far the peace negotiations had gone with the Spanish,[21] surely further indication that any approaches to Louis and Richelieu would not meet with success. As the earl arrived in the Dutch Republic, he had every reason to believe his careful tilt in an anti-French direction was the approved course of action for an English diplomatic representative.

It was not out of line with such a policy for Carlisle to engage in gaining some personal satisfaction. He focused upon the vociferous protests made by the Dutch and the Venetian ambassador in the republic concerning his visit to Brussels, and, on his return to The Hague, he could not resist making matters uncomfortable for those concerned. He did so with remarkable success.

His device with the Prince of Orange was to pretend to slip unannounced from Amsterdam into The Hague. When Frederick Henry intercepted him and attempted to house him at Dutch expense, the offer was declined. Carlisle claimed that he was unworthy of such an honor because the Estates General had spoken so negatively about his journey to Brussels. The prince, after repeated refusals, begged the earl to accept and again met with a rebuff. Finally Carlisle said he would agree only if Frederick Henry commanded him to accept, and, having been effectively humiliated by the ambassador, the prince did so.[22]

Giovanni Soranzo, the Venetian ambassador, had similar treatment in

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[18] Dorchester to Wake, 2 September 1628; SP 99/30, fos. 150[a]–151[b], P.R.O.

[19] Charles to Carlisle, 1 October 1628, Hampton Court; ibid., fo. 187[a].

[20] Conway to Carlisle and Wake, 25 November 1628; SP 104/169, fo. 232[b]; and Charles to Carlisle, 24 November 1628, Whitehall; SP 92/14, fo. 164[a], P.R.O.

[21] Charles to Carlisle, 16 December 1628, Theobalds; SP 92/14, fo. 223[a], P.R.O.

[22] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629,* no. 673, p. 470.

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store for him. Carlisle began their interview "in a jovial manner, saying he had always esteemed the favours I had done him, but especially what I had written about his visit to Brussels."[23] Having put Soranzo on the defensive, the earl kept him there. He continued by assuring the Venetian that he had read his dispatches before they crossed the Alps. He then protested that the Venetian ambassador in Turin had ordered bonfires lit to celebrate the fall of La Rochelle and that the Venetian censors had permitted publication of a book that contained an illustration depicting Charles being led behind Louis's triumphal car. This unexpected assault left the ambassador hard-pressed for replies since he did not know anything about the matters raised. As a result of the conversation, Soranzo could only deduce that "this minister is returning with unsound opinions whereas he set out with perfectly healthy ones. I further recognised that the Duke of Savoy has brought him over to his views."[24] Carlisle had gotten his own back and more.

There was, however, a price for this personal satisfaction. In a subsequent conversation with the Prince of Orange, Soranzo decided that it was necessary to alert the Venetian and Dutch ambassadors in England to Carlisle's hostility to their mediation efforts with the French.[25] Though this information was not exactly fresh news, after their encounter with the earl, it was no doubt transmitted with a new sense of urgency.

Actually by the end of December 1628, Carlisle's change of heart had begun to filter back to England. Lucy wrote him of the rumor that "you are thought hear hugly Spanishe,"[26] and Goring had a similar observation.[27] From that time it appears the prospect of the earl becoming a popular leader of a massive faction became increasingly remote. The majority of the people who looked to him for leadership, though they were not necessarily pro-French, were certainly anti-Spanish. Their attachment to Carlisle was political, not personal, and they would be unprepared to follow him, even for the sake of the Palatines, into the Spanish camp. Furthermore, the earl's potential influence with Henrietta was endangered by this attitude as she was anxious to reestablish normal communications with her family. The one thing that might have overcome all of these disadvantages was Charles's agreement to give priority to a Spanish rather than a French peace. He had other plans. On 12 January 1629 Dorchester wrote Wake that the truce with France was at the make or break stage.[28] Ten days later it was clear it would not be broken.[29] Why matters had turned so rapidly is unknown. Maybe even Charles did not fully understand. It was at this stage of developments that Carlisle finally returned home.

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[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid., 471.
[25] Ibid., 472.
[26] Lucy Carlisle to Carlisle, [22 December 1628]; SP 16/123, no. 6, P.R.O.
[27] Goring to Carlisle, 22 December 1628; ibid., no. 8.
[28] Dorchester to Wake, 12 January 1629, Whitehall; SP 92/15, fos. 11[a]–13[a], P.R.O.
[29] Ibid., 22 January 1629, fo. 81[b].

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Through all these political reversals, it is difficult to find anything positive for Carlisle. Even the one event in which he took great personal satisfaction was founded upon a tragedy. The eldest son of Elizabeth and Frederick was drowned in a boating accident while Carlisle was stranded in The Hague waiting for favorable winds to take him back to England. The earl rushed to give the parents comfort and consolation as well as practical aid in advising them how to have their late son's pension rights transferred to Rupert, a younger, and eventually the most famous, brother. The Palatines had been none too pleased with Carlisle's politics of late and their relationship with him was strained. His thoughtfulness and care restored him to their good graces, and as a result Elizabeth was once more moved to write sympathetically to her "camelface."[30]

Upon his arrival in London, Carlisle started to repair the political damage he had suffered. He began at the source of his troubles, the king. He spent a week before parliament opened closeted with Charles in private conversation.[31] Events proved the earl's charm had not dimmed with age, for though there were occasional periods of time during the remaining years of Carlisle's life in which Charles did not deal with him in a straightforward manner, from that point on their relationship was basically a sound one. Henceforth the earl had direct access to his master's ear, and in the personal politics of the day the value of such a privilege was beyond counting.

A large measure of Carlisle's influence was based on his instincts of what were the limits of acceptable political behavior to the king. The earl's actions in parliament are proof of this statement.

As Carlisle returned to England, the 1628 Parliament was on the verge of entering into its last session. If men such as Sir Robert Phelips had entertained any hopes of the earl playing the role of god-father to the opposition, they were rapidly disabused. Carlisle would not endanger his relationship with the king by even covertly supporting any protest gestures. He kept his attendance in the Lords to a minimum.[32] Given the short, violent course of the session, the earl's behavior was well advised. As events demonstrated, these domestic problems were just a diversion for Carlisle; his main interest was still the issue of England's relationship with the continental powers. Yet he fully understood the interrelationship between the two areas and had no intention of permitting his influence to suffer because of domestic broils.

With the death of Buckingham the framework for conducting both foreign and domestic business changed. Charles set up a series of committees of privy councillors to deal with major areas of concern such as foreign affairs, trade and plantations, and Ireland. Carlisle was appointed

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[30] Elizabeth to Carlisle, 6 February 1629, The Hague; SP 81/35, fo. 139ª; and Frederick to Carlisle, 6 March 1629, ibid., fo. 165ª, P.R.O.

[31] Beaulieu to Sir Thomas Puckering, 21 January 1629, London; Sloane MS. 4178, fo. 105ª, B.L.

[32] *Journal of the House of Lords*, 4: 26–42.

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to the first two.[33] The other people on the foreign affairs committee were Weston, Conway, Arundel, Pembroke, Holland and Dorchester. These men were expected to make recommendations to the king on the nation's foreign affairs, and recommendations was the operative word here. They had no guarantee Charles would listen to them. What is more, since the committee's membership was balanced politically, forming a consensus was no easy matter. In 1629 Holland and Dorchester tended to line up against Spanish interests as did Conway. Arundel and Carlisle were favorable to the Spaniards, while Weston and Pembroke provided the swing vote. In 1629 these latter two both inclined toward a French peace.

As a result of the situation on the committee, Carlisle did not make a passionate, frontal assault on the French truce. After his loud, anti-French language of the past several months, this change in behavior gave Contarini, the Venetian ambassador in England, hope that he was changing his ways.[34] He was only changing his approach.

What the earl did was work privately on the members of the foreign affairs committee. He convinced them to ask difficult questions of Contarini concerning French intentions. Though the Venetian diplomat managed to counter all of the matters raised, he remained nervous that the French might suddenly ask for more and thus strengthen Carlisle's position.[35] For his part, the earl attempted to reassure Contarini that his principal concern was not to thwart a settlement with France, but rather to see to it that the French and the Spaniards were well engaged in Italy before the English made any final commitments. Such a situation would enable Charles to focus his attention on Germany and the Palatines, still the primary concern.[36] There was at least some truth to that reassurance when considered on a long term basis, but for the short run, it was virtually meaningless.

In less than a month's time it was evident that Carlisle was having a major impact on the thinking of the foreign affairs committee. He had the members feeling guilty about abandoning the Savoyards and the Huguenots, and it was clear to Contarini that, if the French tampered with the terms of the preliminary agreement in any way, the settlement would collapse.[37] All of Carlisle's previous experience with Louis and his ministers led him to believe that they would not be able to resist asking for more. In this case the experience proved invalid. They kept their agreement. What is more, Louis's troops crossed over into Italy and did so at the contrivance of the Duke of Savoy.[38]

The result of the new set of circumstances was that the Anglo-French treaty was initiated in early April 1629. For the earl there was great irony

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[33] *A.P.C. 1628–1629,* nos. 831, 841 and 843, pp. 273, 276.
[34] *C.S.P.Ven., 1628–1629,* no. 718, p. 513.
[35] Ibid., no. 719, pp. 514–15.
[36] Ibid., no. 736, pp. 527–28.
[37] Ibid., nos. 743 and 744, pp. 537–38, and 541.
[38] Ibid., *1629–1632,* no. 13, p. 9; Stowe MS. 135, fos. 135[a]–137[b], B.L.

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in the event. The signing took place in the town of Susa, an Alpine village turned over to the French by the Savoyards as part of their agreement. Carlisle's presumptions about the French and what they would do, not to mention those about the Duke of Savoy, were ostentatiously disproved in the process.

These new conditions, with both friends and enemies behaving unexpectedly, would have been justification enough for the earl to leave the field of battle and reevaluate his position, but he did nothing of the kind. He realized that matters were by no means fixed. The initialing of the treaty was not the end of Anglo-French negotiations, but rather the beginning stage. Each side now had to appoint a special emissary to fill in the details. In addition, Charles had given no indication he wanted to continue the war with Spain. Without parliamentary subsidies, it is difficult to see how he could have done so. He still remained willing to hear what the Spaniards had to offer, and Rubens was prepared to come over with his master's full approval just for that purpose. Carlisle saw there was potential for pressing his side of the argument.

Once again he was very nearly successful, for two men loyal to him were originally designated as emissaries to France for the negotiation of the final treaty. The first candidate proposed was the Earl of Danby, who, as Lord Danvers had been a soldier in France during his younger days. Danby, like Carlisle, was a major landowner in Yorkshire, and had been one of the many who wrote anxious letters requesting a rapid return from the last embassy.[39] In 1629 he was friendly enough with Carlisle to offer him a loan of £2,000 with only minimal security.[40] Amazingly even Dorchester was pleased with Danby's appointment, though what he thought of having Carlisle's close political ally, Sir Isaac Wake, join him in Paris is not nearly so clear.[41] Such a team would have been directly susceptible to Carlisle's influence, and, though they would not have violated a royal command, they certainly would have acted with great rigor toward the French. Unfortunately Danby's health did not remain sound,[42] and by the end of May 1629 his mission was cancelled.[43] His replacement was Sir Thomas Edmonds, the aged but still competent former ambassador. He was also a close political ally of Dorchester and had no need of Wake's assistance.

As had been the case so often, Carlisle appeared politically isolated, but he still had the resources to remain constant to his goal. For, whatever his relationship with the other politicians at court, those with the king remained close and gave him further opportunity to act. Their closeness is illustrated by a most unusual event. Henrietta delivered a short-lived

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[39] Danby to Carlisle, 20 November 1628, St. James; SP 16/121, no. 26, P.R.O.
[40] SP 16/154, no. 66, P.R.O.
[41] Dorchester to Vane, 26 April 1629; SP 84/139, fo. 114^{b}, P.R.O.
[42] Danby to Carlisle, 1629; SP 16/147, no. 86, P.R.O.
[43] Dorchester to Wake, 13 May 1629, Westminster; SP 92/16, fo. 107^{a-b}, P.R.O.

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child in May 1629, and she wanted him baptized by her Roman Catholic priest. Both Carlisle and Charles were present at the delivery and knew of the request for the Roman rite. While the king looked on, the earl physically barred the priest from entering the chamber where the queen and the dead prince lay. Over Henrietta's plaintive objections, Carlisle sent for a Protestant minister to perform the needed ceremony.[44] There were few courtiers who were secure enough in Charles's favor and who were confident enough of being able to brave Henrietta's wrath to perform such an act. There were few kings but Charles who would have delegated it.

No means exists of telling if it was Carlisle's influence alone or a combination of factors, but the king did not let the peace proposals from Spain languish. In late May, by means of a visiting Lorraine diplomat, he let the Infanta know that he would be receptive to peace proposals just as soon as the French arrangements were completed. Rubens was therefore given final permission to travel from Dunkirk to England.[45]

The artist-diplomat encountered Charles for the first time at Greenwich where they had a lengthy conversation, after which Carlisle took the visitor by the hand and entertained him in his accustomed manner.[46] If reports of the king's conversation with Rubens are accurate, the latter had cause for optimism. Charles described the agreement with France as only an armistice and claimed that, under the proper conditions, he was prepared to revoke his arrangements within twelve hours. By making such statements the king hoped to create the proper atmosphere for making a settlement that would please the Palatines. Rubens, however, saw the point at which he was driving and brought him up short. The Spaniards had no intention of making any arrangements on the Palatinate without the approval of the Bavarians and the emperor. At the conclusion of their conversation Charles told Rubens to discuss matters concerning the peace with Weston only.[47] Though Carlisle's policy was now being accepted, he was excluded from its implementation.

Further evidence of this situation emerged when a committee was formed to negotiate the Spanish peace; Pembroke and Cottington were added to the Lord Treasurer to form the committee.[48] Carlisle and Holland were not, though both of them were members of a similar group designated to approve the final arrangements with France.[49] The one common element in both areas is Weston. He had managed to convince Charles that foreign policy had to be subordinated to finance and not the other way around.

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[44] Barocci to Savoy, 27 May 1629 (N.S.), London; PRO 30/18/2/1, fo. 710, notebook 38, no. 335, P.R.O.

[45] *Correspondence Espagne-Pays-Bas*, 2, no. 1408: pp. 453–54.

[46] *H.M.C. 12th Report, Appendix 2*, 386–87.

[47] Barocci to Savoy, 6 June 1629 (N.S.); PRO 30/18/2/1, fos. 711[a]–714[a], notebook 38, no. 336, P.R.O.

[48] Ibid., 10 June 1629, fo. 717[a], no. 337.

[49] *C.S.P.Ven., 1629–1632*, no. 165, p. 128n.

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Also, it was apparent that, though he was certainly not the equivalent of Buckingham in the degree to which he held the king's favor, he was able to manipulate his rivals successfully enough to become the "prime" minister. He was well aware of his new-found status and took a certain delight in flaunting his position before his less influential brethren.[50]

Carlisle was conscious of his subordinate position, but circumstances contrived to prevent his improving it. He was able to forward the peace policy with Spain, but he was consistently blocked from becoming its prime mover. In August 1629 Weston administered a blow that forced the earl into a secondary role for the duration of the negotiations when he blocked the appointment of the former ambassador for the Spanish mission and prevented anyone from linking a settlement with Spain to that in Germany.[51]

Another factor that distracted Carlisle was his growing conflict with Holland and the new French ambassador, the Marquis de Châteauneuf. As Rubens became aware shortly after his arrival, there were three major divisions of opinion at the English court: those who wanted peace with everyone, those who wanted peace with Spain only and those who wanted peace with France alone.[52] Holland definitely fell into the last category, and that once again put him at odds with his old mentor, Carlisle. Working on his own, Holland was not much of a threat. He was no better at political intrigue in 1629 than he had been five years earlier, and he did not help his cause with the king by openly favoring a new parliament in order to finance the proposed anti-Habsburg war.[53] Charles would have none of that. Yet Holland could not be discounted, for he had the formidable aid of Châteauneuf.

As was true of Blainville a few years earlier, the most recent French representative could hardly be classed as a diplomat.[54] He was an archintriguer who was so successful at his plotting in England that Weston ultimately arranged for his recall.[55] He was, nonetheless, Richelieu's personal selection for the mission.[56] In the months immediately before outstaying his welcome, during the autumn and winter of 1629, Châteauneuf was at his underhanded best. Not surprisingly one of his main targets was Carlisle. Besides the general anti-French stance that the earl had assumed, he may have discovered that his rival was again plotting with the Duchesse de Chevreuse.[57] What is more, both men realized that Henrietta would play an important role in influencing Charles.

It took a while for Châteauneuf to perceive a weak point in Carlisle's

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[50] Ibid., no. 221, p. 177.
[51] Rubens to Olivares, 24 August 1629 (N.S.), London; Magurn, *Rubens*, 331.
[52] 30 June 1629, ibid., 304.
[53] Ibid., 22 July 1629 (N.S.), London; Magurn, *Rubens*, 313.
[54] *Papiers de Richelieu*, 3, no. 495: 465.
[55] M. V. C. Alexander, *Lord Treasurer*, 156.
[56] *Papiers de Richelieu*, 4, no. 227: 244–45.
[57] Rubens to Olivares, 21 September 1629 (N.S.); Magurn, *Rubens*, 345.

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defenses, but once he found one, he must have taken several people off guard; it was Lucy.

The whole plot, to strike at the earl through the countess, was terribly complex. In its basic outline the scheme emerged in December 1629 when Châteauneuf made Henrietta aware that Lucy did not always show the proper respect for her mistress. Since 1627 the nature of the relationship between the two women had been changing. The countess had acted as mentor for the younger woman, but now the queen chose to assert her own interests. They were not to Lucy's taste. Unfortunately for her career at the royal court, the countess was a sharp-minded woman with a penchant for satire. The queen, like her husband, had good aesthetic sense but was far from being either a wit or an intellectual. Lucy, the Percy princess, was not inclined to suffer those she considered fools, even those of Bourbon descent. The result was that when the queen was informed by Châteauneuf what had been happening behind her back, the countess was forced to leave the court.[58]

A major reason for the plot was to strengthen Holland's hand in the contest for the offices that Buckingham had held. Holland was in the running for the Lord High Admiral's post, while Carlisle continued to support Pembroke's claim. By striking at Lucy and her relationship with Henrietta, Holland was helped while one of the leading backers of the Spanish peace was hurt.[59] From the Frenchman's perspective the plot made good sense.

The difficulty was that Châteauneuf had gone too far, or rather had been too obvious. Even Charles had sensitivities about foreign diplomats choosing his key ministers. The result was that he reaffirmed his faith in Carlisle, and he was present at a privy council meeting in which everyone apologized to everyone else, though bad feelings continued to prevail under the surface.[60] By the end of February 1630 Lucy had been readmitted to her bedchamber post and all was back to normal.[61]

All the while these events were working themselves out, the diplomacy had been progressing, but it had essentially been progressing without Carlisle's aid. It was Cottington who had gone to Spain and would spend the next year there arranging for a treaty.[62] Rubens was replaced by Don Carlos de Coloma, and official relations between Charles and Philip were thus reestablished. Carlisle was so concerned with fighting free of French plots and with Weston's maneuvers to keep him in a secondary position that he played a small role in the practical side of the negotiations. He, like the other courtiers of these years, really had no faction upon which he could depend. Politics had been reduced to an extremely personal level,

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[58] W. Welde to Conway, 22 December 1629; SP 16/153, no. 77, P.R.O.
[59] *C.S.P.Ven., 1629–1632*, no. 337, pp. 263–65.
[60] Ibid., no. 347, pp. 276–77.
[61] SP 16/153, no. 77.
[62] Martin J. Havran, *Caroline Courtier, the Life of Lord Cottington*, 92–102.

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and policy made relatively less difference to the people involved, except as a means of aggrandizement.

Yet, conversely, it was policy that made the difference to Carlisle's career and relegated him to a position of secondary importance. For a complex series of personal and political reasons, he had abandoned his traditional anti-Spanish position just at the wrong moment. As the leader of a Franco-Protestant party, he might have mustered sufficient political influence to push Weston to one side. Working against the grain, as a pro-Spaniard, he had no chance. In truth he had been physically out of position on the shores of the Adriatic when he needed to be on the north side of the Channel. All of these factors combined to enable Weston to gain the position closest to Charles's ear. The Lord Treasurer, being much less certain of his position than Buckingham had been, could hardly afford to give a major role in administering policy to one of his chief rivals. The king's obvious personal fondness for Carlisle only made Weston more inclined to monopolize policymaking.

By the end of 1630, once all the peace treaties were completed, the English court broke into factions with Laud and Wentworth forming one grouping while Henrietta and her adherents such as Holland and Goring formed another. There was also Weston (the Earl of Portland, as he shortly became) and Cottington. The remnant of the old anti-Spanish party, Dorchester, Coke, Naunton and Carlisle remained, but it did not function as a unit. No one among them could or would provide the leadership. Insofar as anyone can tell, Carlisle was not a part of any faction and would line up with different sides depending on the occasion. Whether he was reduced to this role because, after his recent reversal, no faction trusted him, or whether he assumed the role voluntarily because it increased his political value, is uncertain. It is not inconceivable that the first situation led him to make the best of things with the second. This much is sure; though Carlisle was far from abandoning his role as one of the major figures of the Caroline court, his days of great political victories had ended. There was little call for a diplomat *extraordinaire* in an era when non-involvement in continental affairs was the favored policy.

Fade Out

During the final years of Carlisle's life, as successive instructions to French ambassadors in England prove, he was acknowledged as one of the three most important men at Charles's court.[1] Finding the basis for such an observation is no easy matter, for it is difficult to point to a project or policy and say definitively that it was the earl's idea. The problem is that the nature of Carlisle's position within the English court and government changed, and he left few footprints for a historical detective to follow.

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[1] PRO 31/3/68, fos. 117[a] and 142[a], P.R.O.

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What the earl did was cling firmly to his position as intimate of the king. By accepting the post as Groom of the Stole in February 1631,[2] he strengthened this approach. The new post made him first gentleman of the king's bedchamber and literally gave him access to his master at any hour of the day or night. Although Carlisle would not have turned his nose up at the appointment of Lord Chamberlain, his new post suited his method of operation very well. It is worth pointing out that Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, chose this same post with Queen Anne in the last years of the Stuart dynasty.

A perfect illustration of just what this position meant to the earl is provided by Sir George Wentworth, the brother of the Irish Lord Deputy. In early March 1634 Sir George had been sent over from Ireland with information for the king. The first person with whom he made contact was the Groom of the Stole:

> March 4
> About three o'clock in the afternoon I came to New-market, found out the Earl of Carlile's lodging, presented your Lordship's letter to him, . . . His Lordship went up to the back-stairs to see, if there were any fit time for me to wait upon his Majesty, and returning, his Lordship told me, that by reason of a fall his Majesty had received that afternoon in hunting, the time would not be seasonable . . . ,
>
> March 5
> This morning I waited of my Lord of Carlile, who at my coming wished me to repose myself in his chamber, whilst he went up to the King's lodging. Afterwards, himself coming down, he brought me . . . into the King's lodgings, . . . His Majesty caused me to rise up, and went to the window, where in my sight he read every word of the letter, and immediately after fell into speech with my Lord of Carlile, who told me, that his Majesty said, he was happy in Wentworth's service, . . .[3]

Though other government officials had the same privilege of access to their monarch, Carlisle had the advantage of not being tied down to the operation of a specific government department. He became again what he had been at the start of his career, the courtier par excellence, a man with whom Charles could speak at his ease and who could impart the benefit of many years political experience as the occasion arose. The king was too unpredictable a master to leave for long periods of time, and now Carlisle was duty-bound to remain in close proximity.

Even before he became Groom of the Stole, Charles tended to use the earl as a minister without portfolio, directing him where it seemed appropriate. In 1630, for example, he was asked to make use of his Scottish connections.

During the nearly three decades that Carlisle had been in England, he had been at some pains to deemphasize his origins. Whatever his accent

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[2] *C.S.P.Ven., 1629–1632,* no. 612, pp. 478–79.
[3] *The Earl of Strafford's Letters and Dispatches,* 1: 219.

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may have become, he certainly anglicized his spelling. Yet the family ties remained. His sister, Agnes, was married to the Earl of Glencairn, and his cousin, George Hay, was Lord Chancellor of Scotland and in 1633 became the Earl of Kinnoul.[4] When Charles paid his first visit to Scotland in that same year, Carlisle accompanied him. Under the circumstances, it made sense that, when Charles decided the two kingdoms needed to make a united effort to help break Dutch fishing supremacy, Carlisle was asked to use his connections with various Scottish peers to facilitate the formation of the company. In fact, from the distant court in England, the earl's influence does not seem to have counted for very much with the Scottish lords. Perhaps his obvious devotion to things English did not help either. During August 1630 he received a variety of apologetic letters from Scottish nobles explaining why the company could not be formed.[5] Some years later Charles did carry the case with those in Edinburgh.[6] It is likely that Carlisle continued his behind the scenes lobbying and helped convince his countrymen to accept the fishing company. At least no more excuse-bearing letters survive.

Another Scottish contact that the earl maintained, perhaps not entirely at Charles's behest, was with the military commanders who were fighting on the continent. These contacts were especially in evidence after the Marquis of Hamilton took his troops over to aid Gustav Adolph's invasion of Germany in 1631.[7] Insofar as one can detect, Carlisle was doing more than just keeping abreast of events. He was forwarding a policy that once again encouraged military ventures in Germany, and in order to do so, he made every effort to protect Hamilton's interests.[8] In this endeavor Carlisle once again ran counter to Portland's interests.

As one might expect, the major thrust of the Lord Treasurer's policy was to keep Charles's financial commitments to a minimum. He was therefore equally hostile to his master's schemes for alliance with the Spanish in a naval war against the Dutch as he was to the apparently contradictory policy of becoming actively involved with a land war for the recovery of the Palatinate. Part of Portland's efforts in this latter direction were concerned with discrediting Hamilton by means of two Scottish soldiers, Lords Ochiltree and Reay, who evidently invented a story about the marquis's supposed treason. The scheme backfired, and the Lord Treasurer was at some pains to fight clear of the ensuing scandal.[9] It was certainly no coincidence that Carlisle was on the committee that vindicated the mar-

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[4] *The Scots Peerage*, 4: 244; 5: 220.

[5] Haddington to Carlisle, 12 August 1630, Cunningham; SP 16/172, no. 49; and Seaforth to Carlisle, 17 August 1630, Leith; ibid., no. 78.

[6] *Acts of the Parliament of Scotland*, 5: 228–46.

[7] See for example Eg. MS. 2597, fos. 53ª, 59ª, 62ª, 68ª and 72ª, B.L.

[8] Carlisle to Hamilton, 16 December 1631, Whitehall; Hamilton MS. C. 1/198, P.R.O. Edinburgh.

[9] M. V. C. Alexander, *Lord Treasurer*, 180–82.

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quis.[10] It looked briefly as though the earl was gaining ground on his rival.

What placed him in this position was the ever fluctuating scene on the continent. By early 1631 Carlisle had no doubt that his reliance upon the Spanish to aid the Palatines was misplaced. The English representative at the Diet of Regensburg reported that the imperialists and the Bavarians were not prepared to change their position and approve the evacuation of even the Rhenish Palatinate, much less restore the electoral dignity to Frederick.[11] It was at this point that Gustav Adolph began his invasion of Germany.

Virtually from the first moment of conflict, Carlisle had preferred a military solution, and, if at all possible, an exclusively Protestant one. With the King of Sweden's invasion, his hopes revived. Encouragement and protection of Hamilton was one expression of this new-found enthusiasm; doing what he could to give heart to the diplomatic efforts the English were making was another. The main focus of Carlisle's attention was Sir Henry Vane, Charles's emissary to Gustav Adolph.

Vane's letters make him appear a pompous man, very full of himself, who reputedly was anything but committed to a Protestant military solution for the Palatinate.[12] Elizabeth's way of coping with Vane was to deflate him; she consistently joked with him about his rotund shape.[13] Carlisle's approach was to offer him encouragement through their correspondence, in the course of which the earl gave Gustav Adolph the nickname of the "Dragon King."[14]

Comparing the Swedish monarch to a fire-breathing dragon was not entirely out of place. Especially where it concerned Frederick, Gustav Adolph was not much inclined toward benevolence. His attitude toward Charles was scarcely more accommodating. The Swedish king had a winner's impatience and contempt for a perpetual loser. As a result, in early 1632 when Vane transmitted Gustav Adolph's demands to the foreign affairs committee, many of the members were quite openly shocked. There was even talk that the imperialists and the Bavarians were offering better terms.[15] From the Swedish point of view, the problem was that they needed someone with a modicum of military talent to guard the Rhine against Spanish intervention from the Netherlands. As Frederick had demonstrated repeatedly, he was not the person to fulfill that task, and his formal restoration would have to wait for quieter times.[16] Though there is every indication that right through August 1632 his enthusiasm for the Dragon

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[10] *C.S.P.Ven., 1629–1632,* no. 678, p. 523.

[11] Dorchester to Carleton, 25 January 1631; SP 84/143, fo. 29[a], P.R.O.; Michael Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus, A History of Sweden 1611–1632,* 2: 607–08.

[12] M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus,* 2: 609.

[13] SP 81/36, fo. 153[a]; and SP 81/37, fo. 171[a], P.R.O.

[14] SP 16/203, no. 13, P.R.O.

[15] [Windebank?] to Vane, February or March 1632; SP 81/38, fo. 85[a–b], P.R.O.

[16] M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus,* 2: 611–12.

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King continued unabated,[17] Carlisle's hopes and desires once again had reached an impasse.

As was so often the case in the earl's career, it was tragedy that provided the material for renewed hope. Gustav Adolph's death during the Battle of Lützen in November, 1632 and Frederick's subsequent demise a fortnight later crushed more than a few Protestant spirits, but these events were not without their advantages. The Palatine's stubbornness had ruined more than one compromise attempt over the past decade and a half. His heir, Charles Louis, having lived as an exile off Dutch charity for most of his life, was made of much more pliable material. The Swedes, without their Dragon King, were not nearly so arrogant. The result was that they and the German states participating in the Heilbronn League in April 1633 approved the restoration of the Lower Palatinate to the new Prince Palatine.[18].

Carlisle was undoubtedly pleased, but some of the ensuing events were a good deal less pleasing, for they brought an effective end to any hope of active English support. The root of the problem lay with Sir Francis Nethersole. He had maintained his connection with Elizabeth's exiled court ever since Carlisle had procured him the post as her secretary in 1620; indeed he had become the Palatines' chief spokesman in England. Thus, thanks in part to Sir Francis, in May 1633, following the formation of the Heilbronn League, Charles gave his approval for a consortium of merchants and the Earl of Craven to raise funds for Hamilton's latest German military venture. Unfortunately, before all the official papers were signed, the scheme became public knowledge, and Craven felt he had to withdraw his support, as did the other financiers. Nethersole was understandably furious and, for reasons best known to himself, he accused Lord Goring of having leaked the information on the preparations. Goring, in turn, chose to make the accusation public and asked for vindication by the privy council.[19] Though no one ever mentioned his name in this whole affair, it does have the Portland touch; the dispute certainly aided his program of minimizing English involvement in the continental wars.

In this conflict events developed to work right into the peace party's hands. Nethersole was at an extreme disadvantage. Charles, Carlisle, Coke and several other members of the court who might have supported him were on progress towards Scotland. Earlier that year when Sir Francis had gotten into a dispute with Dorchester's nephew (the viscount having died the previous year), Carlisle and Edmonds had upheld him.[20] Now in the summer, with Henrietta, Goring's patroness, dominating the court in her husband's absence and the pro-Spanish Secretary of State, Sir Francis

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[17] Wentworth to Carlisle, 12 August 1632, York; Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 76[a], B.L.

[18] Golo Mann, *Wallenstein, His Life Narrated*, 687; and M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 2: 617.

[19] *D.N.B.* sub Nethersole, Sir Francis.

[20] *H.M.C. 12th Report*, Part 2, 5.

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Windebank (Dorchester's replacement) in charge of communications on the matter, Nethersole stood little chance.

Nonetheless, Goring must have been nervous about Carlisle's intervention because he tried hard to play down the whole business. He wrote a letter in early June 1633 in which he even went so far as to refer to "excellent" Nethersole.[21] Carlisle and Charles must have had some idea of what was going on, although they both considered the whole thing something of a joke.[22] It was only later in June that Sir Francis realized how much trouble he had made for himself and wrote Carlisle asking for help. By then, however, he had been found guilty of offending Goring,[23] and was bound to suffer at the hands of the remnant of the council that had ruled against him.

Carlisle did not return to Whitehall until the end of July, and during that time Nethersole had not taken his defeat gracefully. Among other ill-considered acts, he had foolishly refused to kneel before the privy council because of his status as Elizabeth's official representative in England. Ultimately he gave in to the inevitable and signed the submission Windebank had drawn up for him.[24]

The whole business not only brought to a halt any English support for Hamilton, but also placed Sir Francis under a cloud at the court. As late as the end of November 1633, he needed Carlisle's mediation in order to even appear in a ceremonial capacity on Elizabeth's behalf.[25] Nonetheless, thanks in large measure to the earl, the situation was being restored to some degree of normalcy[26] when in December all was lost.

Elizabeth was the problem here. She was undoubtedly a perceptive, witty person with a gift for charming virtually everyone who came into contact with her. Her weakness was not one of intelligence, but of emotion. She was not well suited for the callous, amoral politics that characterized her age. Unlike her namesake, Elizabeth I, she was unable to turn her emotions to political advantage. It became increasingly clear to her, ever since Nethersole's difficulties, that Charles was growing much less interested in providing meaningful aid for the restoration of her son. The burden of this knowledge bore down upon her to such an extent that she felt moved to write Sir Francis the following:

I see there wilbe nothing don for us in England which I feare will force me to do that which is as much against my hart as ever any thing was . . . and one wold do any thing rather then lose againe what they have, I pray presse that point

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[21] Goring to Carlisle, 6 June 1633; Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 132[a], B.L.

[22] Carlisle to Wentworth, 9 June 1633, Berwick; Wentworth-Woodhouse MS. 13[a]/13 + 1, Sheffield City Library.

[23] Nethersole to Carlisle, 25 June 1633; Eg. MS. 2597, fos. 138[a]–139[a], B.L.; and *H.M.C. 12th Report,* Part 2, 22.

[24] Goring to Wentworth, 2 August 1633, Greenwich; Wentworth-Woodhouse MS. 13[a]/20, Sheffield City Library.

[25] Nethersole to Dinley, 25 November 1633; SP 16/248, no. 25, P.R.O.

[26] Dinley to Nethersole, 10 November 1633; ibid., no. 27, P.R.O.

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home . . . , but not directly from me, but as your feare & as your discretion will make that use you think fitt. . . .[27]

The word "discretion" is the key here, for Nethersole was little inclined in that direction. He was still smarting from the treatment he received in his confrontation with Goring.

By the time Nethersole finished his assignment in January 1634, not even his diplomatic status was going to prevent retaliation. In Charles's view and that of his privy council, the king had gone through much humiliation and made considerable sacrifices of a political and a monetary nature for the sake of his Palatine relatives. To have his sister or even his sister's official representative question his sincerity at this stage was beyond endurance. At the very least, Nethersole was going to have to come before the privy council to explain himself.

Once Sir Francis realized the extent of his trouble and that he was most likely going to cool his heels in prison for his impertinence, he bolted. In all fairness to Nethersole, he did so largely in an effort to protect Elizabeth from direct involvement. He knew his political career in England was over. He committed incriminating papers to a red velvet box and instructed his wife to send it to the Dutch embassy on Warwick Lane in the City. Nethersole himself escaped from custody and found his way to that same embassy where he was protected overnight by one of the Dutch officials. When the red velvet box did not appear the next morning, Sir Francis presumed it had fallen into the council's hands, and he therefore sent word of his whereabouts to the clerk of the privy council from whose custody he had escaped.[28]

On 7 January 1634 Nethersole wrote Carlisle a letter indicating he understood it was all over for him politically and that he would have to retire from public life.[29] Two days later the members of the foreign affairs committee questioned Sir Francis and discovered what the contents of the red velvet box had not told them.[30] Carlisle, as part of the committee, could only witness all this madness with despair. Through political ineptitude and insensitivity to Charles's feelings, the earl's former servant and the "Queen of Hearts" had destroyed the momentum of the Protestant interventionists. For the foreseeable future there was no hope of forwarding an active policy for the recovery of the Palatinate. Portland had beaten Carlisle once again, and he had done so without ever actively taking part in the struggle.

Because of the hopeless deterioration of the policy of direct support for the Palatines, the earl found himself reverting to the device for which he had been known a decade earlier, encouragement of the French. It is possible to raise at least an eyebrow at such a turnabout, but there were

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[27] SP 16/258, no. 39, P.R.O.
[28] Nethersole's Statement, 9 January 1634; ibid., no. 38.
[29] Nethersole to [Carlisle], 7 January 1634; ibid., no. 22.
[30] Ibid., nos. 36 and 37.

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good reasons for it. On the English side of the Channel, a slow change was taking place. Henrietta and her adherents were shifting more and more into an anti-Richelieu position. This tendency became especially marked when Marie de' Medici was forced into exile in the wake of her head-on confrontation with the cardinal in what became known as the Day of the Dupes in November 1630. Henrietta had always been much closer to her mother and Gaston than she was to Louis, and gradually she had become involved with the opposition, particularly under the influence of Madame de la Vandelet, one of her few remaining French servants. As Holland tended to follow his mistress along this course, a pro-Richelieu gap existed among Charles's immediate advisers, and Carlisle was willing to fill it.

On the foreign scene the death of Gustav Adolph and the collapse of the Hamilton scheme meant that the anti-Habsburg forces in Germany were vulnerable. French sincerity in opposing both the Spaniards and the imperialists was more obvious in 1633 and 1634 than it had been for many years. In late 1634, after the Swedes and their allies were virtually annihilated at the Battle of Nordlingen, French support became an absolute necessity. By May 1635 France had declared war on Spain.

Carlisle's gradual shift into the French camp largely coincides with the general pattern of events. In November 1633 the French ambassador in England, Monsieur Boutard, was reporting that the earl was beginning to make friendly noises about Richelieu.[31] By the end of the month Carlisle was putting some distance between himself and Marie de' Medici's emissary to England, the Marquis de Sourdiac.[32] By December Boutard was convinced that the former Francophile's approaches were genuine.[33] What is more important, the next two ambassadors sent over to England, Monsieur Pougny and the Marquis de Saneterre, had instructions to treat the earl as a potential friend of France.[34] After Portland's death in March 1635, Carlisle even managed to restore some of the easygoing jocularity that he once enjoyed with the French representative in England.[35] The whole purpose of this exercise was still, as it had been from the first, the restoration of the Palatinate to Frederick's family.[36] In truth no more success was evident with this approach than had appeared earlier. England was still in no position to become actively involved in continental affairs. What is more, as the years passed, Charles, like his father, tended to assume a pro-Spanish and anti-Dutch stance. Under such circumstances, Carlisle's efforts to maintain a good relationship with France and to encourage that country's rulers to fight the Habsburgs was the most that could be done. That was little enough as England's attitude played only a minute role in determining French policy. For Carlisle it must have been a terribly frus-

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[31] Boutard to Bouthillier, 9 November 1633 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/67, fo. 98[a], P.R.O.
[32] Boutard to Richelieu, 30 November 1633 (N.S.), London; ibid., fo. 104[a].
[33] Ibid., 10 December 1633; fo. 106[a].
[34] July 1634 and February 1635; PRO 31/3/68, fos. 117[a] and 142[a], P.R.O.
[35] Seneterre to Bouthillier, 20 April 1635 (N.S.); ibid., fo. 158[b].
[36] Pougny to Bouthillier, 24 October 1635 (N.S.); London; ibid., fo. 235[b].

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trating process, and it was probably for this reason that his role in foreign policy was much less assertive in these final years of his life than it had been previously.

Frustrations in Carlisle's later life were not limited to his policy goals. His finances were in poorer condition at the beginning of the 1630s than they had been for many years, and the following chapters will be devoted to this complex area of his life. As for his family situation, it followed the same less than satisfying course.

How he reacted to Lucy's infidelities is anyone's guess. She had a reputation for libertinism during these years of which even the diplomats stationed in England were aware.[37] At the end of 1631 she may have even become involved with Holland.[38] She unquestionably contributed a great deal to the fantasy life of more than one gentleman of the era,[39] whatever she may have actually done with them. Yet, through all of the stories that emerged from this period, there was no hint that Carlisle ever criticized her or was not on the best of terms with her. It is possible that he still made some political use of her natural inclinations; her eventual relationship with Wentworth was a case in point and will be taken up in a subsequent chapter. It seems likely that in most instances the earl was simply content to let his wife lead whatever kind of life she chose, providing there was no major scandal. His attitude is a curious precursor of court life during the Restoration period.

When it came to his son and namesake, Carlisle took a much more traditional, authoritarian approach, with disappointing results. The boy was the son of Honora Denny, and the earl had seen to it that he was nurtured in the manner appropriate to the scion of an aristocratic house. He had a token colonelcy of a regiment fighting in Germany[40] and a grand tour of the continent that began with his father's last embassy. Unfortunately the boy shared none of Carlisle's aesthetic or diplomatic interests. Though Doncaster, as the earl's son was called, even managed to visit Rome during his tour (the equivalent of a westerner visiting Peking in the 1950s), all he could think about was getting home. Through his grandfather, Lord Denny (now Earl of Norwich), he requested permission to return earlier than was originally planned.[41] As this incident indicates, the young man was perhaps a bit afraid of his magnificent and largely absent father and much closer to his grandparents who showered him with affection.

As Doncaster approached his twentieth birthday, some thought was given to his marriage. As 1628 ended, the daughter of the Earl of Desmond was proposed.[42] A year later connections of Carlisle in Ireland put forward

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[37] Boutard to Richelieu, 14 December 1633 (N.S.); PRO 31/3/67, fo. 107[b], P.R.O.
[38] W. Murray to Vane, 18 December 1631, Whitehall; SP 16/204, no. 72, P.R.O.
[39] Thomas, Lord Cromwell to ?, 5 October 1634; SP 16/275, no. 23, P.R.O.
[40] *A.P.C. 1623–1625*, 385.
[41] Norwich to Carlisle, June 1629, Waltham; SP 16/145, no. 54, P.R.O.
[42] R. Allsop to Carlisle, 19 December 1628, Inner Temple; SP 16/122, no. 59, P.R.O.

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an heiress worth £10,000 a year.[43] Since the earl was apparently on his way to becoming a major Irish landholder, such matches could not have been without their attractions. Yet, for whatever reasons, the proposals came to nothing. Perhaps the young man already had his eye elsewhere. For in March 1632 Doncaster took matters into his own hands and married Lady Margaret Russell, the daughter of the Earl of Bedford.[44]

Not surprisingly this unauthorized marriage turned Carlisle violently against his son. The key fact was that the ceremony was performed without the earl's consent. In addition it linked the Hays with the Russells. Though the Earl of Bedford's politics were by no means fixed in stone, at various times he was closely identified with country party opposition to the royal court.[45] For a man such as Carlisle, who lived largely from the privileges he was granted by the king, it simply was not wise to become involved even occasionally with the opponents of court policy. Charles was already overlooking a good deal with Lucy's absences, voluntary and otherwise, from Henrietta's court, without throwing in the burden of a son's questionable choice of brides. It is no wonder the earl was so adamantly opposed to the marriage.

As if all of these factors were not enough to sour Carlisle's disposition, he had one more humiliation to swallow: Holland was a party to the secret from the first. He had actually contrived to delay Carlisle at Royston by throwing a huge banquet to which the king and queen were invited. Since the whole court was returning from Cambridge, as first gentleman of the bedchamber, Carlisle's attendance was virtually required at the festivities. Once these events were in progress, Holland rode off to London where he attended the secret wedding ceremony.[46] Not surprisingly, shortly thereafter, Toby Mathew described the two earls as being at their former distance.[47]

Strangely enough it was Lucy who interceded on her step-son's behalf with his irate father.[48] Perhaps she had a longer memory of what it meant to go against a parent's wishes in order to marry both wisely and well.

All of the factors described combined to cast a pall over Carlisle's last years, though occasional flashes of humor still come through. He was capable of needling his brother-in-law, the Earl of Leicester, about a book he failed to return.[49] He also never faltered in maintaining the magnificence of his life style. Yet in all Carlisle did during this period, one has the sense that he is marking time. For in seventeenth century terms, a man of fifty-five was approaching the end of his life span.

Though Carlisle was sick periodically during his final years, his health remained basically sound until the day of his last illness. As late as December

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[43] Sir S. Smith to Carlisle, 18 February 1629, Dublin; Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 42[a], B.L.
[44] T. Mathew to Vane, 25 March 1632, London; SP 16/214, no. 64, P.R.O.
[45] Perez Zagorin, *The Court and the Country*, 94–95, 101.
[46] [J. Weston?] to Vane, 1632; SP 81/38, fos. 357[b]–358[a], P.R.O.
[47] SP 16/214, no. 64, P.R.O.
[48] SP 81/38, fo. 358[a], P.R.O.
[49] *H.M.C. De L'isle and Dudley*, 6: 40.

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1635, he was entertaining the young Prince Palatine at a banquet.[50] It was on Sunday, 13 March 1636, that he had a stroke and was given up for dead.[51] In fact three days later he had recovered sufficiently to send word to an agent of the second Viscount Conway, who had come to wish him well, that he hoped to live long to serve his master.[52] It was a gallant reply, but Carlisle knew better. He executed a series of deeds placing his estate in trust in order to keep it out of the hands of creditors. In these documents he made arrangements for the payment of his debts and left Lucy the major interest in his Irish estates and monopolies. His son was bequeathed little or nothing, though even before Carlisle's death, he had his financial security insured—thanks to the generosity of the Earl of Norwich.[53]

It was 20 April 1636 before Carlisle died.[54] The funeral procession conveying his body began at his house next to the Duchess of Richmond's and proceeded down the Strand past the Temple Bar toward St. Paul's. Seventy poor men came first in mourning gowns followed by the earl's thirteen watermen, all in black coats with his emblem on their sleeves. After them came noblemen and knights and a horse on a lead, all covered in black velvet and wearing black feathered plumes. Representatives from the various royal departments the earl had directed were marching as well: the robes, wardrobe and the royal bedchamber. After them came yet another black horse followed by his personal servants. Between each of their ranks were bannerbearers, trumpeters and heralds. The body itself was carried on a "chariott" drawn by six horses also in black velvet with matching plumes. The coffin was decorated with the same fabric which hung down to the ground on both sides. At one end of the chariot was a pillow upon which lay his earl's coronet and his collar of the Order of the Garter. Next came heralds bearing ornaments of honor, followed by one final richly decorated horse. At the end of the procession came his principal household servants bearing the white staves of their offices.[55]

He was largely unmourned by the Londoners who watched his coffin enter St. Paul's.[56] No small number of them were his creditors or victims of his monopoly to regain royal lands along the Thames. His son was too ill to participate in the ceremony,[57] but most of the rest of the nobility were there. As for Lucy, she found temporary consolation with the young Duke of Richmond;[58] evidently she felt the need of someone to fill the time until Wentworth returned later that year.

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[50] Garrard to Wentworth, December 1635; *Wentworth*, 1: 489.
[51] Ibid., 15 March 1636; 525.
[52] March 16, 1636; SP 16/316, no. 41, P.R.O.
[53] PROB 11/306, fos. 106[a]–110[a], P.R.O.
[54] C2/Charles 1/C206/60, P.R.O.
[55] John Burghe to Viscount Scudamore, 13 May 1636; C/115/N4, no. 8607, P.R.O. My thanks to Tom Mason for this reference.
[56] J. Nichols to E. Nichols, 10 May 1636; SP 16/320, no. 71, P.R.O.
[57] J. Bright to Viscount Scudamore, 13 May 1636; C/115/N4, no. 8607, P.R.O.
[58] *H.M.C. Various Collections, Bruce MSS*, 7: 413.

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IV. ENTREPRENEUR

In his comprehensive work on the English aristocracy, Lawrence Stone described the Jacobean peerage in these terms:

> . . . No longer interested in manpower, they had begun to exploit more fully the financial possibilities of their estates, they had abandoned the rigours of military service, they had migrated from the country to the Court, they had reduced their households and cut down on the excesses of rural hospitality, they had turned eagerly to joint stock adventures, urban development, and mining speculations. The peerage in 1640 was a landed aristocracy increasingly devoted to money-making, infiltrated partly by a capitalist bourgeoisie obsessed with aristocratic pretensions, and partly by jumped-up lesser gentry who owed their elevation to political favour but some of whom had failed to extract from the Crown the favour of a great landed estate with which to endow their successors.[1]

It is difficult to imagine a better description of Carlisle. He was directly in the mainstream of the aristocratic undertakings of his day. It was, of course, important for him as a Scot trying to become an Englishman to merge with the accepted practices of the class into which he had been thrust by royal favor. Having said that, one must also keep in mind that he needed to make a great deal of money in order to maintain his place. Under those circumstances, following the established procedures for enrichment simply made good sense.

As the following chapters will demonstrate, Carlisle was successful at making money. He was, as has already been indicated, also very adept at spending it. His problem was to keep both talents roughly in balance. When it came to taking in funds, he had a series of patched together expedients that seldom brought him long term profits. He used offices, monopolies, patents and investments in various combinations to support his nearly regal establishment. His lands in Yorkshire and Northamptonshire must have contributed as well. It all sounds disjointed and disconnected, and it was. That was one of Carlisle's major difficulties. His finances were largely determined by royal whim. There was never any systematic plan of action that functioned for either the short or the long term investments. Events dominated Carlisle, and they left him to make the best of things.

Actually, his personal role in managing his own finances is unclear. As he was always spending money faster than he made it, he was always borrowing against future income. This situation frequently forced him to

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[1] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy*, 58–59.

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put his sources of income into the hands of the merchant-financiers who retained them until the loans were repaid. For various reasons, Carlisle spread his credit over a wide and ever-changing group of men, and this arrangement must have been part of the reason for the lack of system in his finances. He followed this disadvantageous procedure for a variety of reasons, some of them not of his own making. Yet, the key from the earl's side was that he did not want any one individual to have power over him as sole creditor. From the other side, however, Carlisle could be a bad risk, and he was not the pleasantest of men with whom to deal over money matters. It is worth noting that toward the end of his life his Scottish relatives played an ever-increasing role in his financial affairs. What is amazing here is that, given the emphasis in this era on family ties, Carlisle was so slow in coming to this expedient. Yet, for all we know, given his previous record, had he lived ten years longer, he might have disposed of his relations as well.

In his constant search for money Carlisle was not especially concerned with either the ethics or the popularity of his projects. He was willing to force people to pay again for property they thought they owned, or to drain the lands on which they lived, thus destroying their means of livelihood. When it came to his West Indian holdings, he did not hesitate to use slaves. While there is some danger here of imposing twentieth-century standards on a seventeenth-century man, the fact remains that several of Carlisle's projects drew protests from his contemporaries who suffered from them. Though it is possible that the merchant-financiers who backed the earl forced him into these disputed projects, it is difficult to believe he was incapable of deflecting their schemes had he been so inclined. The man of urbanity, wit and charm definitely had another side to him. It was this side that made him the epitome of the Jacobean nobleman.

A. Assorted Ventures

1. Monopolies and Privileges

It was the expectations fueled by the favor of James that first led Hay into the entrepreneurial field, and it was a fact that he was most willing to acknowledge. He freely stated that during all his years in England, he prided himself upon taking his wealth only from the royal bounty.[2] Actually his financial base was even more restricted than he indicated. Although the king gave him manors in Northamptonshire and Yorkshire that were supposed to bring him just over £1,000 in improved values,[3] English land was never the major source of his income. What is more important, the social and political influence in the counties that came with the land had no attraction for Hay. Though he did cultivate the acquaintance of the local magnates, especially in Yorkshire, he never tried to build a power

[2] Hay to [Buckingham], 18 August 16[20], Southampton; Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 335[b], B.L.
[3] James to Dorset, 12 July 1607; SP 14/28, no. 10, P.R.O.

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base in the countryside. It was not without significance that during his whole career in England, he never constructed a country house. Indeed virtually all the premises he occupied were either his by right of an office, rented, borrowed or, in one case practically stolen. The ninety year old Countess of Leicester (his grandmother-in-law) had to go to court to evict him from Essex House.[4] Hay was a creature of the king's invention, and whatever establishment he had outside the royal presence was purely for the sake of upholding the dignity that befitted a man of his station. Patents, offices and privileges were the main focus of his concern in England, and his royal master was the source of these gifts.

His first reward for being a successful courtier came in December 1603, a very few months after he entered England. As mentioned earlier, together with Sir Philip Herbert, Hay received a royal license to transport 3,000 broad clothes a year for the next five years.[5] Some years later Hay claimed that the total grant was worth £1,500 to him;[6] in fact he undervalued it. For a recently arrived Scot whose funds were by no means equal to his aspirations this sum, even if he underestimated it, must have seemed like a great deal of money. What he rapidly discovered, however, was that having the right to the money and actually acquiring it were by no means synonymous. Without realizing that he had done so with this grant to the two young courtiers, James had infringed the patent of the Earl of Cumberland to export cloth. It took some months to work out a compromise whereby Hay and Herbert received the customs duties on the cloth and split the £1,000 yearly rent Cumberland paid to the crown for his monopoly.[7] In addition, once Cumberland was satisfied, the licenses themselves were still good. These valuable documents were sold to a consortium of merchants who paid £3,000 for them. It is worth noting that Arthur Ingram and Lionel Cranfield paid £450 for their share of these licenses. They made £582 on the deal.[8] It should also be kept in mind that Hay was only given a tiny fraction of what was available from the royal bounty. As Professor Stone has calculated that the cloth export licenses were worth £52,000 to the Earl of Cumberland,[9] Hay was very much an afterthought for the king.

Yet a pattern was established that Hay would repeat innumerable times. With great difficulty he would obtain a privilege and then sell it at a discounted rate to a financier who would make a substantial profit from that arrangement. Seldom, if ever, did Hay maintain any direct involvement in the rights he obtained. Almost invariably he was so deeply in debt and so pressed by his creditors that he had to sell his assets as quickly as he acquired them.

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[4] C 78/515, Case 7. My thanks to Mr. Richard Conquest for this reference.
[5] December 1603; IND 6744, P.R.O.
[6] Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 336[a], B.L.
[7] SP 14/14, no. 2; and 22 May 1605; SP 38/8, P.R.O.
[8] *H.M.C. Sackville*, 1: 119–20.
[9] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy*, 432.

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This burden of debt was established rapidly. By the time the arrangements for the cloth licenses were completed, Hay had returned from his mission to Henri IV. As previously stated, he received £300 for this journey; he estimated that he had spent £6,000.[10] In addition over the next three years the negotiations with Sir Edward Denny for the hand of his daughter ultimately produced an agreement that Hay would pay his prospective father-in-law's debts. These amounted to £8,000 and were encumbrances against lands that Hay or his children eventually would inherit.[11] On the day in January that the future Earl of Carlisle and Honora Denny were married, he was at least £13,700 in debt, and this estimate does not take into account the style of extravagant living that became his trademark. Though he claimed otherwise,[12] it is unlikely that he ever entirely was able to live within his means.

Such a style of living was characteristic of the aristocratic way of life to which Hay aspired. To take just three examples of young men of his position, the earls of Rutland, Southampton and Sussex had each tallied debts in excess of £10,000 before they reached age thirty-five.[13] The young Scot was determined to become one of them in all respects.

As one might expect, Hay looked to his royal master to prevent being buried under this mountain of debt. His expectations were rewarded. Early in 1607 James was beginning to talk about making a one time only grant to Hay and others.[14] In order to pay Sir Edward Denny, he would receive a patent. Approved in November 1607, this document gave him the right to collect £10,000 in debts owed the crown for everything from unpaid taxes to court fines.[15] The individuals involved would have their accounts closed with the Exchequer, and Hay would keep the money.

On the surface this arrangement should have been exactly suited to Hay's needs. He was given only the most collectable of the debts,[16] and provided with a £2,000 cushion for expenses. In fact, between November 1607 and May 1612, when the last of the debts was collected, at least £9,000 was brought in.[17] Yet matters were just not that easy. In an era when officials lived from their fees, a whole variety of individuals could claim a share of Hay's reward. According to Lord Treasurer Salisbury's reckoning, done some time before all of the money was collected, the total "abatements" on this patent were in excess of £2,300. Included in this list of charges were such items as debtors who could prove they had paid their fines (£545) and the charges of Mr. Putts, a solicitor, who traveled to various counties overseeing the actual collections (£500).[18] In order to

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[10] Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 336[a], B.L.
[11] Ibid., fo. 335[a].
[12] Ibid., fo. 337[a].
[13] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy*, 483–84.
[14] Chamberlain, *Letters*, 1: 241. My thanks to Conrad Russell for this reference.
[15] 11 November 1607; SP 38/8, P.R.O.
[16] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy*, 417.
[17] E 403/1704, *et seq.*, P.R.O.
[18] SP 14/40, no. 7, P.R.O.

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compensate for these losses, James approved a flat grant of £1,500 given to Hay from the Exchequer.[19] He thus lost slightly less than 10 percent of the money rather than just over 20 percent.

He had a good deal less luck with his next project, the patent on concealed lands. In theory the proposal had great potential. In 1617 Hay obtained the right to search out concealed lands valued at £200 per year or less.[20] That meant he could either collect a fine from anyone who had concealed the fact that he held lands from the crown, or, in particularly stubborn cases, he could confiscate the property. The stated reason for obtaining this patent was to pay the creditors of the great wardrobe, a department that Hay had been managing for the past five years.[21] As is so often the case with Hay's financial dealings, the intent and result only vaguely resembled each other.

From letters written to Hay it would appear that the people involved with this patent owed him money.[22] He had advanced them sums or at least had given them some assurance of payment during the course of his mastership of the wardrobe. Now the sums were due, and the patent provided a way for them to recoup their payments and more. The arrangement worked out with these men, primarily Sir John Townsend and Sir Samuel Tryon, was that they would pay Hay £8,000 and £4,800 respectively, and in return they would receive either the lands or the fines acquired by virtue of the patent.[23]

It all sounds business-like enough, but it was a highly controversial procedure that was attacked and suppressed through the actions of the 1621 Parliament.[24] Like so many other patents designed to hunt down violators of the law, this one was a license to blackmail. Those hunting wrongdoers could use their position to extort money from their victims and use the threat of confiscation to back up their demands.[25] Tryon, at least, had the kind of reputation that could well indicate that is what he had in mind.[26]

It does not improve one's opinion of Carlisle to discover that he was drawn to this mode of making money. Only two years after the patent was suppressed, he was negotiating for a new one with the Lord Treasurer, Cranfield.[27] By July 1623 he had received the right to collect up to £10,000 in either lands or fines.[28] Why Carlisle chose to politically expose himself again in such a venture is unknown. He must have realized that any future

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[19] June 1611, IND 6745, P.R.O.
[20] *Commons Debates, 1621*, 7: 343–44.
[21] Ibid., 2: 210.
[22] E. Wolverstone to Hay, 9 June 1619, London; Eg. MS. 2592, fo. 130ª, B.L.
[23] *Debates of 1621*, 4: 147.
[24] Ibid., 7: 344.
[25] Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, 66–67.
[26] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy*, 93.
[27] Cranfield to Carlisle, 30 March 1623, Chelsey; Eg. MS. 2595, fo. 183ª, B.L.
[28] *C.S.P.D., 1623–1625*, 6.

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parliament would not look kindly on such proceedings. Perhaps, with the Spanish match seemingly on the verge of completion, he presumed that no parliament would be held for some time. What happened, however, was that parliament met less than a year later. When the Commons did begin their investigation of the patents for concealed lands, Carlisle quickly withdrew his claims. Through James, he informed the Commons that he would give up his interest in these projects.[29]

He was lying. His interest in such ventures remained unabated, but he did decide that he must cover his involvement. Parliament was unlikely to let him off so lightly a third time. What he did was use two men, Daniel Lea and Richard Smith, to mask his participation. A patent was taken out in their names in 1627. Some five years later Carlisle assumed control of the project for a nominal fee.[30] When he did so, he was certain that there would be no parliament on the horizon.

Despite the distance the earl maintained from this patent, he unquestionably had people looking after its progress even in its early phases of operation. Appropriately enough, Sir John Townsend was one of the men assigned to this task.[31] As for the two supposed patentees, Lea's connection with Carlisle is unknown, but Smith was most likely the haberdasher, Richard Smith, who dealt with the wardrobe while it was under the earl's management.[32] They very well both could have been wardrobe creditors.

Perhaps because of experience with the prior grants concerning concealments, Carlisle instituted other changes in his approach. This patent was technically one to search out defective titles rather than concealments. What is more, rather than search the whole country, he confined his interest to the area along the Thames where it borders Wapping, Stepney and Limehouse. The particular focus this time was on encroachments on the royal river, Thames, where various people had been injudicious enough to build structures, such as wharfs, into its midst.[33]

It was fortunate for the earl that there was no parliament in session because the outcry against his actions was immense. He stepped on some important Londoners' toes, including Peter Pett's, the naval architect.[34] There is no way to determine how much money Carlisle collected from these people, but if the size of the outcry and the amount of time it lasted are any evidence, the sums must not have been small.

Why did Carlisle return again and again to a form of money-raising that so many people found obnoxious? There is no way to know for sure, but it is possible that the controversy aroused made them less attractive to competitors and therefore easier to obtain. The earl's persistence in this area is, perhaps, the most unpleasant aspect of his career. If he had been

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[29] Ibid., no. 10, p. 266.
[30] C 54/2953, no. 41, P.R.O.
[31] *C.S.P.D., 1628–1629,* no. 21, p. 387.
[32] AO 3/1117, fos. 6[b], 137[a], P.R.O.
[33] May 1632, IND 6748, P.R.O.
[34] *C.S.P.D., 1635–1636,* no. 1, pp. 21–22.

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a little less confident of the king's favor, he might have earned a slightly less soiled reputation.

The final related patent that Carlisle obtained concerned a cause made famous, at a slightly later time, by the actions of Oliver Cromwell. This was the patent to reclaim marshland and turn it into agricultural property. Here is another example of Carlisle doing what other aristocrats did to make money with people as diverse as Viscount Bayning, the Earl of Bedford and Lord Cottington playing a role in various projects. Yet Carlisle put his own stamp upon the operation. Whereas many of the others were concerned with expanding their landholdings and thus their political influence in the areas of the drainage, Carlisle simply viewed it as a privilege he could sell to others. Whereas the other peers were willing to invest money in the drainage, so far as it is known, Carlisle never put a penny of his own into the project.[35] The excuse for granting this patent to the earl was that the crown still owed him £32,000, and this grant was a means of paying off that debt.[36] By July 1634 Carlisle began selling the reclamation rights to various individuals.[37] In May 1635 he had obtained approximately £11,000 by means of his patent, and in August he added another £12,216 from Norfolk lands that went to the Dutch engineer, Jan Vanhaesdonk.[38] If Carlisle had not died the following year, it seems quite probable that he would have extracted the full amount due to him, regardless of Oliver Cromwell's intervention.

2. *Robes and Wardrobe*

As remunerative as these patents were for Carlisle, almost all of them either had a maximum earnings clause or a time limit or both. Office was the real source of steady income for a courtier; at least it should have been. Once again, unfortunately for Carlisle, he fell into the pattern of the other officeholding aristocrats of the early seventeenth century who found that major offices were difficult to hold for an extended period of time.[39] In his case the posts of Master of the Robes and Master of the Great Wardrobe were in two of the crown's great spending departments. The problem was that with the increasing financial pressure on the king, he could not afford any departmental manager with Carlisle's regal tastes.

The post of Master of the Robes fell vacant in 1605, and by early December Hay had drawn his first £1,000 for that office.[40] The position was, as the name implied, concerned with procuring wearing apparel for the king's personal use. Even without taking into account the necessities imposed by changes in style, by 1605 there was a great need to add to

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[35] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy,* 355–57.
[36] 30 May, 1635; IND 6748, P.R.O.
[37] Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 176ª, B.L.; and SP 16/272, no. 48, P.R.O.
[38] *C.S.P.D., 1635,* 339.
[39] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy,* 468–70.
[40] *C.S.P.D., 1603–1610,* no. 19, p. 269.

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the royal collection. As King of Scotland, James's wardrobe had been modest by royal standards. Elizabeth's massive collection, though it undoubtedly would have appealed to the late Henri III of France, had no appeal for James. It was therefore necessary to virtually start from scratch. Originally it was thought that £2,500 per year would handle the task.[41] By 1608, however, it was necessary to pay off a surplusage in the robes account of just over £7,000 and to change the appropriation to £4,000 per year paid quarterly.[42]

Even by modern standards a yearly clothing allowance of £4,000 sounds impressive, but one must keep in mind what was required here. It was necessary to put in a supply of suitable clothing at every royal palace, every hunting lodge, indeed any place the king was likely to reside for an extended period of time. In each of these establishments James needed: gowns, cloaks, jerkins, suits, waistcoats, beaver hats, silk stockings, silk garters, boothose, boots, shoes, slippers, night caps, cloakbags, sweatbags and silk ribbons.[43] One can also add to this list swords, rapiers, spurs and gloves.[44]

There is a presumption made by later generations that the reclusive James was a down-at-the-heels monarch, indifferent to his appearance and wrapped in large, ungainly quilted garments designed more to stop an assassin's dagger than to hold the fashion. If the descriptions of the clothes Hay bought for his master are any evidence, that image is very far from the truth. In 1610 James acquired a kirtle or short cloak of purple velvet lined with taffeta costing nearly £56. A year later he added a robe and hood, also of purple velvet together with another kirtle of crimson velvet lined in white taffeta. This garment cost just over £127.[45] The examples could be multiplied many times over. Though one does not often hear reports of James taking a personal interest in the design of the clothing he wore, he obviously had no objection to wearing the magnificent creations others had procured for him. Perhaps the ultimate heights of grandeur were reached at the wedding of Frederick and Elizabeth for which he acquired three doublets costing just over a total of £1,000, all of them made from coronation cloth of gold.[46]

Unfortunately there is no way to know exactly what role Hay played in providing these garments. Given his own magnificent tastes in clothing, his part was most likely active rather than passive. Whether or not he actually designed the royal wardrobe is unknown, but he was undoubtedly aware of the increasing grandeur of the other court nobles. Shortly before James came to the throne, the Earl of Rutland was spending £1,000 a year

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[41] December 1605; IND 6744, P.R.O.
[42] *C.S.P.D., 1603–1610,* 421; and April 1608, IND 6744, P.R.O.
[43] E 351/2807, *et seq.*, P.R.O.
[44] E 351/2808, P.R.O.
[45] Cotton MS. Titus B, IV, fo. 319[a], B.L.
[46] E 351/2808, P.R.O.

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on his clothes. By the time the king died, the Earl of Salisbury was spending nearly that much for his outfit when he became a Knight of the Garter.[47] There was no way the Master of the Robes could permit his master to cut less a figure than the surrounding aristocrats.

Whatever the artistic merits of Hay's tenure as Master of the Robes, financially he was subject to extensive criticism. He was no more careful about spending the king's money than he was about spending his own, and what is more, he apparently had little sense of business procedures as he went about procuring the needed materials. The evidence for this statement comes from an undated auditor's report. It provides a list of all the gaps in the methods he used, and they are an impressive collection of omissions and oversights. No warrants or bills were presented to the auditors. The names of the people actually fabricating the garments were nowhere in evidence, nor was the amount of material they were given. With respect to silk, to give but one example, the number of yards required for a garment seemed excessive, twelve yards being the standard under Hay's administration.[48] What is of equally major importance to the financing of this department, the materials were purchased at widely varying rates that presumably went beyond ordinary market fluctuations. To cite but a single instance, gold and silver cloth could cost anything from £3 to £4 per yard.[49]

As is the case in other instances of Hay finding himself under fire, he did nothing to change his ways. At any rate the audited accounts of the department of the robes give no indication that he did so. One is forced to the conclusion that whoever was responsible for initiating the negative report did not have the influence necessary to force action on the recommendations. As a result, the haphazard accounting procedures continued.

Does this kind of shoddy administration indicate carelessness or corruption on Hay's part? There is no way to tell. As late as 1626 suggestions were made to Charles that royal cloaks, gowns and sable lined gloves were still in the possession of the former Master of the Robes.[50] At approximately the same time it was discovered that a whole variety of robes officials had received royal property for which there was still no accounting.[51] These incidents could be either oversights or attempted thefts; no judgment was ever made.

Undeniably the robes office gave Hay opportunities to acquire sums of money to which he would not otherwise have had access. The New Year's gifts from the suppliers and fabricators, not to mention the robes officers, were a recognized, though unrecorded, source. Whether they went so far

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[47] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy*, 564–65.

[48] Cotton MS. Titus B. IV, fo. 325[a], B.L.; and F. C. Dietz, *English Public Finance 1558–1641*, 406–07.

[49] Cotton MS., Titus B. IV, fo. 326[a], B.L.

[50] *C.S.P.D., 1625–1626*, no. 9, p. 513.

[51] *A.P.C. 1626*, 274; ibid., *1627*, 144–45.

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as to pay extortion to Hay in order to assure themselves of contracts is an open question. About all that one can say is that no one ever accused Hay of being anything more than careless and overly lavish with the king's money. If he was personally corrupt in any manner, he was smart enough to keep contemporaries from catching him.

As for the amount of money that Hay handled for this office, approximately £53,000 was appropriated expressly for the robes between 1605 and 1625, when Lord Compton became master.[52] Of that sum just under £30,000 (or an average of £1,500 per year) was actually issued from the Exchequer. After Cranfield became Master of the Great Wardrobe in 1618, Hay was supposed to receive £4,000 of the wardrobe's yearly total of £18,000 for the robes.[53] Some years later in 1628 one of Hay's financial agents mentioned that there were still £8,000 in debts outstanding,[54] whether from the Cranfield era or before, he did not say.

With respect to Hay's own personal finances, it is difficult to imagine that he would have been able to acquire much more than 10 percent of the money actually disbursed. If that sum is pro-rated over the period, presuming that Cranfield honored his obligations toward the robes, the income was less than £300 per year. Thus when Hay temporarily turned the management of the robes over to his brother, Robert, in 1618,[55] he was not making a serious sacrifice of his income that even then must have been close to £10,000 per annum.

When it came to having the potential for making money, it was the great wardrobe that held real possibilities. There is also great potential for confusion here because the robes and the wardrobe sound like the same department. The situation is made even worse because the name, wardrobe, is itself a misnomer. This branch of the government was a major supplier for a whole variety of officers and offices, but especially for the Lord Chamberlain. Depending on the circumstances, the great wardrobe could hire anyone from a roofer to a boxmaker. It not only supplied the liveries, that is the official uniforms, for all royal dependents, but also the king's carriages and dogcarts for the stables. Yet judging by those who were listed as regular officials of the great wardrobe, the emphasis was on the so-called needle trades with three tailors and three embroiderers holding posts in that department.[56]

Once again here was an opportunity for a man of Hay's tastes to make a visible imprint on the quality of the Jacobean court while at the same time reaping the benefits of a highly profitable office. These benefits included the use of a house in the City known as the Wardrobe and fees,

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[52] *C.S.P.D., 1625–1649,* no. 48, p. 13.

[53] Sackville MS. EN M. 1120, fo. 18[a], Kent County Archives Office; and Menna Prestwich, *Cranfield, Politics and Profits under the Early Stuarts,* 259 and note.

[54] R. Allsop to Carlisle, 24 July 1628, Inner Temple; SP 16/110, no.76, P.R.O.

[55] *C.S.P.D., 1611–1618,* no. 22, p. 514.

[56] Northumberland Papers, Syon House MS., British Library Microfilm M/284, fo. 6[b], B.L.

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gifts and salary amounting to £4,000 per year.[57] From the vantage point of someone in a lesser office such as the robes, these were strong attractions. Hay also may have noted that James had appointed to the post first a Scot and then an Englishman brought up in Scotland. It looked like a spot that had been designed for one of his background. While his predecessor, Sir Roger Aston, still held the position, Hay obtained the reversion.[58] In February 1613, just under six years later, upon Aston's death, the office became his.[59]

In terms of what was then occurring at court, this period was an expensive one. Prince Henry had just been buried in great state, and Princess Elizabeth was about to marry with no less pomp. The wardrobe bore the expenses for both events of which the first alone totaled between £15,500 and £16,600, depending on whose figures one accepts.[60] The authorized expenses for the fiscal year Michaelmas 1612 to Michaelmas 1613 came to just under £66,000.[61] As the ordinary revenues of the department were only £18,000, it was obviously necessary to make up the difference. Given the fact that Aston also had a debt (or surplus as contemporaries called it) of his own and that his predecessor, Dunbar, had had one as well, even if Hay had the inclination, the chances were remote of him performing any financial miracles and balancing the accounts. To no one's surprise, he did not have the inclination but rather continued to buy at his usual lavish scale. Some of his yearly accounts ranged well over twice the ordinary appropriation. One result was that merchants who sold to the wardrobe, realizing that they would have to wait a long time for their money, raised their prices to compensate for their lost time.[62] Lest anyone feel that these merchants were exercising very poor business sense by such a procedure and should have refused any further supplies, it is worth noting that many of them seemed to prosper for many years without obvious harmful effects. A large number of people who sold to Sir John Fortescue, Elizabeth I's last Master of the Great Wardrobe, also sold to Hay.[63]

It is difficult to believe that Hay was any better at overseeing the operations of the great wardrobe than he had been at performing the same functions at the robes. As his soaring expenditures indicate, his main concerns continued to be aesthetic and not financial. As a result, his subordinates must have had something resembling a free hand and struck whatever deals they could. Hay was simply putting into operation what became his self-confessed philosophy of life, "Spend and God will send."[64]

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[57] M. Prestwich, *Cranfield,* 229.
[58] *C.S.P.D., 1603–1610,* 355.
[59] February 1613, IND 6745, P.R.O.
[60] Ibid., January 1614; and Sackville MS. EN M 1125, Kent County Archives Office.
[61] M. Prestwich, *Cranfield,* 228 note.
[62] Ibid., 228–30.
[63] LC 9/93; and AO 3/117, P.R.O.
[64] *Autobiography of Thomas Raymond,* 25.

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The problem was that James could no longer afford servants who utilized such a doctrine.

In 1615 efforts were begun to bring royal expenditures under control. In April of that year Hay received a letter from the privy council requesting him to have his servants put their accounts in order so that they could be examined.[65] Matters dragged out for some time, and it was not until December 1617 that any definitive report was made. Actually, the document was submitted by the two people most intimately involved in the question of wardrobe finance, the Lord Chamberlain, Pembroke, and Hay. When one has the poachers examine the fence, one should not be surprised if they leave a few holes in it. Their conclusion was that, if extraordinary expenses such as furnishings for the standing wardrobes, rich hangings, presents for foreign dignitaries and the like were not included in the ordinary financing of the department, the expenses could be held down to £28,000 which would necessitate James approving another £4,000 for the ordinary budget.[66]

Actually, they might have gotten away with making this set of figures seem realistic if it had not been for Sir Lionel Cranfield. He told James that he could run the great wardrobe for £20,000.[67] When matters were finally worked out, he did even better than originally promised. Even with a grant to the robes of £4,000 per year, the great wardrobe charges could be reduced to £14,000 (£18,000 total), or exactly the sum approved by parliament at the beginning of the reign.[68] There was no way the present master could compete with such an offer, and before 1618 was over, Cranfield replaced Hay as Master of the Great Wardrobe.[69]

Hay had held the office for less than six years and received authorization to spend £162,000. From 1614 through 1618 this sum included £64,000 in extraordinary appropriations for the entire period. Of the authorized sum, the Exchequer actually handed out £120,500, leaving roughly a £42,000 deficit. As the earlier portion of this chapter indicated, paying off the debts from the mastership of the wardrobe became one of Hay's principal preoccupations for the next decade and a half. To modern eyes this burden on Hay hardly seems fair, yet in seventeenth century terms both the profits and the debts of the office were his. That is why when he announced to Buckingham in 1620 that he was out of debt, he was talking only in the most restricted, personal sense.

What he did do was contrive to use the wardrobe debts to line his own pockets or at least to pay off his own creditors. In February, 1619 he obtained the right to the £8,500 still remaining in the wardrobe account

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[65] *A.P.C., 1615–1616,* 133–34.
[66] Ibid., *1616–1617,* 402.
[67] M. Prestwich, *Cranfield,* 228.
[68] Sackville MS. EN M 1120, fo. 18ª, Kent County Archives Office.
[69] *C.S.P.Ven., 1617–1619,* no. 475, p. 281.

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from his mastership.[70] Three months later Cranfield was instructed to give Hay just under £7,000 out of the wardrobe, and Sir Roger Dallison to do the same with a little under £10,000 from ordinance office funds still in his possession.[71] All of this money was intended to pay wardrobe creditors as were the various patents to discover concealments. Yet in 1630 Charles was forced to acknowledge that he owed Carlisle £42,000,[72] exactly the difference between the warrants and the money actually issued from the Exchequer during his tenure at the wardrobe. Either James or his officials had not been careful to designate that the £25,500 given Hay was partial payment of the wardrobe debt, and he obviously had no compunctions about taking advantage of that fact.

As late as 1641, when the late earl's creditors were still trying to recover their money from his son, it appears that between £2,000 and £3,000 of the outstanding debts came from the great wardrobe.[73]

Besides these masked contributions to Hay's finances, on leaving office he also obtained official compensation. Becoming Viscount Doncaster was undoubtedly part of his reward, but there were more practical aspects as well. On the somewhat lame excuse that Hay was going abroad in March 1619, he was forgiven the necessity of returning any royal jewels that he might still have in his possession.[74] A year later he received a warrant for £20,000 as compensation for voluntarily giving up his office.[75] By the middle of the month he had received that sum.[76]

All of these financial dealings almost inevitably led to public reverberations. At the time of the 1621 Parliament some of the poorer creditors of the wardrobe presented a petition to the Commons.[77] Unfortunately for them, they were not influential enough to obtain redress. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, when Cranfield was impeached in 1624, he tried to make it appear that he was required to give Hay a £3,000 bribe in order to become Master of the Great Wardrobe. That charge was effectively disclaimed before parliament. In addition the supposed recipient of this money went on to defend his administration as master by claiming that he had been faced with a large number of extraordinary expenses. Thus costs were bound to increase.[78] His defense is ingenuous and somewhat beside the point. One can only marvel that anyone who administered the wardrobe so poorly and accumulated a mass of unpaid debts that represented three times his department's annual income, was able to escape

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[70] February 1619, IND 6746, P.R.O.
[71] May 1619, ibid.
[72] January and May 1630, IND 6747, P.R.O.
[73] C 3/408/45, P.R.O.
[74] March 1619; IND 6746, P.R.O.
[75] February 1620; ibid.
[76] 15 February 1620; E 403/1725, P.R.O.
[77] Chamberlain, *Letters*, 2: 378.
[78] *Journal of the House of Lords*, 3: 377.

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unscathed. No parliament or other legal body ever took effective action against him.

Although one can speculate, there does not appear to be any obvious reason for Hay's good luck. Perhaps the Commons simply had targets that dramatized their grievances better than what went on at the wardrobe. Perhaps Hay was careful not to antagonize key figures of the parliament who might have led an investigation. Perhaps he made some sort of deal. Whatever happened from the earl's perspective the important thing was that his luck held.

Despite his good fortune, leaving the post of Master of the Great Wardrobe was a pivotal point in Carlisle's life. From then on he had to work much harder to obtain the royal privileges and grants he needed to finance his ostentatious tastes. What is more, the burden of debt he accumulated, coupled with the political frustrations of the 1620s gradually hardened his personality. He never lost his power to charm both sexes, but one becomes aware that, for the last ten to fifteen years of his life, he had to make a conscious effort to exercise this very attractive aspect of his personality.

3. *Extraordinary Ambassadorships*

Just as Carlisle's aesthetic tastes were the basis for his service in the robes and wardrobe, his charm was the source of his advancement in diplomacy. As was true of all the earl's endeavors, this work did not come cheaply. It also must be kept in mind that, given the fact Carlisle operated only as an extraordinary envoy, he was under an obligation to represent the grandeur of Great Britain in the appropriate manner. Such an assignment meant not only equipping himself and his staff in the manner indicated in an earlier chapter, but also distributing equally lavish sums of secret service money to his hosts. These funds were transformed into public gifts to everyone from the footmen to the nobles,[79] and also, presumably, they were used to bribe key officials. Unlike the Spanish, who preserved the records of who received such money,[80] the English were either not as bureaucratically inclined or were more discreet. One would suspect that such a procedure gave the English ambassador an opportunity that his Spanish brethren lacked: to retain a portion of such funds. The secret service money might also account for the variations in the estimated costs of a given diplomatic mission. Carlisle's 1619 embassy to Germany had cost estimates ranging from £16,300 to £30,000.[81]

In practice, running an extraordinary embassy was immensely complex. It involved large outlays at literally every turn of the road. Though no detailed list of Carlisle's ambassadorial expenses has survived, the records

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[79] Carleton to Chamberlain, 1 January 1620, The Hague; SP 84/94, fos. 5[b]–6[a], P.R.O.
[80] G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 247.
[81] M. Prestwich, *Cranfield*, 364; and *Commons Debates of 1621*, 2: 9.

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of another extraordinary ambassador of the period, Sir George (later Viscount) Chaworth, have. He was sent on a brief, and therefore relatively inexpensive, mission to the Spanish Netherlands in 1621 to offer condolences to the Infanta Isabella on the death of her husband, Albert. £1,000 was authorized for the journey, and the expenses began instantaneously. The signet office wanted £1 for its seal; the privy seal cost the same. The Exchequer officials also had their fees ranging from Sir Robert Pye, who received £11, to one of the tellers, whose fee of fifteen shillings per £100 issued came to £7–10/0. Even the teller's messenger, who carried the money, received ten shillings.[82] The expenses for transportation started from the moment the ambassador said farewell to the king. Before ever setting foot in a boat, Chaworth spent close to £50 and that only brought him to the coast.[83]

Once on the other side of the Channel, food, transportation and accommodation made up the bulk of the expenses. All of these commodities had to be purchased locally at whatever price the native populace thought the market would bear. It is true that for the embassy of the French match, Carlisle had his transportation expenses reduced because he stayed so long in one place. Yet that was not the usual pattern. As a rule the extraordinary ambassadors were incessantly on the move. Given that it was not uncommon for Carlisle to have seventy people with him, finding sufficient transport was problem enough. The costs were often astronomical. Carleton estimated that they were £100 per day on the 1619 embassy, of which coach rental made up a significant proportion.[84]

The large number of people involved also created problems in that it was impossible to keep an eye on everyone. Chaworth discovered this fact to his cost when one of his servants broke into a large trunk and stole £350.[85] As for Carlisle, his servants were scarcely more dependable. One of his men was actually hanged for a felony, but survived the experience. Carlisle found himself in the unenviable position of having to plead for the man's life for honor's sake.[86]

When it came to handling the massive sums involved in the embassies, the earl used a more sophisticated system than Chaworth's trunk. He arranged for letters of credit drawn on various merchant-financiers with continental connections. The key figure was Phillippe Burlamacchi, a Lorraine merchant of Italian extraction who was a prime mover in ambassadorial finance. As early as January 1614, Burlamacchi was loaning money to James to underwrite his diplomacy.[87] Beginning with the 1619 embassy Carlisle used letters of credit issued by the Lorraine merchant.[88] Burlamacchi

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[82] *The Loseley Manuscripts*, 423–24.
[83] Ibid., 432–33.
[84] Carleton to Chamberlain, 16 July 1619, The Hague; SP 84/91, fo. 41ª, P.R.O.
[85] *Loseley Manuscripts*, 435.
[86] Carlisle to Conway, 26 April 1624; SP 14/163, no. 55, P.R.O.
[87] 12 January 1614; E 403/1716, P.R.O.
[88] E. Wolverstone to Hay, 9 June 1619, London; Eg. MS. 2592, fo. 130ª, B.L.

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also arranged a way to have his associates on the continent either cash the letters of credit or provide other necessary banking facilities.[89] At least with respect to the 1628 mission, the Exchequer turned over Carlisle's funds directly to Burlamacchi, and he in turn was supposed to issue them as needed.[90] Practice did not always match theory, for even a great merchant-financier could not always guarantee that funds would be available when they were required.[91] Carlisle was most unforgiving of such lapses, especially in the atmosphere of 1628, and he was not above complaining directly to Charles about such behavior.[92] Perhaps as a result of this ill-will, Burlamacchi was still trying to collect money from Carlisle's estate a decade after the embassy had ended.[93]

The merchant-financier aside, the sources of money to finance these embassies were as various and unrelated as one could imagine. To begin with the obvious, warrants were drawn on the Exchequer that over the course of Carlisle's diplomatic career came to roughly £43,200 (not counting secret service funds). He was unique among the ambassadors of the period in that he received virtually all of the money assigned to him. The amount involved, however, was less than half the cost of the embassies, and the remainder had to be made up. In 1616 the reported expedient was to sell a peerage for £10,000 and assign the proceeds to finance the mission.[94] In 1625 part of a grant of £6,000 came from Henrietta's dowry to Carlisle.[95] Yet, despite the wide variety of methods tried, insofar as one can tell from the surviving evidence, the earl personally financed as much of the costs of the embassies as the Exchequer paid. Given problems with obtaining cash, he did not actually lay out these funds, but rather borrowed on the security of his monopolies[96] or on any other basis he could imagine.[97]

Carlisle's hosts on these missions provided him with a means of recouping at least part of these funds. There is no way of knowing how much pension money, to use the polite phrase, the earl might have received from the French, Palatines, Savoyards or the Dutch during the course of his diplomatic career. What did become public knowledge were the gifts with which he was presented by them and others. The scale of these presents escalated with his status. In 1604 Henri IV presented him with a jewel worth 600 French crowns.[98] In 1625, after the marriage treaty was signed, Carlisle received 22,000 French crowns from Louis XIII.[99]

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[89] Burlamacchi to Hay, 21 July 1621, London; Eg. MS. 2594, fo. 56[a], B.L.; and Burlamacchi to Rambouiller, 17 May 1624, London; Eg. MS. 2596, fo. 7[a–b], B.L.

[90] April 1628; IND 6747, P.R.O.

[91] Burlamachi to Carlisle, 8 July 1628, London; SP 99/30, fo. 34[a], P.R.O.

[92] Carlisle to Charles, 10 December 1628, Basle; SP 92/14, fo. 211[a–b], B.L.

[93] *C.S.P.D., 1638–1639,* 135, 168–69, 570.

[94] Ibid., *1611–1618,* 380.

[95] Ibid., *1625–1626,* 534; and Conway to Ley, 19 February 1625, Newmarket; Add. MS. 35,832, fo. 175[a], B.L.

[96] Carlisle to DeRenzi, 22 April 1628, London; SP 46/91, fo. 68[a], P.R.O.

[97] *C.S.P.D., 1634–1635,* no. 68, p. 417.

[98] *C.S.P.Ven., 1603–1607,* no. 206, p. 143.

[99] Chamberlain, *Letters,* 2: 623.

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Even with gifts, however, there could be problems. In 1620 the Dutch gave the earl tapestries valued at £1,000,[100] but these items proved an expensive proposition for the recipient. What the canny members of the Estates General had done was present Carlisle with four panels out of a set of eight. He was forced to buy the remaining four,[101] no doubt at suitably inflated prices.

Although the costs of Carlisle's embassies ranged on the higher end of the scale, they were not out of line for what else was happening in his era. The Earl of Hertford spent over £20,000 for an embassy to Brussels in 1604, and Lord Digby's peace mission of 1621 cost over £25,000.[102]

As was true of virtually every other governmental office the earl held, once he stopped acting as an ambassador, he left debts behind him on an impressive scale. It is difficult to make exact comparisons, but evidently Carlisle owed as much after being an ambassador as he had after being Master of the Great Wardrobe, thus creating a total debt in excess of £80,000. Insofar as people of the time had any record, he managed to pay off nearly £69,000 of this money by the time of his death, a most remarkable feat. It is all the more remarkable when he is compared to other debt-ridden aristocratic officeholders of his day. Salisbury and Buckingham died owing over £50,000, while Stafford and Arundel owed in excess of £100,000.[103]

4. Patronage

One final area that deserves at least brief consideration under the heading of assorted ventures is the earl's patronage. The following chapters will cover his extensive patronage rights in Ireland and the West Indies. On the English side of the Channel, however, the earl's opportunities were a good deal more restricted.

It would be impossible to tell what profits Carlisle derived from successful patronage ventures. At a minimum, he must have received a New Year's gift from those who were indebted to him, but further than that it is difficult to say. At least when it came to placing diplomats, he was probably more interested in forming a communications network for his own use than receiving cash or gifts. Yet a clever man such as Carlisle knew that there were ways of converting information into power and cash. On just what scale he did so, one can only guess.

Perhaps the best place to begin a consideration of Carlisle's patronage is to explain what powers he did not have. Placing adherents in parliament was definitely beyond his capabilities. In every parliament from 1621 onward there were men who were intimately connected with the earl and

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[100] Carleton to Chamberlain, 1 January 1620, The Hague; SP 84/94, fo. 6[b], P.R.O.
[101] Hay to Carleton, 9 November 1620, Essex House; SP 84/98, fo. 29[a], P.R.O.
[102] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy*, 461–62.
[103] Ibid., 543.

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who could look after his interests, but he was not responsible for placing any of them in the Commons. In the case of his brothers-in-law, Viscount Lisle and Algernon, Lord Percy, they used their family influence to sit for Monmouthshire or either Sussex or Chichester. With respect to Sir Francis Nethersole and John Woodford, their borough seats of Corfe Castle, Dorset, and Tamworth in Staffordshire[104] were not even in counties where Carlisle could pretend to have influence. As for those counties in which he could, Northampton and Yorkshire, Carlisle did not devote enough time to county politics in order to obtain control of any of the local patronage machinery.

When it came to offices such as Master of the Great Wardrobe, one would think that the opportunities for patronage would only be as limited as the posts under his jurisdiction. Such was not necessarily the case. It was possible to buy reversions to wardrobe offices.[105] As these reversions were often purchased prior to a given master assuming his post, he could not control the personnel. Even with this limitation, there were some unclaimed offices, and the master and his servants saw to it that they were sold at suitable prices.[106]

Insofar as the diplomatic posts were concerned, there was no government office related to diplomacy that was in Carlisle's gift. Nonetheless, having served with him or having been adopted as his protégé was as close to a guarantee of further advancement as an individual could obtain in Stuart government. His secretaries, Nethersole, Boswell and Barnet, became, respectively, ambassadors to the Princes of the Union, the Dutch Republic and consul at Smyrna.[107] His faithful ally, Sir Isaac Wake, was transferred from Savoy to France. Even Wake's servant, Oliver Fleming, became agent to Switzerland because of Carlisle's influence.[108] It is difficult to categorize men such as the Earl of Leicester, who went as extraordinary ambassador to Denmark and resident ambassador to France, or Basil, Lord Fielding, who became the resident ambassador in Venice. They both had served with Carlisle, but their family connections were more than adequate to procure them such posts without the earl's help. Nonetheless by 1633, with the exception of Hopton in Madrid, there was scarcely an English diplomatic representative at a major European capital who did not owe something to Carlisle.

When it came to other areas, no consistent pattern emerges. Occasionally, as in the case of John Donne, the earl was able to influence even ecclesiastical decisions. He could do the same periodically with regiments sent to the continent, particularly with those commanded by Scots. Nonetheless no one area was Carlisle's private preserve, and he had to vie with other courtiers to obtain any of these positions for his dependents.

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[104] *Official Return–Members of Parliament, 1213–1702,* 1: 451, 453, 460, 463, 466.
[105] January 1604 and April 1606; IND 6744, P.R.O.
[106] Sackville MS. EN M 1143, Kent County Archive Office.
[107] *C.S.P.D., 1635,* no. 10, p. 385.
[108] *C.S.P.Ven., 1629–1632,* no. 251, p. 201.

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Perhaps it was in search of a private hunting ground that Carlisle turned his attention to areas outside England. He was to discover that the distance did not necessarily add ease to the life of an entrepreneur.

B. Irish Undertakings

1. Wine Imposts

Evidence of Hay's interest in Ireland came not long after his marriage to Honora Denny. In July of that same year, 1607, Lady Anne Brouncker wrote Salisbury a letter filled with cries of outrage. Her husband, Sir Henry, had recently died while he was in possession of the monopoly on the Irish wine impost. During December of the previous year, Hay had been granted the reversion of that privilege.[1] Lady Anne could see losing this rich prize and she pleaded with Salisbury to prevent this rank injustice.[2]

Her efforts were not entirely without success. Though Hay received his first patent for the wine impost in 1608,[3] the following year Lady Anne was still fighting a rearguard action that could have kept Hay from claiming his due.[4] In any case James saw fit to reissue the patent to the new patentee in 1611, extending the period of the lease from twenty-one to forty-one years.[5] For this privilege Hay claimed he paid an entry fine of £7,000[6] that may have been used to silence Lady Anne. He also had to pay a yearly rent of £1,400.[7]

Hay had no desire to run this vast business undertaking personally, and he immediately arranged for a consortium of merchants, some of whom controlled the English wine imposts, to take over his interests as well.[8] Of the people initially involved, only Abraham Jacob established a continuing relationship with Hay and that lasted well over ten years. The composition of the remainder of the group did not remain stable, and even Jacob dropped out after awhile. By 1621 a whole new set of people were serving Hay's interests.[9] In 1623 this new group, led by Sir William Pitt, a teller of the exchequer, made a new agreement with Carlisle (as he had become by then). They had control of the monopoly until a loan of £3,000 was paid off.[10] Though no continuous record of it survives, it is not unlikely that Carlisle used virtually all his privileges as collateral for

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[1] *C.S.P. Ireland, 1606–1608,* no. 72, p. 45.
[2] *H.M.C. Salisbury,* Part 19, 182.
[3] James to Chichester, 14 June 1611; PRO 31/8/201, p. 513, P.R.O.
[4] *H.M.C. Salisbury,* Part 21, 45.
[5] PRO 31/8/201, p. 513, P.R.O.
[6] Hay to Buckingham, 18 August 1620; Harl. MS. 1581, fo. 336^{b}, B.L.
[7] Hugh Kearney, "The Irish Wine Trade, 1614–1615," 404.
[8] Ibid., 402–03; and James to Chichester, 5 November 1612, Westminster; PRO 31/8/202, p. 94, P.R.O.
[9] Sackville MS. O.N. 7528, Kent County Archives Office.
[10] SP 46/90, fo. 188^{a}, P.R.O.

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loans and that his creditors assumed control of the enterprises to insure payment. As the next chapter will illustrate, that was certainly the pattern with his West Indian holdings.

Like so much else that Carlisle touched, over the years the prospects for making a continuing profit on the wine imposts (and therefore guaranteeing his loans) were reduced. Several factors were responsible for this trend of which the most important were the continental conflicts and internal French difficulties. The available figures indicate that the profits on the impost reached their peak in the period from September 1615 to September 1616 at £4,596. During the Huguenot revolt collections were down to perhaps less than £1,700 for a year, with totals of only £884–13/3 for the six months between September 1621 and March 1622.[11]

Given this context, Carlisle's peace mission to France during the period had more than a little self-interest involved. The disruption of French commerce was bound to cost him money. As mentioned earlier, when the French actually interfered with English shipping coming up the river from Bordeaux, the ambassador made a heated protest. What is more, he was not in the least shy about stating that he had done so because of the loss of customs revenue.[12]

Actually the worst was yet to come. Once the war developed between England and Spain, profits from the monopoly reached their nadir. After doing his reckoning at Michaelmas 1628, one of Carlisle's agents reported that the income was only £800, and if Charles had not agreed to forego his rent, it would have come to even less than that.[13] The Dunkirk privateers were the principal problem. Despite the war with France, the Dutch were quite happy to take up the slack left by the inability of English and Irish ships to trade at Bordeaux. Unfortunately the Spanish war with the Dutch Republic meant that the Dunkirkers could take Dutch ships as well.[14] War, especially war with the Spaniards, was proving a most expensive luxury for Carlisle. Perhaps in late 1628, when he made his dramatic shift to favoring peace with Spain, financial considerations were not entirely absent from his mind.

The prospect of peace did not make an immediate difference. Just as the Spanish peace treaty was signed in the winter of 1630–31, the earl's share of the impost was reported as only £770 for the previous six months.[15] A year later incomplete returns from the collectors totaled just over £1,800 for the entire year, but that was without deducting expenses.[16] Even though the port of Wexford is not included in these accounts, it would be difficult to expect the gross profits to exceed £2,200. As late as 1635, Sir George

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[11] *H.M.C. 4th Report*, 301–02; H. Kearney, "The Irish Wine Trade," 428.
[12] Hay to Calvert, 19 May 1621, Bordeaux; SP 78/70, fo. 116[a], P.R.O.
[13] David Lewis to James Hay, 13 October 1628, Dublin; SP 63/247, fo. 184[a], P.R.O.
[14] M. De Renzi to Carlisle, 22 April 1628, Dublin; SP 63/246, fo. 111[b], P.R.O.
[15] M. De Renzi to Carlisle, 15 January 1631, Dublin; Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 55[a], B.L.
[16] SP 46/92, fos. 104[a] and 134[a]–183[a], P.R.O.

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Radcliffe, a man who knew the monopoly well, did not think it was worth £1,000 to its owner.[17]

It was probably the slowness of the monopoly to recover even in peace time that caused the earl to agree to radically altered arrangements. In 1632 he signed over the monopoly to Charles in return for a pension of £1,400 a year.[18] What he had done was reverse the original arrangement with the crown. From here on, however, matters become terribly confused. In 1633 Carlisle's chief agent in Ireland, Sir Matthew De Renzi, still did not fully comprehend the status of the impost. He announced to his patron that thanks to the new customs rates there was now £3,500 in the account.[19] Obviously he thought the figure mattered to the earl. Maybe it did because from Carlisle's correspondence with the new Lord Deputy, Wentworth, it appears that there was no final agreement about the impost.[20] Ultimately it seems that a complex, long term arrangement was worked out. The wine imposts would merge with the other customs for a period of fifteen years. Carlisle would receive £11,050 immediately plus £1,400 per year for the duration of the agreement. Once the time expired, the earl or his heirs would reassume the monopoly.[21] This arrangement was sealed in June 1635; mysteriously, only one month later Carlisle made an agreement with two of the customs farmers, Sir Arthur Ingram and Thomas Ferrers, that they would collect the wine impost for a year in order to pay back a loan of £3,160.[22] Just what right the earl had to make such an agreement is not clear, but no one questioned his dealings.

Like so much else that Carlisle touched in Ireland, the wine monopoly was filled with confusion and disappointment. He also had the additional difficulty of not being close at hand to supervise the work of his associates and subordinates. This was a recurring problem in his Irish undertakings. What he wanted to do was borrow money using the imposts as collateral and then leave the burden to others. But the politics and the economics were too closely associated for him to ever deal with matters in such an off-hand way. He had to remain actively involved, but all too often outside factors over which he had no control made his involvement practically futile.

2. *Wine Licenses*

Another example of the frustrations that Carlisle faced in Ireland concerned his second, related monopoly. In 1615 he was granted the right, previously held by Arabella Stuart, of licensing internal wine distribution

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[17] Sir George Radcliffe to Sir Arthur Ingram, 9 May 1635, Dublin Castle; *H.M.C. Various, Wood MSS*, 8: 47.

[18] C 66/2709, P.R.O.

[19] De Renzi to Carlisle, 11 July 1633, Dublin; SP 46/92, fo. 211[a], P.R.O.

[20] Wentworth to Carlisle, 25 June 1633, Westminster; Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 140[a], B.L.

[21] C 66/2709 and June 1635; IND 6748, P.R.O.

[22] Wentworth-Woodhouse MSS. Vol. 24, no. 181, Sheffield City Library.

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along with the production and sale of *aqua vitae* (or *usquebaugh* as the Irish called it). In practice this grant was the licensing procedure for inns and alehouses, and it became as unpopular in Ireland as Sir Giles Mompesson's comparable monopoly was in England.

The motivations for founding this profitmaking endeavor involved the usual mixture of governmental and private considerations. Inns and alehouses tended to attract a certain number of shady clientele. Especially in a country such as Ireland, where the control of the government was much less firm than its officials desired, the idea of individuals drinking and plotting at unspecified locations was not a settling prospect.[23] In addition, given the volume of wine imported through Irish coastal towns at this time, there was every reason to believe that such a monopoly would be extremely profitable. Yet, as was so typical of Stuart government, it was not the crown that would derive the principal benefits. In this case the object of the king's goodwill was the Lady Arabella Stuart, his cousin, who found her income of over £2,000 per year quite inadequate for a royal princess. Beginning in 1609 she applied for the monopoly,[24] and it was granted to her soon thereafter.

It did not take Hay long to discern that this new grant would have implications for the impost on wines. If sales were limited to only licensed inns, it could have had the effect of reducing the volume of wine consumed and therefore shipped. Under such circumstances he claimed damages and forced an arrangement on the lady whereby he received the wine license money plus an additional one hundred marks in recompense.[25] This deal served two purposes. It provided some immediate additional revenue for Hay, and it meant that, if the Lady Arabella ever gave up the monopoly, he would have a claim upon it. When she died in 1615, Hay did indeed take over all of her share.

Initially his formal acquisition of the monopoly did not mean a significant change in income, for Hay had a partner: Sir Samuel Smith, a former servant of the Lady Arabella, who had either granted her or underwritten loans to her of £10,000. He was the joint-holder and chief manager of the monopoly in Ireland where he was assisted by one George Richards. In England Sir Henry Yelverton acted for the patentees,[26] though he was eventually dropped after his disgrace during the 1620s. After Richards's death in 1628, Sir Matthew De Renzi took over management of Carlisle's share of the licensing in Ireland.[27] In effect De Renzi became the chief agent of all Carlisle's Irish undertakings, having previously done good service for Cranfield in the collection of the Irish customs.[28]

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[23] SP 63/227, fo. 228^{b}, P.R.O.
[24] C.P.V. Akrigg, *Jacobean Pageant*, 117.
[25] De Renzi and Sir S. Smith to Viscount Falkland, 20 July 1628; SP 46/91, fos. 78^{b}–79^{a}, P.R.O.
[26] Ibid., fo. 78^{b}; *C.S.P. Ireland, 1611–1614*, no. 754, p. 420; *H.M.C. Hastings*, 4: 49–50.
[27] De Renzi to Carlisle, 22 April 1628, Dublin; SP 63/246, fo. 111^{a}, P.R.O.
[28] Falkland to Carlisle, 23 July 1626, Dublin; SP 46/91, fo. 17^{a}, P.R.O.

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The monopoly operated by selling licenses to local merchants or gentlemen, and they in turn would sell a portion of their privilege to others in the area.[29] Judging by the number of licenses issued in the late 1620s and early 1630s, it is even possible that those making and using *aqua vitae* for their own estates were forced to buy these licenses. Over the years resentment of this procedure grew, and in 1621, when a list of Irish grievances was forwarded to James from the Irish privy council, this monopoly was included. Basically the complaint was that the cost of licensing was passed on to the consumer. The council and the current Lord Deputy, Viscount Falkland, felt the grievances were justified and recommended a system of price regulation.[30] The recommendations of the commissioners for Irish manufacture, who made their report in July 1623, were even harsher. Citing among other factors the shortage of grain caused by the manufacture of *aqua vitae,* they concluded that Carlisle and Smith should be pensioned off and the monopoly abolished.[31]

One of the unspoken considerations going through many English minds during the 1620s was the possibility of foreign interference in Irish affairs. As early as 1621, when a French warship under the command of an Irishman named Captain Keating shipwrecked on the English coast, extra patrols were sent into the Channel to thwart any invasion plans.[32] Given the nervousness of the English officials, they were more inclined than usual to meet Irish grievances part way. From the king's point of view, if pensioning off Carlisle helped bring peace to Ireland, it was a relatively small price to pay. In 1628 it was Charles who finally acted on this conclusion. In principle he agreed to a petition that was submitted to Falkland and the Irish privy council requesting the elimination of the monopoly.[33]

The king's action caused Carlisle more than a little consternation. He had used the profits from the licenses as security for a loan from Sir William Pitt in order to help finance his 1628 embassy.[34] If the monopoly was abolished, Pitt could demand other security or the immediate return of his money. At that particular time the earl was in a position to provide neither. His servants were literally hiding the family plate to prevent it from being confiscated by creditors.[35]

Rumors of the cancellation spread through Ireland as early as April, just as the earl was about to depart for the Dutch Republic.[36] He could do no more than turn matters over to his agents and leave, hoping that the business could be settled in his favor. Financially and politically these

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[29] *C.S.P. Ireland, 1615–1625,* nos. 342, 377, 447, pp. 152, 170, 202.
[30] Harl. MS. 3292, fo. 19^{b}, B.L.
[31] *C.S.P. Ireland, 1615–1625,* no. 1055, p. 426.
[32] Jean Beaulieu to J. Woodford, 14 November 1621, London; Eg. MS. 2594, fos. 175^{a}–176^{a}, B.L.
[33] SP 63/247, fo. 319^{b}, P.R.O.; and ibid., fo. 55^{a}.
[34] Carlisle to De Renzi, 22 April 1628; SP 46/91, fo. 68^{a}, P.R.O.; and ibid., fo. 66^{a}.
[35] *C.S.P.D., 1628–1629,* no. 36, p. 391.
[36] De Renzi to Carlisle, 22 April 1628, Dublin; SP 63/246, fo. 111^{a-b}, P.R.O.

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next six months represented the depths of Carlisle's career. With Buckingham eyeing him suspiciously, the imposts fallen to an all time low because of the wars, the licenses now apparently forfeited, and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, his patent for the West Indies threatened by a rival claimant, the fact that the earl survived as a major political figure borders on the miraculous.

At least with respect to wine licenses, by the end of July matters showed signs of improvement. At that point Conway wrote to Falkland indicating that, as quietly as possible, Carlisle's rights to the monopoly should be protected. The basis for this action was that it would be unjust to take any permanent action while the earl was abroad on the king's service.[37] By September it became obvious to those concerned that Charles was on the verge of taking back his royal word. Pressure was applied once again to Falkland by Ireland's opponents of the monopoly, but to no avail. The Lord Deputy was intelligent enough to see that his master increasingly was willing to uphold the monopoly, and he wrote a letter to the court proclaiming what a sound policy that action was.[38] A month later virtually all the paid-up license-holders petitioned Falkland to support the current system on the grounds that it would be unfair to those who had fulfilled their obligations if the monopoly was suddenly suppressed.[39] In November 1628 Charles completed his reversal and confirmed Carlisle in his patent.[40] With such behavior the wonder of Charles's reign was that it took nearly fifteen years for serious trouble to occur.

From such a massive struggle, one would presume that the yearly sums of money involved ran well into the thousands of pounds. That was not the case. From the time he obtained the grant until the late 1620s he had taken in approximately £4,000 and presently about £230 per year. Carlisle still shared the monopoly with Smith, but in 1631, when the original patent expired, he looked forward to receiving a larger share.[41] Yet even though the actions of the king had been reversed, they had obviously taken their toll. As late as January 1631, there was still £250 outstanding on the wine licenses.[42]

De Renzi kept careful tract of the licenses from the time he was appointed in 1628 until his death during the summer of 1634. From his records it is clear that it was the English and Anglo-Irish residents who paid for the vast majority of the licenses. Names such as Southwell, Blake, Hackett and Clotworthy far outnumber the occasional McGlanchie.[43] That is undoubtedly why so much political pressure was brought to bear in order

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[37] Conway to Falkland, 21 July 1628, Whitehall; SP 63/247, fo. 55[a], P.R.O.

[38] Falkland to Charles, 8 September 1628, Dublin Castle; SP 46/91, fo. 82[a–b], P.R.O.

[39] Smith and De Renzi to Falkland, 5 October 1628; ibid., fos. 86[a]–87[a].

[40] Coke to Carlisle, 19 November 1628, London; SP 92/14, fo. 145[a], P.R.O.; *Calendar of Patent and Close Rolls of . . . Ireland of the Reign of Charles the First,* Membrane 27, pp. 406–08.

[41] D. Lewis to J. Hay, 13 October 1628, Dublin; SP 63/247, fo. 184[a], P.R.O.

[42] De Renzi to Carlisle, 15 January 1631, Dublin; Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 55[a], B.L.

[43] SP 46/91, fo. 107[a], P.R.O.

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to do away with the monopoly. Yet in terms of the sums collected for the earl, there seems to be little cause for complaint. From Easter 1628 to Christmas 1630, all De Renzi could bring in for Carlisle was a little over £260.[44] When the period was extended another year to the summer of 1631, the total did increase substantially to £600 with a further £273 yet owed.[45] Nonetheless in terms of what the wine impost brought, even in its worst days, this total is not particularly impressive.

Given this situation, it is difficult to understand how Carlisle could have let himself get drawn into a court suit involving the profits from the monopoly. Yet as 1634 began, that is exactly what he did, and what is more, the other party to the case was Sir Samuel Smith, his partner in the monopoly. After several delays during the year, in late November the case was finally decided by the English Chancery. Despite the fact that the earl had Edward Littleton, the Recorder of London, as his counsel, he lost the case and had to pay Smith £2,000.[46]

At least the wine imposts had a phase in which they were highly profitable. With the loss of this suit, Carlisle was in a position where he had wiped out what small profit this monopoly had shown. During what brief time remained to him, the wine and *aqua vitae* licenses were essentially in the Smith family rather than his own.

3. *Byrnes Country*

With all the ill-success the earl had in his Irish undertakings, it requires some effort to imagine him becoming further involved in the affairs of that nation. Yet the lure of a steady income was more than he could resist. As a result, he attempted to set up a plantation, that is an estate, in an area just south of Dublin known as Byrnes Country.

The history of this area of County Wicklow reads much like that of America's Oklahoma Territory as it was being taken away from supposedly friendly Indians. In Ireland it was the native gentry who were the victims. (The Irish farmers and peasantry actually working the land were probably victimized regardless of the owner.) In this case the target was Phelim McFeagh O'Byrne, who had run afoul of various members of the Irish government. As events developed, in an effort to get a large part of these lands for himself, the Lord Deputy Falkland stepped over that relatively obscure line of permissible behavior. The result was his recall at the end of 1628.[47] His departure left a free-for-all in its wake.

What happened over the next decade was an attempted landrush in which no one ever quite got together all that was necessary in order to win the admittedly valuable property. Two things were needed to claim the prize, a patent from the crown granting the rights to Byrnes Country

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[44] SP 46/92, fo. 99[a], P.R.O.
[45] Ibid., fo. 125[a].
[46] SP 46/93, fo. 39[a], P.R.O.
[47] H. Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland 1633–41*, 175.

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and proof that the land was indeed royal land held in some tenure directly from the king.[48] Carlisle, having much readier access to the king than his competitors did, obtained a grant in September 1627.[49] As it turned out, the earl had received a hurriedly drawn document that would not do. If Carlisle was going to have a chance to colonize Byrnes Country in the most profitable manner, he needed to have the patent withdrawn and a revised version enrolled. Such an action gave rivals another chance.

Among those rivals, Buckingham could not be discounted. He thwarted the earl's efforts to have the grant resubmitted in its more effective form. He then convinced Carlisle to give up the patent, evidently on the assurance that it would be reissued in some reduced, but unspecified, form.[50] These arrangements were made during the time when the earl was preparing to leave on his 1628 embassy and while the two men were trying to play down their mutual hostilities. Even so Carlisle must have understood he had no guarantee the bargain would be kept.

The men Carlisle left to manage his interests in his absence were not nearly so willing to abandon Byrnes Country. They were some of the earl's chief creditors such as Sir John Townshend, Robert Allsop and Sir James Hay. What they did, either with or without their patron's approval, was fight an effective delaying action hoping that events would work in their favor. With Buckingham's assassination they did. Within a month they had the needed patent for Byrnes Country.[51]

Amazingly their success actually went back to an almost unbelievable series of mistakes and coincidences. According to David Lewis, a highly competent agent of the earl's in Ireland, his master's whole involvement with Byrnes Country was based upon a misunderstanding on Charles's part. Some time before 1626 the earl had acquired the manor and castle of Newcastle in County Wicklow.[52] He bought the property from the Harrington family sight unseen and then discovered that the title was imperfect. In 1627 Carlisle approached the Lord Treasurer, Marlborough, and asked for a confirmation of the patent in proper form. Marlborough, who knew the Irish situation reasonably well, was aware that Newcastle bordered on Byrnes Country. The Lord Treasurer was then in his dotage and must have presumed that Carlisle was asking for Newcastle and Byrnes Country. In any event he presented the expanded grant to Charles who, in the presence of a somewhat bewildered Carlisle, signed the document.[53] Some months later, after Buckingham had freed himself from the aftermath

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[48] *Crisis in Europe 1560–1660,* 298–99; reprint of T. Ranger, "Strafford in Ireland; a Revaluation," *Past and Present,* no. 19 (1961).

[49] September 1627, IND 6747, P.R.O.

[50] R. Allsop to Carlisle, 19 December 1628, Inner Temple; SP 16/122, no. 59, P.R.O.

[51] Ibid., and Townshend, Hay and Allsop to Carlisle, 20 November 1628; SP 16/121, no. 21, P.R.O.

[52] Carlisle to De Renzi, 28 November 1626, Whitehall; SP 49/91, fo. 38[a], P.R.O.

[53] D. Lewis to J. Hay, 18 October 1628, Dublin; SP 63/247, fo. 200[a], P.R.O.; and September 1627; IND 6747, P.R.O.

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of the Ré expedition, he discovered what had happened and moved to block the reissuing of the patent. Exactly how he found out what was afoot is unclear, but had it not been for Buckingham's assassination, Carlisle would most assuredly have lost the grant. With Buckingham out of the way there was no further problem in England, and the final patent was approved in September 1628.[54]

If the earl then thought he was going to begin drawing a profit immediately from this fortunate turn of events, he was quickly brought back to reality. He had yet to prove that the lands for which he had a patent were held from the king. If a consortium of Irish officials had their way, he never would do so. These men, Sir William Parsons, Lord Ranelagh and the Earl of Cork had the evidence the earl sought. It was their intent to exhaust his efforts and then to buy up the patent for a relatively modest sum.[55]

With the recall of Lord Falkland in 1628, Carlisle was not unaware that he lacked allies in the upper reaches of the Irish government. It seems likely that he was involved in the appointment of the Earl of Danby as Falkland's replacement in the spring of 1629. After first serving on the extraordinary peace mission to France that year, Danby was supposed to take up residence in Dublin Castle as Lord Deputy.[56] Having such a friend and ally would have served Carlisle's purposes very well. Unfortunately for the earl, Danby begged off and went to neither France nor Ireland. His refusal left a vacuum of four years' duration at the head of the Irish administration that was not filled until Wentworth's appearance there in the summer of 1633.

During that time the Irish officers opposed to Carlisle's patent used every opportunity to deprive him of it. Their agent in England was none other than the deposed Lord Deputy, Falkland. Yet, as was true of so many contemporaries, the viscount's main concern was to have favors owed him by the winning side. As a result, he not only worked to make Carlisle receptive to the Parsons' proposals,[57] but also to improve the relations between the earl and Adam Loftus, the Lord Chancellor, who was opposed to the Parsons group.[58]

The result of such a situation was an increasingly nasty conflict between the earl and his rivals. They could and did hide the proofs he needed to make the Byrnes Country patent operative; he could and did resort to his own political weapons, and slander was one of them. A man who could walk into the presence of the king at any hour of the day or night and receive a warm welcome was in a position to do a distant rival a great

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[54] September 1629; IND 6747, P.R.O.

[55] T. Ranger, "Strafford" in *Crisis in Europe*, 298–99; J.P. Cooper, "Strafford and the Byrnes' Country," 2–3.

[56] Dorchester to Vane, 26 April 1629; SP 84/139, fo. 114^{b}, P.R.O.

[57] Falkland to Parsons, 28 December 1629; M 2445, p. 24; Irish P.R.O., Dublin.

[58] Falkland to Sir John Veele, 4 July 1630; ibid., p. 94; and *Letters and Papers of the Verney Family*, 154.

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deal of damage. During the summer of 1630, he did just that, by telling detrimental tales about his competitors to the king.[59] All of those in Ireland were only too well aware that they had wider interests in England than obtaining Byrnes Country. Carlisle proved that he was in a position to make nearly everyone of their projects a trial, and he was not in the least averse to doing so.[60]

Deadlock was the outcome of all these maneuvers. The most the earl could procure through Loftus's efforts was the agreement of the natives of Byrnes Country to accept their would-be absentee lord if he granted them their lands.[61] Yet the documents indicating that the lands were held from the king still remained hidden from Carlisle. As late as January 1632 Parsons was writing teasing, taunting letters emphasizing that fact,[62] while Cork went right on pretending he was devoted to his rival's best interests.[63] It was the appointment of Wentworth as Lord Deputy that provided the means for breaking the stalemate.

The selection of the viscount as head of the Irish government took place two years before he actually arrived in Dublin.[64] Even before that time, while Wentworth was Lord President of the North, he and Carlisle had begun to build a working relationship. It was a most unusual blend of talents. While the earl was courtly, oblique, casual and cosmopolitan, the viscount was blunt, self-defensive, harsh and self-consciously provincial. He referred to himself as using the dialect of a "Northern Cracker."[65] Both men were more cautious in their relationship with each other than they cared to let on, and it is doubtful if either man made a move with respect to the other without careful calculation of its effect. Yet overlaying this politic pattern of behavior was the knowledge that there was much of value for both parties in a good relationship. It is not known if Carlisle actively lobbied Charles to make Wentworth Lord Deputy, but based upon their contacts both before and after the appointment, such was most likely the case.

By the time the viscount entered Dublin Castle in the summer of 1633, each man had demonstrated his usefulness to the other. It is important to point out that Carlisle did have his uses. Though Wentworth's close relationship with Laud is well known and though it served him well, at least as long as Portland was alive, the archbishop was not as a rule in close personal contact with the king. Someone such as Carlisle was an absolute necessity for a Lord Deputy of Ireland or a Lord President of the North, for people in such positions could reach the royal ear only through

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[59] Carlisle to [Parsons?], 30 July 1630, St. James Court; Eg. MS. 2597, fos. 49[a]–50[b], B.L.; and Falkland to Parsons, 18 August 1630; M 2445, p. 106, Irish P.R.O., Dublin.
[60] Falkland to Ranelagh, 28 April 1631; M 2445, p. 206, Irish P.R.O., Dublin.
[61] Esmond to Dorchester, 11 September 1631, Lynsicke; SP 63/252, fo. 237[a], P.R.O.
[62] Parsons to Carlisle, 20 January 1632, Dublin; Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 60[a–b], B.L.
[63] Cork to Carlisle, 18 March 1632; Cork MS. 78(4), pp. 440–44, Lismore Papers, Chatsworth.
[64] Falkland to Ranelagh, 5 January 1632; M 2445, p. 243; Irish P.R.O., Dublin.
[65] Wentworth to Carlisle, 20 December 1632, York: Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 108[a], B.L.

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intermediaries.[66] For Wentworth that was especially true since Charles felt both uncomfortable with him and about him. The benefits to Carlisle of this relationship must have been enough to warrant a major sacrifice.

The person offered up as a sacrifice by the earl was his cousin, Sir David Foulis. The conflict between Wentworth, as Lord President, and Foulis, as the representative of the country gentry, is well known.[67] Basically the viscount was upholding prerogative, conciliar government and Sir David was trying to undermine it. Carlisle fell into acting the role of intermediary among the various parties.[68] In the process of performing this part, the earl became quite critical of his cousin's behavior,[69] and did little or nothing to mitigate the penalty of an £8,000 fine and the loss of all offices the king was willing to see imposed. Wentworth was most pleased with that kind of mediation.[70] Coincidently or not most of this action took place as the viscount was settling in as Lord Deputy.

With this background in mind, one can approach their dealings concerning Byrnes Country. Wentworth has been accused of treating Carlisle in a manner scarcely more honest than Parsons and his associates did.[71] That explanation by no means covers the whole story. The earl did ask the Lord Deputy to look into his problem with the disputed property. Once Wentworth did so, he proposed a scheme whereby he and the king would make a handsome profit.[72] It is worth pointing out that it was Charles who was prepared to give Carlisle short-shrift indeed when he heard Wentworth's proposal.[73] It was the Lord Deputy who gently reminded his master that he had obligations to honor when he gave his word.[74]

In no sense did Wentworth rush into anything after his arrival in Ireland. It was not until the end of October 1633, that he wrote Carlisle recommending that he should at least consider Parsons's proposal to buy up the patent, meanwhile a commission would be formed to investigate whether the lands in Byrnes Country were in fact held from the king.[75] Parsons was anything but enthusiastic about such a commission and proposed various expedients to prevent its formation.[76] Nonetheless, by the end of May 1634 Charles issued orders to the Lord Deputy and council to form such a commission.[77] It was probably as a result of the commission's

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[66] J. P. Cooper, "Strafford and Byrnes' Country," 5–6.

[67] C. V. Wedgwood, *Thomas Wentworth . . . A Revaluation,* 108–10.

[68] Carlisle to Wentworth, 16 September 1631(*sic*); Wentworth-Woodhouse MS. XIId/254+1, Sheffield City Library.

[69] Carlisle to Foulis, September 1632; Eg. MS. 2597, fo. 78ª, B.L.

[70] Wentworth to Carlisle, 29 January 1634, Dublin Castle; Wentworth-Woodhouse MS. VIII, p. 70, Sheffield City Library.

[71] T. Ranger, "Strafford" in *Crisis in Europe,* 299–300.

[72] Wentworth to Charles, 7 September 1634, Wentworth-Woodhouse MSS., Letter Book 3, pp. 128–31, Sheffield City Library.

[73] Charles to Wentworth, 23 October 1634, Hampton Court; ibid., 149.

[74] Wentworth to Charles, 15 December 1634, Dublin; ibid., 151.

[75] Wentworth to Carlisle, 30 October 1633, Dublin Castle; ibid., MS. VIII, p. 39.

[76] 29 October 1633; ibid., pp. 53–54.

[77] Charles to Lord Deputy and Irish Privy Council, 29 May 1634; SP 63/254, fos. 285ª–286ª, P.R.O.

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work that in the late summer or early autumn of 1634 Parsons was prompted to admit to Wentworth that he was holding the necessary proofs. At that point he made the unsavory offer of giving the ill-gotten lands to the Lord Deputy in return for future favors.[78]

Not until March, 1635 did Wentworth broach the issue to Carlisle. He then recommended selling the patent for £15,000. At no point in this letter did the Lord Deputy apply any pressure or use any threats, though he did obviously withhold the information that the proofs were available concerning royal title to the land and that he and Charles planned to split the profits.[79] In fact by June 1635 the earl was aware of the plan to make a plantation for the king,[80] and it is doubtful that he found Wentworth's denial of this intent very impressive.[81] What then happened was not a sudden break between these two men as a result of the Lord Deputy's treachery, but rather continued negotiations through intermediaries much as they had done before.[82] The only change was reminiscent of Carlisle's dealings with Buckingham; suddenly enclosed with the earl's own letter to Wentworth in September 1635 was one of compliment from Lucy.[83]

A sympathetic cord was struck with the viscount who replied to the countess's overture with all the courtiership his abrasive personality could muster.[84] For the next three years and more Lucy and Wentworth became the most intimate of friends. She even permitted him to make his residence at an estate in County Wicklow secretly bought in her name.[85] Of more importance she felt it necessary to procure the return of some of her letters to him after his execution.[86] Certainly after Carlisle's death in 1636 there is no reason to believe that she withheld from Wentworth the favors she had granted Buckingham.

As for Byrnes Country, Carlisle got the last laugh, even if it was from the grave. Wentworth was under the impression that before the earl's death, he had signed the lands back to the king. In fact whatever his original intentions might have been, Carlisle gave the property to his trustees to help pay his debts. The manner in which the earl did so was not valid, and the second earl was the true heir to the patent as far as the common law was concerned. In 1637 Wentworth was chagrined to discover that for nearly a year he had been paying money illegally to Lucy and her agent in fulfillment of a contract that did not exist.[87]

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[78] Wentworth-Woodhouse MSS., Letter Book 3, pp. 128–131, Sheffield City Library.
[79] Wentworth to Carlisle, 12 March 1635, Dublin; ibid., MS. VIII, p. 194.
[80] Carlisle to Wentworth, 17 June 1635, Greenwich; ibid., 246.
[81] Wentworth to Carlisle, 11 July 1635, Abbey Boyle; ibid., 246–47.
[82] Carlisle to Wentworth, 7 September 1635; ibid., XVc, no. 210.
[83] Lucy Carlisle to Wentworth, 7 September 1635; ibid., no. 211.
[84] Wentworth to Lucy Carlisle, 14 October 1635, Dublin; ibid., VIII, p. 287.
[85] H. Kearney, *Strafford,* 176; and *H.M.C. Egmont,* 1: 97, 98, 177 and 494.
[86] Lucy Carlisle to Mr. Rayston, 13 October [1641]; Wentworth-Woodhouse MS. XIXb, no. 114, Sheffield City Library.
[87] Wentworth to Lucy Carlisle, 17 April 1637, Dublin; ibid., Xa, pp. 2–3.

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Ireland had proved a most unhappy place for Carlisle. The riddle of how to manage valuable interests there effectively proved insoluble. When he sent out intelligent people to look after his financial affairs, they contrived to cheat him; when he sent out less capable individuals they were cheated. In addition the continental conflicts of the 1620s in which England was involved were bound to have their repercussions for a fortune that was primarily founded upon a commercial base. Carlisle never had the military and naval skills or interests to become a successful war profiteer. The closest he came to pursuing a venture occurred with his involvement with the West Indies, and even here the fates were reluctant to be kind.

C. West Indian Adventures

Early in Carlisle's career he became aware of the possibilities that colonial ventures had to offer, and by 1612 he was a director of the Virginia Company.[1] His attraction to these projects is understandable. Though many of the companies formed to exploit colonies ended in bankruptcy, those that succeeded could be profitable indeed. Yet there were different levels of return. As an individual investor or even director of a joint-stock company, if all went well, one stood to gain a moderate profit. As a proprietor of a colony, one stood to gain a great deal. In the latter case, with little or no risk of personal capital, the owner sold privileges to those who were willing to take the chances. For a long-time monopolist like Carlisle, such a principle was well understood.

Finding an unoccupied, yet potentially profitable, tract of land in the early seventeenth century was, however, not a casually undertaken venture. In the Far East the Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese all were active and jealously guarded their territory. The same countries were scarcely more generous in the Americas where the French were also beginning to take an active interest. The one area that did seem to show promise, however, was the West Indies.

As the first ones on the scene, the Spaniards certainly had taken the most profitable locations: Cuba, Hispaniola and Puerto Rico. The adjacent and even more profitable mainland was also occupied and under their control. The smaller islands forming a crescent at the eastern side of the Caribbean, beginning with Barbados in the southeast and ending with the Virgin Islands in the northwest, were another matter. It was not that these volcanic outcroppings were unknown; Columbus had wandered by most of them on his second voyage in 1493. What is more, the standard route of the Spanish fleets bound for Panama brought them to the southern end of the Lesser Antilles, as these islands were sometimes called.[2] The Spaniards' lack of interest in this area of the Caribbean can be accounted for by the greater attractions of American gold and silver found on the

[1] Theodore Rabb, *Enterprise and Empire*, 311.
[2] Samuel E. Morison, *The European Discovery of America, The Southern Voyages*, 103.

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mainland and some of the larger islands. Without the lure of monetary gain it was difficult to maintain settlements, regardless of their strategic importance and what twentieth century observers would consider the paradisiacal nature of these islands.

As a result of Spanish indifference, by the late sixteenth century vessels from other nations found it possible to make temporary stops in the Lesser Antilles, and they did so with increasing frequency. The English were among those who began to filter into the area. Captain John Smith, an adventurer more closely identified with the Virginia settlement, wrote about a trading voyage to Dominica, Nevis and Guadeloupe during 1606 and 1607.[3] In 1620 he again reported stopping at Guadeloupe and discovering six Frenchmen marooned there.[4] Though trade with the Indians may have been part of the motivation for such cruises, many of these vessels were engaged in much more nefarious activities. Not all Spanish ships carrying valuable commodities traveled in convoy, and a bit of piracy could be quite profitable. In addition the Spanish settlements themselves were short of European goods, and their guardians were not averse to turning a blind eye to some illegal trade, if the price made it worth their while.[5]

Carlisle's involvement in this area began in an indirect way through Captain Thomas Warner. This gentleman was originally from Suffolk and chose a military career. He eventually became a member of James I's bodyguard,[6] where he must have encountered Carlisle and other leading members of the court. Warner, however, was attracted to more strenuous activity and found his way to the Caribbean. While participating in Sir Roger North's 1620 voyage to South America, he discussed the virtues of the Island of St. Christopher as the site of a habitable settlement.[7] The other party to the discussion was one Captain Thomas Peyton, a veteran of Raleigh's ill-fated Guiana expedition, and thus a man who was familiar with the islands.[8] Warner went off to investigate largely on his own, and by 1623 had succeeded in interesting several merchant-financiers in sponsoring his venture. In November 1623 he once again left for the West Indies with about nineteen other settlers. When he arrived on St. Kitts (as St. Christopher's is usually called), he discovered three cast-away Frenchmen in addition to an Indian village.[9] None of these circumstances discouraged him from establishing what became a permanent English settlement. The question is, at what point did Carlisle become involved in this process?

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[3] *The Travels and Works of Captain John Smith,* 1: 909; 2: 90.
[4] Ibid., 2: 544.
[5] J. H. Parry, *The Spanish Seaborn Empire,* 257–59.
[6] N. Darnell Davis, *Cavaliers and Roundheads of Barbados,* 18.
[7] Ibid., 18–19.
[8] *H.M.C. 5th Report, Griffith MSS,* no. 801, p. 409.
[9] Rawlinson MS. C 94, fo. 7^{b}, Bodleian.

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No certain answer is possible. A variety of authors have pointed out that Carlisle and the Earl of Marlborough both maintained that James had granted them rights in the Caribbean. It was at least 1627 before Marlborough was bought off,[10] but how long their rivalry lasted is an open question. Nonetheless, there is at least some grounds for believing that Carlisle had an interest in the project before Warner left on the 1623 voyage.

In the first instance there is the impression of contemporaries. In 1629 the French ambassador, Monsieur Châteauneuf, was informed that the earl had been granted the islands by King James,[11] but he failed to mention a specific date in his dispatch. There is little chance, whenever the rights were granted, that Carlisle could have been actively involved before 1623, the year Warner left with the permanent settlers. It is unlikely that they could have worked out something during 1624 and 1625 because of the French marriage negotiations. Therefore it is most likely that the earl and the captain came to some arrangement before Warner left with the settlers on the colonizing voyage.

The other evidence concerning Carlisle's involvement is connected with the personnel involved with the venture. Some of the leading backers of the St. Kitts expedition appear to have had earlier connections with the earl. The most prominent were Captains Charles and John Jeafferson.[12] A member of the Jeafferson family had served as box- or chest-maker for the crown during James's reign and thus came under the jurisdiction of the wardrobe while Carlisle directed its administration.[13] It is, of course, impossible to tell if the John Jeafferson listed in the wardrobe records is the same man who called himself a captain and backed the St. Kitts plantation, and about all that one can say is that, if this is a coincidence, it is not the only one. The families of Thompson,[14] Weaver,[15] and of Warner itself[16] all appear in wardrobe records as suppliers as well as on the lists of St. Kitts settlers. If one goes to a slightly later period, the name of Thomas Horne appears. Someone with the same name was a groom in the robes for Carlisle.[17]

One should keep in mind that the pattern of West Indian development was for a family to purchase a tract of land and send out an agent to work the property. Not infrequently that person was a member of the family. Unfortunately, as the people involved are relatively obscure, there

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[10] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623–1667*, xx–xxi; B. Edwards, *The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies*, 1: 318–20.

[11] Châteauneuf to Richelieu, 10 September 1629 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/66, fo. 151[a], P.R.O.

[12] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing*, xvi; and J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands under the Proprietary Patents*, 28.

[13] AO 3/1117, fos. 55[a] & 144[a], P.R.O.

[14] Ibid., fos. 13[a], 109[b].

[15] Ibid., fos. 75[b], 177[b] and 251[b].

[16] Ibid., fos. 75[a], 251[a].

[17] Ibid., fo. 36[b] and Trinity College Dublin MS. 736, [no foliation], Dublin.

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is no way to verify that those concerned with the robes and wardrobe were the same as the St. Kitts settlers. Even so, it is a situation that should not pass unnoticed.

Another figure tied Carlisle to the St. Kitts settlement, Colonel Marmaduke Royden. He was a well known London financier and creditor of the earl's who was much involved with the colony on Barbados. The reason for his involvement and that of several other merchants was in order to permit Carlisle to pay off his debts to them.[18] What has so far gone unnoted is the colonel's role in the early development of St. Kitts. West Indian settlers had a penchant for going to the islands on vessels named after their sponsors. It is therefore significant that the ship that carried Warner and his colonists to St. Kitts in 1623 was called the *Marmaduke*.[19] It would be strange if Royden's involvement did not mean the earl's as well.

Another factor worth consideration is the mode of Carlisle's operations at this time. As noted earlier, the close call with the 1621 Parliament on the patent for concealments had made the earl more than a little shy of associating his name with projects that might be taken away from him. That was especially true since in 1623 he was once again trying to become involved with another patent for concealed lands. At a slightly later date Carlisle became a silent partner in the Wapping reclamation patent. He may well have adopted the same approach with the Caribbean Isles and planned to reveal his connection only when circumstances made it necessary to do so.

The necessity arose when competitors appeared on the scene who could not be bought off. The people involved were Sir William Courteen, the principal financial backer, and the Earl of Montgomery, the aristocratic patron. In 1625 a captain in the service of Courteen, John Powell the elder, stopped at the settlement Warner had established on St. Kitts, and while there he undoubtedly revealed his plan to claim Barbados for his patron. Powell had just explored this uninhabited island that lay east and south of the main island group of the Lesser Antilles.[20] The following year he returned with settlers who were working for Courteen and were not permitted to own their own plantations. Despite the different styles of running the colonies, there were now two rival English establishments in the West Indies, each at opposite ends of the archipelago, each with the potential for expansion. At least from Carlisle's perspective that arrangement was totally unacceptable, and open warfare was the result. It was Carlisle who was the victor.

The battles of this war were fought on two fronts, in the royal courts and on Barbados. Though there were times when that outcome was anything but certain, in both arenas the earl whipped his rivals. What is more,

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[18] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing*, 31 citing Rawlinson MS. C 94, p. 28, Bodleian.

[19] J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 22.

[20] V. T. Harlow, *A History of Barbados, 1625–1685*, 3; and J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 33–34.

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as was true of virtually everything else the earl touched in this period, Buckingham may have been waiting in the wings to claim the prize regardless of the winner's identity.[21]

It was July 1627 before Carlisle formally registered his patent for the Caribbean Isles,[22] though the month before one of the captains of a ship transporting goods to St. Kitts described the earl as "chiefe Governer of those West India Ilands."[23] In all likelihood Carlisle had been reluctant to move openly until he had disposed of Marlborough's claim.[24] As events developed, Carlisle beat his other rivals to the great seal by some nine months, though he was uneasy enough about their efforts to have his own grant reregistered in April 1628, just before he left on his final embassy to the continent.[25]

Simply reestablishing the patent rights was not enough. The Courteen group was in physical control of Barbados, and that situation was intolerable to Carlisle. So, as he left for the continent, he placed Captain Charles Wolverstone in charge of the expedition that was designed to take over the management of the island. The Wolverstone family had several connections with Carlisle. They owned land in Byrnes Country, and one of their number had acted as an agent for Carlisle at the wardrobe and continued to do so for various Irish projects.[26]

Captain Charles proved a cunning soldier; by keeping the intent of his mission a secret, he contrived to land his eighty men on Barbados without opposition from Courteen's governor, John Powell, junior. Once Wolverstone discovered how matters stood, he produced documents recognizing him as governor, and he prepared, if necessary, to do battle with Powell. After an initial flurry, the Courteen group gave up without serious difficulty, and by September 1628 Barbados was under Carlisle's control. Perhaps if Courteen had granted plantations to his colonists, they might have been more enthusiastic defenders of his and their interests, but as simple wage earners, they had little interest in a fight.

As had been the case with his Irish holdings, the earl was disinclined to place his trust in any one man. As insurance he had arranged for, or at least agreed to have sent, another expedition. It set out in September 1628 under the direction of George Mole and Godfrey Havercamp.[27] If Wolverstone had failed to overpower the Courteen group, the second undertaking might have been more effective. If, on the other hand, Wol-

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[21] M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 2: 376, note 2.
[22] *C.S.P., Colonial, 1574–1660*, nos. 29–30, pp. 85–86.
[23] Thomas Combe to Buckingham, 21 June 1627, Southampton; CO 1/4, fo. 69[a], P.R.O.
[24] J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 39.
[25] Ibid., 46.
[26] Ibid., 49; Eg. MS. 2592, fo. 130[a–b], B.L. and *C.S.P., Ireland, 1625–1632*, no. 1138, p. 380.
[27] J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 52–53.

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verstone had any thoughts of setting up on his own, the second expedition could act as a hedge against such ambition.

Since Carlisle was in the Dutch Republic at the time, the one thing he could not do was prevent Courteen and Montgomery from launching a counter-strike against Barbados. Strangely enough, while all of these warlike preparations were in progress, as noted earlier, Montgomery's brother, Pembroke, was writing letters to Carlisle urging him to hurry home. In the final analysis, the speed with which the earl traveled made little difference. Thanks to surprise and superior force, the new invasion succeeded, and by February 1629 Wolverstone was imprisoned and the island was once more under Courteen's control.[28]

Presumably when Carlisle returned to England in January 1629, he became aware of his rivals' efforts to retake their lost possessions. Having two conflicting patents on the rolls was just not going to work; the differences required a final arbitration or the expeditions would exhaust both sides. With parliament no longer demanding the attention of the court, a hearing was scheduled before the Lord Keeper, Coventry, to settle the Barbados question. It was not until the end of April that he rendered the decision, and it went in Carlisle's favor.[29] There is no way of knowing if Coventry made an independent judgment or simply acted as the legal figleaf to cover Charles's arbitrary will. Carlisle was Charles's creditor for a very great sum of money,[30] and this ruling may have been partial payment of the royal debt. In addition at that time, as mentioned earlier, the earl had a close personal relationship with the king, reinforced by Lucy's influence over the queen. Montgomery had nothing comparable on either score.

However intense this struggle was in the West Indies, as the Pembroke letters indicate, it was carried on with a distinct lack of personal animosity among the courtiers involved. Later in 1629, after the judgment was lost, Montgomery and Pembroke had no compunctions about accepting Carlisle's aid in attaining the posts of Lord Steward and Lord High Admiral, respectively. Courteen, as the loss of his colony led to bankruptcy, was not nearly so polite about the matter, but there was nothing more he could do. The legal theft of Barbados was an established fact.

The actual theft had to wait until August 1629. The man chosen for the job was Henry Hawley. Of all the cunning, crafty servants Carlisle employed, Hawley must be classed in the first rank. His family was active in colonial matters with his brother, Gabriel, acting as surveyor for Virginia and another brother, Jerome, serving as treasurer and councillor for the same colony.[31] They were all sons of James Hawley whose estate was

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[28] Ibid., 54.
[29] Ibid., 58–59.
[30] January 1630; IND 6747, P.R.O.
[31] *C.S.P., Colonial, 1574–1660,* 529; and Darnell Davis MSS., Box 1, no. 12, Royal Commonwealth Society, London.

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located in Brentford, Middlesex,[32] not far from Carlisle's rented manor at Hanworth.[33] At the time Henry set out to reconquer Barbados, he already owned land on St. Kitts.[34]

Hawley accomplished his task with amazing ease. Though the Powells, who still governed the island, were suspicious enough not to let Hawley land his men, they were foolish enough to accept a breakfast invitation on board the good ship, *Carlisle.* One would have thought the name of the vessel alone would have caused them to stay on shore. Upon sitting down to dine, they were read a letter authorizing Hawley to take control of Barbados. To emphasize the point a group of musketeers under the command of Captain Ramsey (perhaps a relative of the man with Doncaster's regiment in Germany) leveled their weapons in the direction of the Powells. After they made a futile attempt at resistance and escape, Hawley took his prisoners and chained them to the mainmast. Robert Wheatly, one of the original merchant-investors in the Barbados venture, remained on the island to act as deputy until the new governor, Sir William Tufton, arrived.[35] Hawley and his shock troops (with the prisoners still chained to the mainmast), sailed on to Nevis, a small island south of St. Kitts, recently planted by some of Warner's settlers. Henry's cunning was required here as well.

The early history of St. Kitts and its sister island, Nevis, reads like a page from the Book of Job. Not only was the first settlement struck by a hurricane, but it had to face hostile Carib Indians, and the French also decided to settle on St. Kitts. On top of all these difficulties, the settlers were prone to violent conflict among themselves, and they did not stop short of attempted murder. It was the aftermath of one of these murderous disagreements that brought Hawley to Nevis.

It all went back to the original terms of settlement. Carlisle's method of colonizing his West Indian holdings was based upon the same pattern he used with his monopolies. Various merchants were given the privilege of making investments that would yield them and the earl a profit. It was to Carlisle's advantage to attract as many different individual investors or groups of investors as he could, and then to keep them in separate and competing cartels. That way no one group could become strong enough to wrest the ultimate control from him. Even Colonel Royden eventually centered his interest on Barbados. In 1628, having established the St. Kitts and Barbados settlements, Carlisle gave his auditor, Mr. Thomas Littleton,[36] the right to Nevis. He in turn called on a man named Anthony Hilton from Durham to establish the actual settlement. Hilton seemed a sound choice as he already owned land on St. Kitts and had various schemes for marketing tobacco in Ireland.

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[32] N. Darnell Davis, *Cavaliers and Roundheads,* 57 note.
[33] R. C. Bald, *John Donne,* 432.
[34] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing,* 28.
[35] N. Darnell Davis, *Cavaliers and Roundheads,* 47–48.
[36] *H.M.C. 4th Report, House of Lords MSS,* 96.

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All of these events seemed normal enough, but Hilton had the misfortune to offend Mr. Asten of St. Kitts, a close friend of Edward Warner, the governor's son. Asten himself may have been related to Hugh Asten (or Aston) who had been a groom with the robes during Carlisle's administration.[37] These connections gave credibility to Asten's letters to Carlisle damning Hilton. They may have also given the gentleman thus well favored the impression that he could literally get away with murder because he sponsored an unsuccessful attempt against his rival. While all this confusion was in progress, Hawley was on his way to Nevis with George Hay, the earl's cousin and Hilton's replacement as governor. Hilton was forewarned by informants on Barbados of what to expect from Hawley. That was enough for Hilton, who boarded a merchantman in Nevis harbor and returned to England to right himself with the earl.

Once again upon arrival, Hawley was told that neither he nor his would-be governor would be permitted to land, and also in a repeat of the Barbados situation, the deputy governor of Nevis accepted a social invitation to board the *Carlisle* and "to be merry." Before Captain Ramsey and his men could perform their accustomed function, a large Spanish fleet appeared off the coast under the command of Don Frederico de Toledo. It was their intent to clear Nevis and St. Kitts of all non-Spaniards.[38]

Don Frederico's squadron was actually the second such warlike fleet to appear in the area during August and September 1629. The first was a French squadron under the command of Monsieur de Cussac. He had come supposedly to protect the French on St. Kitts from Spanish attack, but more likely to teach the English a lesson about violating the boundary lines established on the island in 1627 separating the two nations.[39]

Both French and Spanish hostility against Carlisle and his settlement were well founded. During the period when the islands were beginning to attract settlers, England was engaged in its double conflict with the two countries. The earl was not one to let the financial opportunities of this condition slip by. Virtually every vessel he sent to the West Indies during this time had a privateering license.[40] Thomas Warner may have even gone so far as to attack Spanish-held Trinidad,[41] presumably on his patron's behalf. In these circumstances it is no wonder that the Spaniards viewed St. Kitts as a spawning ground for pirates and chose to remove their habitat.

Whereas Monsieur de Cussac and his small squadron had simply appeared, chastised the English for violating French territory and left, the Spaniards made an attempt to end the settlement. Houses were burned, settlers transported, first to Cuba and then to England. Hostages, including

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[37] AO 3/1117, fo. 153[b].
[38] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing*, 6–10.
[39] R. P. du Tertre, *Histoire Générale des Antilles Habités par les François*, 1: 25–27.
[40] *C.S.P.D., 1628–1629*, 298, 299, 307.
[41] J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 31.

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Henry Hawley and John Donne's son, George, were also sent back to Spain, where the latter (but not the former) would spend several years.[42]

Word reached England of these events in a rather garbled fashion. Initially Carlisle received two contradictory reports about what the French had done, neither of which was accurate. At first it was believed that Cussac had been responsible for the massacre of the 4,000 English settlers on St. Kitts. As the French ambassador, Châteauneuf, acknowledged in his dispatches, this news brought Carlisle's drift toward a pro-French outlook to an abrupt halt.[43] Shortly thereafter, based upon information probably obtained about the period before Cussac arrived, the earl began to spread the word that his settlers had won a great land battle against the French.[44] It was mid-November before the English refugees from St. Kitts arrived in England with the real story, and then it was the Spaniards' chance to be embarrassed.

By September the Spanish agent, Rubens, had a reasonably accurate picture of the Cussac raid on St. Kitts and reported the information to his superiors. He also mentioned that Carlisle took the attack as a personal affront offered to him by Richelieu.[45] When the story of the Spanish raid became known in November, Rubens realized he had a major problem on his hands. He was reduced to asking Carlisle not to hold it against the Spanish if they took back from the French what they had stolen from the English.[46] The earl's basic belief in the inherent treachery of both the French and Spanish thus received very personal confirmation and was no doubt one of the reasons why his desire to forward an alliance with either country was much reduced in 1630.

Though the situation at Nevis and St. Kitts was serious, once Carlisle took stock of just what had happened, he realized that there was no need to give up the settlement there or on any other islands in the area. The Spaniards had not left any of their number on either St. Kitts or Nevis, and indeed they were much more concerned with Dutch incursions into South America than with the English settlements in the Antilles.[47] It also turned out that St. Kitts and Nevis had not been swept clean of English settlers. Upon sight of the Spanish fleet, a large number of the English had literally taken to the hills. The Spaniards, if they knew of these escapees, were apparently unwilling to follow them into the still wild volcanic region at the center of the islands. Thus when the newly knighted Sir Thomas Warner, who had providentially been in England during these troubles, returned with more supplies and settlers in 1630, he had an effective base

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[42] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing*, 12–13; and V. T. Harlow, *Barbados*, 13.

[43] Châteauneuf to Richelieu, 24 September 1629 (N.S.), London; PRO 31/3/66, fo. 160[a–b], P.R.O.

[44] 18 November 1621 (N.S.); ibid., fo. 193[b].

[45] Rubens to Olivares, 21 September 1629 (N.S.), London; R. S. Magurn, *Rubens*, 341.

[46] Rubens to Isabella, 23 November 1629 (N.S.), London; ibid., 350–51.

[47] Cottington to Dorchester, 21 March 1630, Madrid; SP 94/34, fo. 202[a], P.R.O.; and Cottington to Porter, 5 May 1630; ibid., fo. 221[a].

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from which to build.[48] He did so well that by the end of the year Carlisle was collecting revenues from these islands and continued to do so for the rest of his life. The connection with Warner proved one of the most profitable associations the earl ever made.

The situation on Barbados was not nearly so straightforward. Carlisle's choice for governor in 1629, as mentioned earlier, was Sir William Tufton. He was the brother of Nicholas, Earl of Thanet[49] and most likely was recommended to Carlisle by his first father-in-law, the Earl of Norwich.[50] There was nothing passive about the new governor. Soon after his arrival on Barbados, he began confirming the existing land grants and making new ones. He also divided the island into six parishes, founded vestries, built churches and even arranged for payment of the ministers chosen by the vestries. Although this latter practice might have raised a few eyebrows back home, by and large the new governor was doing his best to make Barbados resemble England as much as possible. Unfortunately in the pursuit of this goal Tufton began interfering with the relationship between the plantation owners and their bond slaves.[51]

It is a commonplace that the West Indian settlements were founded upon a slave base. Virtually one of the first acts of the Carlisle-sponsored group on Barbados was to enslave the Arawcoe Indians brought over from the mainland by the Powells to teach them the agricultural skills of the area.[52] Not that the Courteen group was any more delicate about using slaves, but they needed the cooperation of this particular group too much to enslave them. As West Indian society began to develop, the treatment of the slaves was progressively more brutal, regardless of the race of the individuals involved. Until 1636 by far the bulk of the slave population was made up of English bondslaves, people who had sold themselves into slavery for a stated period of time. Presumably upon receiving their freedom, they hoped to remain in the colony and acquire land of their own. What they had not realized when making this arrangement was just how harsh their treatment would be. The degree of their suffering is indicated by their reaction when the Spanish fleet appeared at Nevis, for the bondsmen swam to the ships in hopes of gaining their freedom. What is more, they freely and willingly gave away the English military situation on the island.[53]

Under such circumstances Tufton's desire to mitigate the lot of the bond slaves is understandable, even if it was only meant as a hedge against rebellion. Yet to the planters, the governor had entered into dangerous ground, for he was threatening to take the slaves away from those who

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[48] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing*, 14.
[49] G. E. C., *The Complete Peerage*, 12, part 1: 690–91.
[50] CO/1/5, fo. 221[a], P.R.O.
[51] J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 89–90.
[52] Sloane MS. 3662, no foliation, B.L.
[53] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing*, 10.

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ill-treated them and to grant them to more benevolent masters.[54] Such a move would have made the plantations involved worthless, especially since the colony had virtually no draft animals to replace the lost manual labor.[55] The result of the governor's move was a letterwriting campaign to England and an attempted rebellion on the island. It is worth noting that one of the leaders of the movement against the Tufton regime was Richard Pierce, Henry Hawley's brother-in-law. It is certainly no coincidence that Carlisle chose Hawley, who had contrived to escape from Spain, to oust Tufton.[56]

Why the earl chose to act at all against his appointed governor is not obvious from this simple story. Tufton was in control of the island and capable of remaining in such a position for the foreseeable future. Carlisle, so far as is known, had no special place in his heart for sadistic slave owners. The piece of information missing from the puzzle is that without warrant, the governor had taken over Carlisle's personal plantation on Barbados and appropriated it for his own use.[57] The earl would never have forgiven such an action, nor would Tufton's patrons, the earls of Norwich and Thanet who approved Hawley's ouster mission without it.

The earl sent over two commissions with his new governor. The first document called for free election of the governor. If that ploy failed to produce the desired results, the second paper authorized Hawley to become governor. In the event, having lost the election, Hawley had to use the reserve commission.

Tufton recognized when he was faced with superior force and left office peacefully, devoting himself to his plantation. He must have been relieved that he was not made a prisoner and shipped back to England. His sense of relief was premature, however. His popularity with many of the planters bothered Hawley, who saw the potential for an incipient rebellion centered around his predecessor. Displaying the ruthlessness for which by now he was infamous, Hawley contrived to provoke Tufton and his friends into a protest when supplies were withheld. The governor chose to characterize their protest as a rebellion and had Sir William shot.[58] Hawley's control of Barbados was never seriously questioned again during Carlisle's lifetime.

To civilized men the behavior of Hawley and the other planters must have appeared barbaric. Unquestionably this era was a violent one in the West Indies. Many of the planters who actually worked the land were n'er-do-wells of one sort or another. Henry Winthrop, the younger son of the governor of the Massachusetts Bay colony, is a mild example. There was an adventurous, happy-go-lucky air about this young man who originally signed on with the Courteen group for Barbados after leaving sub-

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[54] V. T. Harlow, *Barbados*, 14.
[55] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing*, 74–75.
[56] J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 90.
[57] Darnell Davis MSS., Box 1, no. 2, Royal Commonwealth Society, London.
[58] CO 1/5, fos. 220ª–222ª, P.R.O.

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stantial, unpaid debts in England. After the first Carlisle-sponsored invasion, Winthrop cheerfully shifted alliances and became a member of Wolverstone's new council.[59] He was among the tamer inhabitants of the Antilles. A variety of observers commented upon the pervasive drunkenness in the West Indies. Indeed the situation was so bad that someone passed out in a drunken stupor on the beach ran the danger of being devoured by the numerous scavenging landcrabs that occupied the area.[60] It is even likely that Hawley maintained his dominance on Barbados in part because he held his liquor better or drank less than his fellow planters.[61] In such an atmosphere perhaps the wonder is that the violence and the brutality were only periodic occurrences.

For the settlers living in the West Indies, whose numbers were well into the thousands by the time Carlisle died in 1636, the aspect of their lives that troubled them most was not the lack of civilization, but the taxation that Carlisle's government imposed upon them. A decade later, when the citizens of the area were attempting to free themselves from all proprietorial control, they filed a series of depositions indicating how harsh and unjust Carlisle's regime had been.[62]

Though some projects, such as the Providence Island Company, were beyond his reach, unquestionably the earl had extensive power over the islands. His grant was modeled on the rights of the bishop of the county-palatine of Durham.[63] In practice this situation meant that Carlisle could do just about anything, subject only to appeals to the privy council. In fact no appeal was made during Carlisle's lifetime, at least none that ever received a formal hearing. What is more, he was most careful not to offend Charles's or Laud's political or religious sensibilities, so they largely left him to his own devices. Since Laud eventually became the chairman of the privy council committee dealing with trade and plantations, his goodwill was particularly important.[64] Carlisle was thus the king of the Caribbees, yet it took him some time to make the most of that position.

After experimenting with several methods of tax collection in England and Ireland as well as in the West Indies, in 1634 the earl began charging a poll tax of twenty pounds in weight of either tobacco or cotton for every man and woman (and perhaps child). All the planters had to bring their produce to one central point where the tax was collected before shipment was made.[65] The cries of outrage that resulted from this system had more to do with its efficiency than anything else, and its use needs to be placed in the context of the time.

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[59] H. Darnell Davis, *Cavaliers and Roundheads*, 31; and J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 52 note.

[60] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing*, 44; du Tertre, *Histoire*, 1: 24; and J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 93 note.

[61] V. T. Harlow, *Colonizing*, 66.

[62] Trinity College Dublin MS. 736, Trinity College.

[63] J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 40–41.

[64] Ibid., 101.

[65] Trinity College Dublin MS. 736, Trinity College.

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In the initial stages it appears that Carlisle planned to make his profits from the customs revenues.[66] His problem was that collecting these revenues was a major and very uncertain undertaking. Despite the fact that English ships trading with the West Indies had to post bond guaranteeing the payment of duties, it was all too tempting to unload the taxable items on the continent before returning to England. The English naval vessels patrolling the Channel did what they could to prevent such practices,[67] but their efforts fell a great deal short of an effective blockade and many ships slipped through. In addition the Dutch and Hanse merchantmen regularly stopped in the islands. Since virtually every plantation had its own wharf, it was impossible to monitor all the business that was transacted. Customs revenues thus became too uncertain a proposition, and other methods were sought.

Another possibility was to charge large sums for the land itself, either in the form of entry fines or as the actual rent. For a distant colony where in the first instance colonists were taking the land sight unseen, such a procedure would have discouraged settlement. In fact the exact opposite approach was taken. As late as 1634 the earl was leasing one hundred acres on Barbados for fifty-one years with only a five shilling entry fine. The only proviso was that all duties and taxes had to be paid.[68]

Despite all of these factors, it is legitimate to question how heavy a burden such a tax would be on the inhabitants. With tobacco selling for between one and three shillings per pound, a 20 lbs. tax meant roughly a £1 to £3 impost each year for each adult on the plantation. In the tobacco culture of North America it was generally accepted that each acre would produce about 1,000 lbs. of tobacco per year.[69] It was also generally accepted that one person could farm ten acres of West Indian land. Whether one presumes that the tax was on freemen as opposed to bond slaves, or not, it represents a modest percentage of the potential harvest. Yet it was a novel and inflation-proof tax, and therein lay the major problem. The regularity of its collection in an age of relatively easy tax avoidance could not have added to the popularity. What is more, Carlisle was not the only one collecting taxes. The governor, the clergy and the militia all required support from the local populace.[70] Yet as long as the economy of the islands continued to expand, Carlisle had no difficulty attracting settlers or maintaining control over the West Indies.

Estimates of how much the earl actually collected from all his various sources of income on the islands vary considerably. Only three islands were producing during his lifetime: Barbados, Nevis and St. Kitts. Antigua and Montserrate were just in the process of becoming established colonies

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[66] J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 70.
[67] *H.M.C. 10th Report*, Appendix 4, Muncaster MSS., 284, 285.
[68] Northumberland Papers, Syon House, Microfilm M/356, Y-11-13, B.L.
[69] L. C. Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860*, 1: 218.
[70] J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands*, 83–87.

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when Carlisle died in 1636. Even so, one estimate of the customs income alone is £9,000 per year.[71] It is conceivable that by 1635 that is a reasonable estimate, but until the shipping was done from one central facility, much of the tobacco and other produce must have been smuggled out untaxed. In addition the Spanish ravaging of St. Kitts and Nevis in 1629 and the so-called "Starving Time" on Barbados in 1630 seriously cut into the earl's income during these early years. Looking at just the poll tax, as late as 1636 roughly 10,500 lbs. of tobacco or cotton were taken in at Bridgetown, Barbados for the proprietor when there were grounds to expect as much as four times that amount. Even here, 2,100 lbs. of that amount was for back taxes.[72] Depending on the price at that time, the net worth of these taxes was somewhere between £525 and £1,500, hardly a princely sum by the earl's standards.

Taking all of these factors into account, a reasonable guess as to Carlisle's net profits in 1630 is in the neighborhood of £4,000, and by his death that figure may have been as high as £11,000 or £12,000, when one takes into account all sources of income.

It had been a terrible struggle to obtain and hold the West Indies and all its profits, but by 1636 the earl had attained that goal. The irony was that it was not until the year of his death that these islands became Carlisle's one possession that did not have either a fixed or a declining income. The balance of his financial affairs was so delicate that his physical presence was needed to achieve the maximum benefit. Neither Carlisle's trustees nor his son was able to reap the golden harvest he had finally cultivated.

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[71] Ibid., 84.

[72] J. H. Bennett, "Peter Hay, Proprietary Agent in Barbados, 1636–1641," 5 (1965): 13–14.

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V. EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION

Carlisle's death made no discernible difference in the politics of Charles's court. Laud reports that, shortly before dying, the earl warned the king about potential trouble in Scotland,[1] but clearly to no avail. One can imagine how effective he would have been as an intermediary between the rebels and the royal government once the trouble started. In any case he couldn't have done a worse job than the young and inexperienced Marquis of Hamilton. It is a task he would not have relished, yet it is a shame Carlisle did not survive a decade longer. It would have been intriguing to see if his diplomatic skills could have changed the course of the Civil Wars.

Carlisle's death did not remove the problems of his immediate family. The second earl had to face his father's angry creditors, and he had to do so with most of the estate, especially the West Indian portion, in the hands of trustees.[2] Within five years of Carlisle's death the new earl did manage to take control of the Caribbee Isles, but his problems were far from over. By that time the Long Parliament was in session, and the creditors appealed to the Commons for redress of the £11,000 still owed them.[3] Perhaps their use of parliament was one of the reasons why the second earl raised soldiers and fought for the king in the Civil Wars. Actually, his decision did no more than delay the inevitable because ultimately the creditors had their claims honored by the chancery remaining under parliamentary control in London. It was around this time that the second earl withdrew his services from the king and made his peace with the parliamentarians. At last he had to mortgage the West Indian islands to Lord Willoughby of Parham in order to pay the debts. By the time the younger Carlisle died in 1661, the only thing left of the first earl's estates were the dower lands in Yorkshire; everything else was gone. It was the Earl of Norwich's estates around Waltham, Essex that provided the second earl with the means of maintaining his aristocratic lifestyle.[4]

Since there was no third earl and Lady Ann Hay disappeared and presumably died around 1630, the only member of the family left to consider is Lucy. In some ways the death of her husband marked the beginning of her career. She never married again but rather used the freedom of her widowhood to pursue political interests. Her close asso-

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[1] *The Works of Archbishop Laud,* 299.
[2] C2/Charles I/C106/60, P.R.O.
[3] C3/408/45, P.R.O.
[4] PROB11/306, fos. 106ª–110ª, P.R.O.

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ciation with Wentworth has been noted already. She utilized this contact in order to advance the fortunes of her brother-in-law, the Earl of Leicester. This mild-mannered aristocrat was in the embarrassing position of having his career planned for him by both his wife and sister-in-law, neither of whom could be described as withdrawn personalities. Their ardent pursuit of office and power may have been responsible for the often-repeated story that, after Wentworth's execution, the Countess of Carlisle became associated with John Pym reputedly in much the same way as she had been with the former Lord Deputy and the late Duke of Buckingham. What is more, she was reportedly the one (or at least one of the ones) who gave warning to Pym and the other Five Members that Charles was coming to arrest them.

For the next twenty years Lucy surfaced periodically on the political scene. She helped raise money for the losing side during the second Civil War, and in 1649 Cromwell had her imprisoned in the Tower for trouble-making. Shortly thereafter she emerged to look after the royal children who had not managed to flee to the continent. She survived until 1660 and died at age sixty-one not long after Charles II's restoration. Regardless of the chances she took, she had learned the knack of survival. In many ways Lucy's best teacher was her husband.

In order to evaluate Carlisle's (or Lucy's) effect on contemporary politics, it is necessary to set the scene. Given all the disagreement among historians about the nature of that scene, the task is not an easy one. Part of the difficulty is that there is a tendency on the one side to see matters in terms of polar positions. Someone is "of the court" or "of the country," or an individual is a "puritan" or an "Arminian." Along with each of these poles comes an agenda. In the 1620s the country party or grouping stood for parliaments to redress grievances, as much decentralization of authority to the local level as was possible, a pro-Protestant foreign policy (provided it cost no extra taxation), a naval war with Spain (that would pay for itself) and general hostility toward the Roman Catholics everywhere. This list is by no means exhaustive, but however far it is extended, it implies that the court grouping or faction stood for the opposite goals. The same case has been made on the religious side. The puritans shared a variety of goals designed to move a half-reformed church toward a more godly position while their Arminian opponents fought to maintain the concept that there were both matters indifferent and matters necessary for religious purity. At the earliest stages of this historical debate about both the reigns of James I and Charles I, there were efforts to simplify matters even further by equating the puritans with the country and the Arminians with the court.

The other side of this argument has swung so far that the 1620s are characterized as a period in which cooperation rather than conflict was the normal mode of operation for the political figures of the age in their relations with the crown. From this perspective there are few serious ideological differences separating the leading men of the era, and what conflict

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there was consisted largely of a power struggle among the king's advisers for his ear and his patronage.

The gap between these two historical views appears insurmountable, for there are times when the dispute seems to hinge on the question of whether or not one believes people are moved more by power or principle. What has become increasingly clear in the course of these debates is how inadequate most preconceived models of behavior are when they are applied to a specific individual, however well they may work for groups. It is rather like applying that imaginary character of the university economist, economic man, to an actual being. Such a person may be a useful fiction, but it is a mistake to believe that these beings inhabit our world in vast numbers. By the same token, there was, no doubt, the perfect court party man in the 1620s, but to lock all those about the court into that mold is hardly a way to understand the period. It is certainly no way to gain an understanding of Carlisle.

The basic problem is the evident need to classify and categorize in order to make the actions of historical figures more comprehensible. Yet, even in the area of political education (never mind religion), this effort can fly in the face of experience. Politicians of the period seldom acquired their ideas in a systematic way, and they were, even in an age of censorship, exposed to a wide range of ideas. Dekker and Middleton's *Roaring Girl* would have shown them a very different view of the world than the masques of Charles I's court. Even so, they may well have seen and learned from both. What this diversity meant is that the ideas of a given politician did not necessarily coincide on all points with the supposed platform of the court or country groupings or with the supposedly cooperative nature of the period. When it came to Carlisle, he was, as one would expect, just such a mixture.

Even here, it is necessary to exercise caution. Carlisle may have committed his political thoughts to paper, or he may have discussed them at length with friends or relations who did so for him. In the manner of the time he might also have written an "advice to his son." If he did any of these things, the documents have failed to materialize during the past decade of research. Thus, to a large extent, Carlisle's philosophy of politics and religion must be judged by his actions and from his surviving utilitarian correspondence with his superiors and subordinates. Having made these qualifications, it is possible to say that Carlisle acted as a "king's man" and that he was perfectly prepared to devote his life to the royal interest. Nevertheless, he had the countryman's concern about the dangers of Roman Catholicism, and he was prepared to recommend the calling of parliament to redress grievances if there was also the possibility of obtaining funds to halt the advances of the anti-Protestant forces on the continent. Additionally it is true that he was willing to cooperate with his royal masters until they adopted a policy he could not accept. Then he would arrange to visit the continent where he could work for his own program without

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interference from the king. What does this behavior make Carlisle? A man who belies the existing categories.

In an age where the concepts of loyalty and opposition, court and country and established religion and puritanism can thus become blurred to the point of invisibility, Carlisle never lost sight of the key to it all: what really mattered was how the king perceived each deed. If the monarch was satisfied that his servant acted out of loyalty, it was possible to oppose the royal will on a given issue. Obviously there were limits to such behavior, and Carlisle comprehended them very well. As a result, he survived and flourished under both kings.

This issue of perceived loyalty is one that deserves a great deal more attention. In the early seventeenth century viewing the monarch as the fountain of office and power was not some abstract or outmoded ideal. It was the way to understand how the system worked. The king might grant out bits and pieces of what he controlled, but no one mistook him for a figurehead. Unless he was willing to grant an aspiring politician an important office, there was no way short of revolution to acquire it. James and Charles defined the opposition, not later historical writers. In making their royal choices, a person's deeds often seemed to matter more to the kings than personal philosophy. Granted certain people managed to capitalize on their nuisance value and acquire meaningful offices. Sir Edward Coke did so during James's reign, while Pembroke and his brother, Montgomery, did so during Charles's. So, too, did Wentworth. What these people did not get, however, was influence. It is not without significance that none of these men who achieved office by such means (with the exception of Wentworth in the last year of his life) became part of the inner core of advisers who had the opportunity to genuinely shape policy. What Carlisle perceived, and what seems to have been lost on many other aspiring politicians (including his brother-in-law, Leicester, and perhaps his son's father-in-law, Bedford) is that James and Charles had very different standards of loyalty. It was possible to say and do things with the royal father that could not be done with the son. Carlisle understood this point and never exceeded the limits set. Those who grew up under James all too often played an outmoded game with Charles for which there was endless frustration and no forgiveness.

Both the inner and outer sets of politicians tended to gather in groups for protection and support. Some were like-minded on a key issue, such as the Spanish match; some were not. Regardless of the reason for the grouping, Carlisle generally held himself aloof. Had he become tied to a faction or tried to create one, he would have lost the flexibility he needed to remain at the center of power.

Carlisle's avoidance of factional entanglements was not characteristic of his age, at least not for successful courtiers. Yet he did remain successfully outside of the factional structure. The other figures who used a similar technique did so in order to form their own groups. One thinks here of

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Cecil and Buckingham. That was not Carlisle's style. He was not, however, unique . Bacon, after the experience with membership in the Essex faction, discovered that his upward mobility was thwarted and tried a less limiting approach. Cranfield, after early association with the Howards, attempted to take a more independent line as treasurer. They both failed. Independence and abrasive aloofness brought them down. It was a mistake that Carlisle did not make. Charm and tact were always the essence of the man, and as a result, he was a survivor.

But is that all there is to say about Carlisle, that he survived? While not for a moment denigrating the value of such a talent in an unstable age, as his career shows, he did have goals that went beyond the mere holding of office for its own sake. His primary goal was the security of Protestantism, first in Britain and then in Europe. As far as one can tell, he was no theologian and no hair-splitter. Any state-supported, reformed religion was included under his protective blanket from the most rigorous Calvinism to the most flexible Arminianism. Thus Carlisle seemed to have no difficulty in making the shift between James's style of religion and Charles's. Certainly conservative observations of him at the York House conference place him consistently on that side. One can presume that those of the right knew their friends as well as their enemies. Nonetheless, caution is necessary in making any firm statements about Carlisle's personal religious philosophy. As was true of his political attitudes, there is no surviving statement of his religious beliefs. It should be kept in mind that Pembroke and Carlisle tended to talk in unison at York House,[5] and no one has accused the first-named gentleman of being an Arminian.

Judging by Carlisle's actions, the important thing to him was to prevent the spread of Roman Catholicism. Practically speaking that meant encouraging the competition between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons. Though he periodically tilted toward the Spanish-based family, for most of his life he had definite inclinations toward the French. Yet, whichever way Carlisle leaned, he remained faithful to his scheme of encouraging continental rivalry and hostility.

Had the earl's second royal master realized the wisdom of this policy, he might have begun his reign on a much happier note. Although the alliance Charles provoked in 1627 between France and Spain lasted only a brief time because of the dispute over the Mantuan succession, that event was one of the few strokes of luck the Stuarts had in this period. If the old Duke of Mantua had lived until 1630, Charles's reign could have been a disaster much earlier.

Under the circumstances, it is natural to look for an explanation for this most unnatural situation: why was England at war with two of the continent's leading powers? Many contemporaries thought they knew. From

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[5] *The Works of the Right Reverend Father in God John Cosin, Lord Bishop of Durham*, 32, 59, 64.

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Sir John Eliot in the Commons to the hawker of illegal broadsides in the London streets, it was Buckingham whom they blamed. There is some justice to that charge, but it is a good deal more complicated than many people, then and now, were willing to acknowledge. From the modern day perspective much of the difficulty, as usual, is that we know how the story turns out. We know that France, led by Cardinal Richelieu, engineered the blows that within the century dropped Spain from the ranks of the first-class powers. How then is it possible for England at Buckingham's urging to start a war with the nation that would become the hammer of the national enemy, Spain?

Historians must not be too shocked to discover that matters were not nearly as clear to the duke as they are to succeeding generations, or as they were to his enemies who had the luxury of second-guessing him. Buckingham (and Charles as well) can be forgiven for missing the point because it seemed to them that Richelieu was much more concerned with his religion than he was with an anti-Spanish crusade, and they had the evidence to prove it. Was the cardinal not the one who caused trouble over the religious provisions of the marriage treaty with England? Indeed did he not engineer the removal of his predecessor mainly on the grounds that the man had given away too much to the English heretics? Then there was the matter of Mansfeld and how to use his army,—added to which was the clear hostility that the cardinal exhibited toward the Huguenots. What is more, he withdrew French troops from the Alpine passes, thus permitting the Spanish free access to Germany. Buckingham and his associates certainly may be forgiven for believing Richelieu was a doubtful ally in rolling back the Roman Catholic and Habsburg menace.

The point that must not escape here is the one brought forth by the duke's most recent biographer.[6] The whole purpose of the actions in 1626 and in 1627 at Ré was not to provoke a general war with France, but to discredit Richelieu as the king's leading minister. With the cardinal out of the way France's natural anti-Habsburg tendencies would surface once more, and England would have the help it needed to restore the Palatinate to Protestant hands and thwart the expansion of aggressive Romanism.

All too often theory and practice do not work out properly, and they did not here. Rather than thwarting the cardinal, he became more powerful by capturing La Rochelle. Rather than leading home a victorious army and navy from Ré, Buckingham brought back a sad, decimated group of men who had been thoroughly whipped. Nonetheless, the duke seemed to have a belief in God's providence, and it could not be shaken by failure—he was murdered while planning yet another naval venture that would set all right.

The duke is made the prime mover here in large measure because without him, Charles gradually drifted back toward his father's policy of keeping

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[6] R. Lockyer, *Buckingham*, 336–37, 370.

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clear of burdensome alliances and aggressive policies. He, too, viewed himself as an agent of God's providence, even if the view was much less sanguine than his late friend's.[7]

Carlisle, on the other hand, though he undoubtedly trusted in God, was not about to wade into any neck-high streams with his powder strapped to his belt. He was the first person of influence to adopt a stance against Richelieu, and it is difficult to believe that he did not play a major role in moving both Buckingham and Charles in that direction. Yet there came a time, after the plotting in the first half of 1626, when it was plain to Carlisle that some kind of deal had to be struck with Richelieu and the French. The English had tried to remove the cardinal through an aristocratic *coup* timed to coincide with the expulsion of the French from Henrietta's court. They had failed in the first endeavor (though it had cost the English nothing) and they had succeeded in the second. Some honor was redeemed. It was time to concentrate on the Habsburgs again. Unfortunately, having pointed Buckingham and Charles down the anti-Richelieu path, Carlisle discovered he could not recall them and disaster followed.

Insofar as Carlisle was able, it was primarily as a diplomat that he pursued his policy. Here there is no question but that the man had talents above the ordinary. He had the gift for seeing the central issue of a mission and going right after it. Yet, despite Carlisle's abilities, the fact remains he failed more often than he succeeded. There were times, as in 1628, when he was a major contributory cause of the failure, but in no case was he the single most important cause. On the whole, it was his fate to assume a Cassandra-like position and watch his unheeded predictions come all too true. With few exceptions he had a sense of what was possible in a given negotiation, and his problem was to convince his royal master of these realities. Distance and time as often as not mitigated against accomplishing these ends, and the result was that Carlisle had to live with constant frustration.

Another factor that cannot be ignored in the earl's diplomacy was the perceived weakness of the three kingdoms the Stuarts ruled in comparison to many other European nations. Though the navy did begin to revive under Buckingham's administration, there was no military force in the islands that was up to continental numbers. It was not a question of quality. Contemporaries were quite impressed with the English regiments fighting for the Dutch, and Gustav Adolph did not disdain the Scottish troops offered him. Rather it was a question of quantity and strategic leadership. The number of troops and ships depended directly on finance, and it simply was not forthcoming at either Elizabethan or Civil War levels. The reasons for this situation were complex, but not the least of them was the lack of successful military direction by either James or Charles. The

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[7] Martin Havran, "The Character and Principles of an English King: The Case of King Charles I," 49, no. 2 (1983): 199–208.

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father was a pacifist at heart, and everyone who mattered knew it. Thus, when he made warlike noises, he was less than convincing. Charles, unlike his late brother, had no inclination to take the field in person until the Civil Wars left him little choice. During the period under study here, he relied mainly upon Mansfeld, Wimbledon, and Buckingham to lead his campaigns. They were all singularly unfortunate generals.

The combination of all these factors gave Carlisle little ammunition for his diplomatic arsenal. No matter how much charm he exercised, in the final analysis he had to either promise or threaten to use force or money. His masters had precious little of either.

When it came to money, Carlisle's services did not come at bargain prices. His lifestyle was of such a nature that it was probably incapable of being maintained by any attainable level of income. This fact did not mean that the earl ever gave up trying to increase the amount of money he could receive, but it does mean that here, too, he was constantly frustrated. In this facet of his personality he was no different from the vast majority of other courtiers who inhabited the Stuart court. What set Carlisle apart was his ability to gain both substantial sums of money and highly valuable privileges from the first two Stuarts. No other courtier was able to maintain his level of royal favor through three decades. Few others who attained his degree of affluence were able to do so without arousing the envy of powerful figures both within and without the court. It is true there was a time when Buckingham looked like a threat to certain of Carlisle's ventures, but compared to what the duke could and did do to men such as Bacon, Cranfield and Digby, Carlisle had little that warranted complaint. The same held true for the earl's relationship with parliament. Through the whole course of his career, the discrepancies in and mismanagement of two major government departments provoked scarcely a mention from the Commons. The after-shocks from the suppression of his monopolies were hardly more worrying. He was both a very lucky and a very skillful politician.

What makes Carlisle's accomplishments even more remarkable were his origins. He was a Scot playing out his career on an English stage. He did so by conscientiously trying to become like the English. His spelling gradually became anglicized, and, though one can never know, it would not be surprising if his speech followed the same pattern. Although it seems to have taken over a decade, his contemporaries ignored his origins. Did he? One suspects not. He was too careful not to be identified with the other Scots courtiers both in his politics and his marriages. He was also too concerned with keeping people off balance through a combination of charm and grandeur. His relatively humble Scottish origins must have always lurked in the back of his mind.

Historians have spent a great deal of effort trying to determine for the period in which Carlisle lived which classes were rising and which were declining and what effect it all had on the advent of the Civil Wars. In some ways this emphasis is unfortunate, for unconsciously it can lead to

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the idea that people knew in advance about the imminent battles and guided their lives accordingly. In fact with rare exceptions contemporaries did not envision the wars until they were on the verge of participating in them. Certainly nothing in Carlisle's writings, either public or private, indicated that he foresaw serious trouble between his monarch and the parliamentarians, whatever his observations about the Scots might have been. Given such a situation, it would be a mistake to try to understand his life in the context of the causes of the wars. It would be very difficult to argue that anything he did in his lifetime was a unique contribution to the later conflict. A much more persuasive argument can be made for his importance as vital participant in the major aspects of the political, economic and social life of his day. He was very much in the center of events. As a result, through Carlisle's life and career we can see something of seventeenth-century England as those then living saw it.

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